The FEMAG review expressed a view Compliance Monitors should be more proactive rather than reactive in making themselves available and accessible to stakeholders. To emphasise this, its report stated only a few stakeholders had any interaction with the Compliance Monitors and this interaction has been quite limited. Its October 2005 report provided recommendations for improved practices by Compliance Monitors, to:

• • circulate quarterly email with updates to stakeholders and conduct forums regularly, and
  • expand their stakeholder base to include COSBOA, Small Business Coalition and State / Territory Small Business Commissioners, and
  • inform ASIC, ACCC and State and Territory Fair Trading and consumer protection agencies on compliance issues in conjunction with email updates.

These recommendations are supported by the few complaints by customers referred to the Compliance Monitors in 200405. This demonstrates that, at this early stage, there was a need for the Compliance Monitors to improve accessibility and transparency to their publics and stakeholders.

FEMAG stated the public profile of the Compliance Monitors thus far is quite low, and a banking representative commented the lack of a public profile by Compliance Monitors limits their effectiveness.’

Effectiveness of Monitors compliance monitoring  

The Compliance Monitors are required to publish an annual survey, which they started publishing in June 2004. This was a two-part process largely based on the UK Banking code Standards Board’s standards.

The review commented that the Compliance Monitors survey could be improved by including more meaningful information such as how many complaints were referred to the FOS, how many involved possible Code breaches and how many actual breaches were found. When assessing the effectiveness of the Compliance Monitors monitoring activities and techniques, FEMAG stated there is a need for:

benchmarks and key performance indicators (KPIs) against which the KPIs should be measured. These KPIs need to be developed from objectives. In paragraph 8 of its report, FEMAG makes suggestions on objectives the Monitors might adopt.

Monitoring by Compliance Monitors to date has been done by two means: an annual compliance statement that completed by the banks and the handling of complaints lodged with the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee.

FEMAG recommended KPIs, to:

provide independent and objective verification of compliance with the Code, and

ensure banks implement controls for compliance and for KPIs, and

provide the public with a degree of confidence the self regulatory scheme is working.

The recommendations should have been implemented when the Compliance Monitors were appointed. Any framework that relies on self regulation can potentially lack direction and enforceability without clear objectives being established. Regular reporting of the Compliance Monitors performance against KPIs to their publics and to stakeholders and regulatory bodies such as ASIC, ACCC and Fair Trade agencies is needed to ensure self regulation is working and is independent, transparent and fair, and not controlled or constrained by a few vested interests.

Key Issues Side-lined

Banks play an important part in the economic well being of Australians and whilst they are subject to a number of legislative requirements, the Code presented an opportunity for banks to demonstrate their commitment to self regulation in their relationship with customers.

In addition to the above issues raised in the FEMAG report, it identified key issues that went beyond the scope of the review. This is unfortunate, given the issues raised were relevant to the task at hand. Possibly FEMAG did not have financial resources to pursue its inquiry to significant depths or that it was constrained in terms of access to materials that might have assisted its review.

Restrictions on Investigative Powers

The FEMAG report states there is an overlap in the roles of the Compliance Monitors and the FOS and therefore continuing cooperation is necessary. FEMAG noted the lack of public profile limits Compliance Monitors effectiveness however they should not seek to achieve a similar profile to that achieved by the FOS.

In commenting on the difference in profile, FEMAG commented that:

as far as the Compliance Monitors are concerned, provided that when a person obtains information about the FOS from its website or otherwise, they can readily access effective information allowing them to decide whether they should raise a matter with the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee.

It may be appropriate for the FOS to encourage a consumer who makes a complaint to consider whether it might involve a breach of the Code and if so to make a simultaneous complaint to Code Compliance Monitors. It is not possible under the current arrangements for the FOS to refer the matter to the Compliance Monitors because of the privacy rights of a FOS complainant, without first obtaining consent from the complainant.

According to FEMAG, the Compliance Monitors investigative powers are set out in the Code. However, in their report it was not suggested these investigative powers were inadequate due to restrictions imposed by the bank CEOs constitution. It seems the FEMAG review avoided drawing adverse conclusions by distinguishing between evidence of factual non-implementation of high principles of the Code and evidence of structural flaws that may give rise to future failures.

The review did acknowledge however, there were instances when Compliance Monitors may be constrained from performing their duties due to provisions in the bank CEOs constitution. As discussed earlier, clause 34 of the Code makes clear stakeholders have a right to believe Monitors have powers to investigate all complaints other than those resolved to the satisfaction of customers.

This statement appears to give wide berth to categories of complaints Compliance Monitors can investigate. Yet, according to the review, paragraph 8.1(b) of the bank CEOs constitution restricts Monitors investigating complaints where it is or may be determined in another forum.

FEMAG reports that in the bank CEOs constitution, the term FORUM was defined widely as being any court, tribunal, arbitrator, mediator, independent conciliation body, complaint/ dispute resolution body, complaint/ dispute resolution scheme or Ombudsman in any jurisdiction.

This paragraph provides banks an optout provision detracting from high principles banks introduced in response to the Martin Committee’s recommendations. These principles were recommendations when the banks published the first Code in 1996.

While the report noted the optout provision competes with paragraph 34(i) of the Code, it raises potential limitations for action by Compliance Monitors where there may be serious or systemic noncompliance. The report noted in some instances the Monitors may be better able to take action to deal with systemic matters than either the FOS or ASIC.’

Prior to the Martin report and publication of the first Code in 1996, banks used their significant resources to abuse courts and dispose of customer complaints, covering up misconduct and adversely affecting individuals and small businesses. The Martin report dealt with this in depth because they believed rogue banks with access to vast resources misuse courts when dealing with complaints when individuals and small businesses could often not defend actions or seek redress if banks sought to conceal serious breaches.

When adopting the 11 May 2004 Code and remaining silent on the bank CEOs constitution, published three months earlier, banks appear to have successfully effected a coup d’état on an already feeble self regulatory system. As the optout provision excludes investigatory powers by the Compliance Monitors, as the alternate FORUM has jurisdiction, paragraph 8.1(b) of the bank CEOs constitution allows banks to transfer dubious concerns to courts or another FORUM, where they enjoy an unmatched advantage, rather than having Code Monitors investigating them.

Restrictions on Resources

Whilst the above matters confounded Compliance Monitors three years later when they reported their views to Jan McClelland’s review, in its 2005 report, FEMAG stated Compliance Monitors required additional resources if their full potential was to be realised. FEMAG was concerned the Monitors might not have sufficient resources to successfully discharge their functions set out in the Code, and state the Compliance Monitors:

were obliged to deal with a number of allegations of breaches of the Code very early in their life and these required commitment of a substantial proportion of their limited resources in order to inform themselves of issues in compliance and to develop procedures for real experience. In the Code, the function of monitoring compliance is paragraph 34 (b)(i) for investigation and determination of Code breach allegations in paragraph 34(b)(ii).

The FEMAG Report reinforces the notion Compliance Monitors are reliant on funding obtained from banks to carry out their two main functions of compliance monitoring and investigating and making determinations on customer complaints in relation to Code practices.

In setting out its report, FEMAG noted that:

case management was very good, but the lack of resources available to the Compliance Monitors in this area was a matter of concern as additional resources were needed to ensure a continuing capacity to manage cases and to obtain the greatest benefit from their results in terms of code compliance in general. And Compliance Monitors might require additional funding to fund activities aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the Compliance Monitors and, through this, its credibility which requires increased resources and further commitment from the signatory banks.

We consider the Compliance Monitors need personnel to undertake strategic thinking, business planning and drafting budgets, liaison with banks and other stakeholders at a senior level, writing bulletins and high level policy papers and drafting determinations; managing general monitoring activities; and managing cases of Code breach allegations; special inquiries and office administration.

ASIC, ACCC and State and Territory Fair Trading

FEMAG stated that:

ASIC is naturally aware of Compliance Monitors operations, but submissions from State and Territory Fair Trading and consumer protection agencies tells us they are lacking information about the Monitors, their role and activities. This is of some concern since they are responsible for administration of credit regulation.

[FEMAG] believe ASIC, ACCC, State and Territory Fair Trading and consumer protection agencies should be informed on the Code issues and receive email bulletins and dedicated quarterly reports even if these are to advise there are no significant compliance issues current, and that they be invited to the recommended forums.

FEMAG notes clause 13.3 of the constitution:

empowers Chairs of the association and FOS to jointly determine the budget of Compliance Monitors. This could be seen as potentially allowing banks to limit their resources and thus the effectiveness of the Monitors although the Code obliges banks to ensure the Monitors have sufficient resources to carry out their functions satisfactorily and efficiently. To improve resource control and to give greater confidence adequate resources are being provided, a more defined and accountable planning and budget process could be valuable.

Regardless of whether Compliance Monitors vulnerability has been exploited, this admission indicates these dynamics may come into play, and are largely invisible.

In the Appendix of the FEMAG Report headed Matters Beyond The Scope Of This Review, it notes:

the constitution constrains the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee from making public statements on their own behalf other than in the Annual Report without prior approval of both the FOS and chairs of the bank CEOs association. This could preclude the Monitors speaking publicly at conferences or forums where they are seeking to raise their profile and improve relationships with the banks or other stakeholders.

Besides constraining the independence of Compliance Monitors, it implies a lack of trust in them. There may well be matters the Compliance Monitors should make public from time to time other than in its Annual Report and the Code does not prevent them from doing so.

It is of paramount public interest the public perceives the Compliance Monitors as both a responsible and accountable independent body regulating the banking industry.

Requiring the Compliance Monitors to obtain approval of the banks that appointed them, the FOS and association Chairs, before they can issue public statements must be seen by stakeholders to severely undermine the perception of impendence. At issue is the timeliness with which information is made publicly available. By requiring prior approval, the banks can silence critics and according to the review ‘it could be some 12 months before a bank found to be in systemic breach could be named’.

The conduct of banks, being fiduciary institutions, is often measured against highest standards of care. It is contrary to public interest a bank in breach of its own Code be afforded protection from the scrutiny of the public eye.

Indemnity and exerting influence over Monitors

FEMAG responds to the need for full indemnity to be provided by the bank CEOs to Compliance Monitors make reciting comments by banks. The bank CEOs will have considered the most appropriate structure when they received the Viney Report in 2001, and preferred an unincorporated body to manage the affairs of the bank CEOs association and the Code Compliance Monitors Committee.

FEMAG commented on the effect of this decision without commenting on motives of the banks and stated:

paragraph 14.1 and 14.2 of the constitution provides for a ‘full indemnity by the Association, or its members, of Code Compliance Monitoring Committee members against liabilities arising out of their actions as members.’ However the bank CEOs association being unincorporated, the status of Compliance Monitors being unclear and doubts about access to liability insurance cover suggest the Compliance Monitors might not be adequately protected in all circumstances.

FEMAG concluded stating ‘consideration be given to establishing the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee as a legal entity in its own right.’ This suggestion diverts attention from the core issues of responsibility and accountability. If the Compliance Monitors are carrying out a public function, there should be a high level of accountability that arises from them should their actions or conduct cause damage.

To indemnify the Monitors against such responsibilities appears to weaken the obligation they have to the public to monitor high standards set out in the Code and to conduct themselves with integrity in regard to their duties.

It needs to be asked what the bank parties motives were when they drafted its constitution in 20 February 2004 limiting the independence and powers of the Monitors. Instead, the banks introduced the opt-out provision that safeguarded bank managers and officers if they act dishonestly or flout the Code.

It is unlikely either the individual and small business customers, or FEMAG, would have suspected the banks failure to incorporate the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee as a limited liability company meant they could justify indemnifying the Compliance Monitors for damages which might flow from their failure to comply with clause 34 of the Code.  Certainly, had that been the case, FEMAG would have raised this in 21 recommendations provided to the Compliance Monitors in their October 2005 report.

Merging parties: CCMC and the FOS

The FEMAG report analysed advantages and disadvantages of forming a single dispute resolution and Code compliance body through amalgamation of the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee with the FOS. It preferred amalgamation, as it concluded it would establish a stronger link and foster cooperation between them.

The issue of the Compliance Monitors autonomy and accountability should have been prioritised before suggesting amalgamation with the industry bodies. Independence is critical to Compliance Monitors in carrying out its role of compliance monitoring and for self-regulation to function effectively.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMATION

FEMAG recommendations

FEMAG made recommendations in its 2005 report not dealt with or evaluated by the Compliance Monitors in their 2006 Annual Report. The recommendations included:

(R1) develop its own budget associated with a business plan;

(R2) following the development of a business plan, its resources could be increased to provide for further employment of staff and contracted consultants;

(R3) increase the commitment of the Compliance Monitors for the next two years and thus to increase in their remuneration for that period;

(R4) as result of the above, improvements in procedures should be invited;

(R5) that the Committee give consideration to this;

(R6) email bulletins to member banks each quarter and conduct forums with the bank Code compliance staff on a regular basis;

(R7) email bulletins to financial counsellors and consumer organisations each quarter and conduct forums with them on a regular basis;

(R8) email COSBOA, State/Territory Small Business Commissioners with updated bulletins;

(R9) inform ASIC, ACCC, State and Territory Fair-Trading/ consumer protection agencies of compliance issues, and email quarterly reports inviting them to forums;

(R10) distribute an abridged version of the annual report to parliamentarians and seek to be included in the industry-based ombudsmen’s road shows;

(R11) build its profile amongst stakeholder groups, but do not seek to attain a high profile with the general public;

(R12) seek professional advice in the operation and effectiveness of it’s, the FOS and other appropriate websites and to have links on appropriate websites;

(R13) monitor the level of compliance with paragraph 9 of the Code concerning the display and availability of the Code at bank branches;

(R14) have a brief resume of it’s and the FOSs role, with contact details in Code booklets distributed by banks, and require same in the next version of the Code;

(R15) seek data on how many complaints referred to the FOS involve possible Code breaches and for how many actual breaches were found to exist;

(R16) obtain feedback on survey forms within three months of the receipt of all of the completed survey forms;

(R17) include all of the above techniques in its business plan as Compliance Monitors resources allow;

(R18) discuss this idea further with the FOS;

(R19) share information with the FOS with a view to the FOS developing a mechanism to transfer information about Code breaches to the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee;

(R20) discuss better ways of informing consumers about both bodies and encourage contact with Compliance Monitors in relation to Code issues; and

(R21) develop a business plan for a 3-year period setting out methods of monitoring that the Compliance Monitors will use.

2005 FEMAG report summation

The Code Compliance Monitoring Committee was established as an unincorporated body separate from the Bankers Association and the FOS. The FEMAG report looks to investigate whether the Compliance Monitors are able to effectively and efficiently undertake functions set out in the Code. The report makes the point that this may clearly be constrained by the manner of its establishment.

For the Compliance Monitoring Committee’s functions to be undertaken efficiently and effectively, FEMAG set out conditions that need to be satisfied. They include having:

satisfactory investigative powers; and

adequate resources; and

access and ability to collect compliance information regarding breaches of the code as soon as possible after their occurrence ; and

authority to interpret the code independently or to obtain authoritative interpretations; and

ability to make public statements on code compliance and to publicly name banks and as and when it thinks fit; and

ability to act with confidence as to the professional liability of Committee members.

2005 FEMAG report concludes:

these conditions are largely satisfied, however we think there are some issues that could very usefully be considered when the bank CEOS constitution and the Code are reviewed.

MATTERS BEYOND SCOPE OF FEMAG REVIEW

2005 FEMAG report states:

We were told, and we fully agree, that increased general monitoring by the Compliance Monitors would add greatly to the public confidence and through this the public credibility of the self-regulatory approach. It demonstrates commitment by banks to the Code and self-regulatory apparatus designed to deliver outcomes.

A number of stakeholder representatives raised concerns about the Compliance Monitors access to information from the FOS relating to Code breaches. We have recommended the Compliance Monitors require banks to provide information on Code breaches the FOS has raised with them because banks will not see complaints that relate to Code provisions

Other than banks, the BFSO is currently the main potential source of possible instances of code breaches, but potential code breaches also need to come to the Committee. In some cases this will occur because the complainant or, their adviser, sees value to the operation’ of making a parallel complaint to the CCMC.

Complaints that come to the FOS involving loss, and the FOS deals with, are potential instances of Code breaches. The FOS may not pursue a Code breach as to do so may not be in the interest of efficiently. There may well be a significant number of potential instances of Code breaches that do not get attended to.

Even where a complainant raises a potential instance of Code breach simultaneously with the FOS and the Compliance Monitors, the Monitors are currently constrained. Paragraph 8.1(b) of the bank CEOS constitution prevents Compliance Monitors considering a complaint if it is being or may be considered in another forum.

It is difficult to ascertain the extent FEMAG reviewers were constrained from exploring key issues raised in the Appendix. Regardless of these limitations, of greater concern to individuals and small businesses was lack of follow-up by later Code reviewers and banks following the insightful FEMAG report. Nor does it seem the FEMAG report was fully appreciate the banks, preferring to rely on options they held in Paragraph 8.1 of the bank CEOs constitution.

At the very least, substantive issues were raised by FEMAG regarding dubious structures and extraordinary relationships should have been dealt with more carefully by following reviewers. These structures and relationships signalled motives behind the unpublished constitution that should have raised alarm bells.

Bank motives seemed well disguised in a set of ethics and best-practice principles. FEMAG only suggested how banks might later control their Committee members. It seems dubious structures and flawed practices may have been excluded because they were beyond the scope of this review.

The subscribing banks and Australian Bankers Association published and promoted Code (2003) based on high-principles banks reported they were providing, and the customers could rely on.

This paper explains how Code (2003) was designed to allow the banks to hide behind clever, well-disguised and ambiguous words in order to conceal breaches of the Code and bank complaints, and potentially serious indictable offences. Code (2003) was the first of two steps designed by banks to constrain the Code Compliance Monitors from naming and shaming them.

This was an ambitious plan by banks, preferring customers to use courts, rather then their internal dispute resolution practices to resolve disputes. The Code was said to be a contract between banks and customers backed by Code Compliance Monitors to investigate all complaints.

In 2004, the decision to publish and promote Code (2004) with restrictions placed on Compliance Monitors by the bank CEOs constitution was misleading and deceptive. This paper will publish policies designed by ambitious bankers to conceal reckless and dishonest conduct known to a wide group of banking people.

This paper sets out how banks adopted and promoted Code (2004) principles, without referring to the bank CEOs constitution. It notes the cause: wicked practices and lack of regulation, a trademark of banking over the past decade.

WHAT’S THE NAB STORY

National Australia Bank limited

Principle Place of Business

(UB4440) ‚ Level 4

800 Bourke Street

DOCKLANDS VIC 3008

NAB adopted Code (2004) on 31 May 2004 

The National Australia Bank board was restructured in 2004 with events during the previous year being the catalyst for appointing new directors and renewing bad policies. Since then, a total of fifteen new directors have been appointed, whilst the bank renewed its commitment to meeting the highest standards of corporate governance.

The NAB Corporate Social Responsibility Report states directors have responsibility for corporate governance and board members believe governance is a matter of high importance. The directors will ensure NAB operates with a culture of greater honesty and openness, and greater transparency.

The directors of the bank will provide high quality, relevant and credible information that contains a complete picture of its performance that can be trusted. In its Corporate Responsibility Report, the bank makes no mention on how many customers lodged complains, how many were settled and how many complainants alleged code breaches.

The bank directors did not comment on how effectively the Code Compliance Monitors found their Internal Dispute Resolution procedures, nor did they mention the board supporting the bank CEO’s constitution. The directors accepted the CEOs constitution when they adopted Code (2004), and since then allowed the allegedly dishonest arrangement to remain.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Cameron Clyne, Managing Director, NAB in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Cameron Clyne 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Cameron Clyne10 September 2012 letter: Click here

NAB Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Graham Kraehe (28 Aug 1997 – 27 Sep 2005)

John Stewart (11 Aug 2003 – 31 Dec 2008)

George Williamson (10 May 2004 – 7 Jun 2012)

John Thorn (16 Oct 2003 until 2012)

Geoffrey Tomlinson (22 Mar 2000 until 2012)

Francis Cicutto (28 Jul 1998 – 1 Feb 2004)

David Allen (19 Nov 1992 – 16 Feb 2004)

Catherine Walter (28 Sep 1995 – 7 May 2004)

Edward Tweddell (26 Mar 1998 – 27 Aug 2004)

Kenneth Moss (23 Aug 2000 – 27 Aug 2004)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Daniel Gilbert (2 Sep 2004 until 2012)

Paul Rizzo (2 Sep 2004 until 2012)

Robert Elstone (2 Sep 2004 – 5 Jul 2006)

Jillian Segal (7 Sep 2004 until 2012)

Michael Ullmer (7 Oct 2004 – 31 Aug 2011)

Ahmed Fahour (7 Oct 2004 – 20 Feb 2009)

Michael Chaney (6 Dec 2004 until 2012)

Patricia Cross (1 Dec 2005 until 2012)

Thomas McDonald (7 Dec 2005 – 7 Nov 2008)

Cameron Clyne (1 Jan 2009 until 2012)

John Waller (5 Feb 2009 until 2012)

Mark Joiner (12 Mar 2009 until 2012)

Anthony Yuen (1 Mar 2010 until 2012)

Kenneth Henry (1 Nov 2011 until 2012)

Peter Duncan (2 Nov 2011 – 31 Jul 2008)

WHAT’S THE WESTPAC STORY

Principle Place of Business

Westpac Place

Level 20

275 Kent Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

Westpac adopted Code (2004) on 1 June 2004

The Westpac Bank’s 2004 Annual Report states its approach to corporate governance is to have a set of values that underpin their everyday activities, which ensure transparency, fair dealing and protecting stakeholder interests. The Westpac Board believes good corporate governance needs to be values driven and directors, senior executives and employees have to be aligned to core values of teamwork, integrity and performance.

Westpac operates with a policy of requiring honesty and integrity and respect for the law, and requires the banks practices and behaviours ensure transparency, fair dealing and protection of stakeholders best interests.

By contact, it is the Westpac Group directors overlooked commenting on their prior knowledge of the bank CEOs constitution when adopted the 2004 Code.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Ms Gail Kelly, Managing Director, Westpac Group in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Gail Kelly 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Gail Kelly 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Westpac Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Peter Wilson (31 Oct 2003 until 2012)

Carolyn Hewson (6 Feb 2003 – 30 Jun 2012)

Edward Evans (23 Aug 2002 – 14 Dec 2011)

David Morgan (23 Aug 2002 – 31 Jan 2008)

David Crawford (23 Aug 2002 – 13 Dec 2007)

Leonard Davis (23 Aug 2002 – 31 Mar 2007)

Helen Lynch (23 Aug 2002 – 14 Dec 2006)

Llewellyn Edwards (23 Aug 2002 – 16 Dec 2004)

William Cap (23 Aug 2002 – 12 Dec 2003)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Gordon Cairns (8 Jul 2004 until 2012)

Elizabeth Bryan (6 Nov 2006 until 2012)

Gail Kelly (1 Feb 2008 until 2012)

Lindsay Maxsted (1 Mar 2008 until 2012)

John Curtis (1 Dec 2008 until 2012)

Peter Hawkins (1 Dec 2008 until 2012)

Graham Reaney (1 Dec 2008 – 14 Dec 2011)

Ann Pickard (1 Feb 2011 until 2012)

Robert Elstone (1 Feb 2012 until 2012)

WHAT’S ST GEORGE BANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

St George Bank House

14 – 16 Montgomery Street

KOGARAH NSW 2217

St George Bank adopted Code (2004) on 1 June 2004 

The St George Bank published a code of ethics setting out expectations of directors and staff in dealings with customers. The bank said it required the highest-standards of integrity and honesty in all dealings, avoidance of conflicts of interest and observance of the law.

On 1 July 2004, when the government’s new corporate governance reforms were published, St George Bank published a statement stating whilst these laws have not yet been applied to the bank, the directors have decided to early-adopt some of the reforms.

The St George Bank directors are responsible for implementing governance policies and overseeing bank controls, systems and procedures to ensure there is compliance with all regulatory and prudential requirements. The directors review all matters of corporate governance and monitor senior managers implementation of strategies, including reporting known or suspected incidences of improper conduct.

The board’s acceptance of the bank CEOs constitution, in place when the St George Bank adopted the 2004 Code, has never been explained. The banks code of ethics appears to constrain conflicting values, yet the code of ethics encourages bank staff (but possibly not its directors) to report, in good faith, suspected unlawful/ unethical behaviour.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr George Frazis, Managing Director, St George in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the George Frazis 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View George Frazis 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

St George Bank Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Gail Kelly (29 Jan 2002 – 1 Mar 2010)

Graham Reaney (27 Oct 1996 – 1 Dec 2008)

Paul Isherwood (27 Oct 1997 – 1 Dec 2008)

Linda Nicholls (26 Aug 2002 – 1 Dec 2008)

John Curtis (27 Oct 1997 – 1 Jul 2008)

John Thame (24 Feb 1997 – 1 Jul 2008)

Leonard Bleasel (27 May 1993 – 16 Dec 2005

Frank Conroy (28 Aug 1995 – 17 Dec 2004)

Bank Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Richard England (10 Sep 2004 – 1 Dec 2008)

Terry Davis (17 Dec 2004 – 1 Dec 2008)

Roderic Holliday-Smith (27 Feb 2007 – 1 Dec 2008)

Peter Hawkins (24 Apr 2007 – 1 Dec 2008)

Gregory Bartlett (1 Dec 2008 – 1 Mar 2010)

John Curtis (1 Dec 2008 – 1 Mar 2010)

Peter Hawkins (1 Dec 2008 – 1 Mar 2010)

Lindsay Maxsted (1 Dec 2008 – 1 Mar 2010)

Paul Fegan (7 Feb 2008 – 1 Dec 2008)

WHAT’S THE BANK SA STORY

Principle Place of Business

Level 11

97 King William Street

ADELAIDE SA 5000

Bank SA adopted Code (2004) on 1 June 2004 

The St George Bank Limited wholly owns the Bank of South Australia. For the purpose of this paper, the same policies, practices and principles will apply.

JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Ms Jane Kittel, Managing Director, Bank SA in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Jane Kittel 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Jane Kittell 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

WHAT’S ING BANK (AUST.) STORY

Principle Place of Business

Level 14

140 Sussex Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

ING Bank adopted Code (2004) on 15 June 2004

The ING Bank directors have responsibility for identifying and ensuring compliance of the banks regulatory and ethical expectations and obligations.

The JMA parties referred dual contacting allegations to Mr Donald Koch, Managing Director, ING Bank (Australia) in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Donald Koch 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Donald Koch 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

ING Bank Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Phillip Shirriff (1 Jul 1985 – 31 Mar 2011)

Anthony Berg (19 Apr 2000 – 24 Jul 2007)

Hans Verkoren (31 Dec 1994 – 31 May 2006)

Vaughn Richtor (8 Feb 1995 – 27 May 2006)

Geoffrey Brunsdon (19 May 2000 – 26 Jul 2005)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Eric Robles (19 May 2004 – 20 Mar 2007)

Evert Drok (30 Nov 2005 – 1 Jun 2009)

Irene Lee (23 Dec 2005 – 2 Nov 2011)

Dirk Harryvan (25 Jul 2006 – 1 Jun 2009)

Simonis Tellings (9 Mar 2007 – 1 Oct 2010)

Hugh Harley (24 Jul 2007 – 26 Feb 2010)

Donald Koch (1 Jun 2009 until 2012)

John Masters (1 Jan 2010 until 2012)

Michael Katz (1 Jan 2010 until 2012)

Vaughn Richtor (5 Feb 2010 until 2012)

Brunon Bartkiewicz (1 Oct 2010 – 29 Mar 2012)

Amanda Lacaze (31 May 2011 until 2012)

Ann Sherry (30 Aug 2011 until 2012)

Leenaars Conelis (29 Mar 2012 until 2012)

WHAT’S SUNCORP BANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

Suncorp Centre

Level 18

36 Wickham Terrace

BRISBANE QLD 4000

SML Bank adopted Code (2004) on 30 June 2004

The Suncorp Annual Report 2004 states core values are:

Trust– keeping promises;

Honesty– talking straight, being genuine and ethical;

Courage– taking accountability for results;

Fairness– treating people justly and equitably;

Respect– treating individuals with dignity, and

Caring– listening carefully to others.

Suncorp Bank identified important attributes its directors and executives must have in dealings with customers. These are accountability, independence, diligence, prudence, transparency and most of all integrity.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Patrick Snowball, Managing Director, Suncorp Metway Bank in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Patrick Snowball 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Patrick Snowball 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

SML Bank Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

William Bartlett (1 Jul 2003)

John Story (24 Jan 1995)

Ian Blackburne (3 Aug 2000)

Cherrell Hirst (8 Feb 2002)

Christopher Skilton (13 Nov 2002)

Martin Kriewaldt (1 Dec 1996)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Zygmunt Edward (19 Sep 2005 until 2012)

Geoffrey Rickets (20 Mar 2007 until 2012)

Patrick Snowball (1 Sep 2009 until 2012)

Ewoud Kulk (20 Mar 2007 until 2012)

Ilana Atlas (1 Jan 2011 until 2012)

Leo Tutt (20 Mar 2007)

Paula Dwyer (26 Apr 2007)

WHAT’S HSBC BANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

Level 32

HSBC CENTRE

580 George Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

HSBC adopted Code (2004) on 5 July 2004

In HSBC Supplementary Product Disclosure Statement dated 1 March 2010, with a footnote stating HSBC, the worlds local bank, it states HSBC Bank is committee to delivery of excellence; our aim is to resolve most issues within five working days; if you have a concern about procedure, compliance issues… we want you to tell us.

We have designed a simple customer complaint process; [and] the bank warrants that it will comply with the Code of Banking Practice where those requirements apply to your dealings with the bank.

The JMA parties referred the problematic code issues to Mr Paulo Torre Maia, Managing Director, HSBC Bank in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Paulo Torre Maia 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Paulo Torre Maia 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

HSBC Bank Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Stuart Davis (8 Mar 2002 – 1 Jul 2009)

Michael Smith (1 Jan 2004 – 15 Jun 2007)

Anthony Hodgson (24 May 2001 – 26 Oct 2005)

David Eldon (2 Feb 1993 – 24 May 2005)

David Say (18 May 1993 – 31 Dec 2004)

Garry McLennan (24 Apr 2001 – 31 Dec 2004)

Aman Mehta (2 Feb 1998 – 31 Dec 2003)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Graham Bradley (4 June 2004 until 2012)

Vincent Cheng (25 May 2005 – 1 Feb 2010)

Lynette Wood (26 Oct 2005 – 31 Dec 2008)

Richard Humphry (26 Oct 2005 until 2012)

Alexander Flockhart (1 Aug 2007 – 30 Apr 2012)

Kerrie Kelly (1 Jan 2009 – 1 Feb 2010)

Paulo Maia (1 Jul 2009 until 2012)

Carol Austin (1 Feb 2010 until 2012)

Peter Wong (1 Feb 2010 – 1 Feb 2011)

Anthony Cripps (17 Jul 2010 until 2012)

Guy Harvey-Samuel (1 Feb 2011 until 2012)

WHAT’S THE CBA STORY

Principle Place of Business

Ground Floor Tower 1

201 Sussex Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

CBA adopted Code (2004) on 22 July 2004 

The CBA Annual Report 2004 states the bank demands the highest standards of honesty from bank people. CBA value statement is – trust, honesty and integrity’ which reflects the bank’s high-standards.

The bank adopted a code of ethics known as its Statement of Professional Practice, which sets standards of behaviour required of all bank directors and employees. It requires bank people to avoid situations that may give rise to conflicts of interest, and to ensure they are absolutely honest in all professional activities.

CBA states its standards are regularly communicated to staff to reinforce the need for the highest standards of honesty and loyalty, and its governance principles. The bank is strongly committed to maintaining an ethical workplace, and complying with legal and ethical responsibilities, and reporting instances of fraud, corruption and maladministration.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Ian Narev, Managing Director, Commonwealth Bank in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Ian Narev 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Ian Narev 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

CBA Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Fergus Ryan (31 mar 2000 until 2012)

Sarah Kay (5 Mar 2003 until 2012)

Colin Galbraith (13 Jun 2000 until 2012)

Reginald Clairs (1 Mar 1999 – 13 Apr 2010)

John Schubert (9 Oct 1991 – 10 2 2010)

Francis Swan (11 Jul 1997 – 7 Nov 2007)

Warwick Kent (13 Jun 2000 – 7 Nov 2007)

Anthony Daniels (31 Mar 2000 – 3 Nov 2006)

Barbara Ward (14 Sep 1994 – 3 Nov 2006)

David Murray (21 Jun 1992 – 22 Sep 2005)

John Ralph (17 Apr 1991 – 5 Nov 2004)

Norman Alder (17 Apr 1991 – 5 Nov 2004)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Jane Hemstritch (9 Oct 2006 until 2012)

Harrison Young (13 Feb 2007 until 2012)

John Anderson (12 Mar 2007 until 2012)

Andrew Mohl (1 Jul 2008 until 2012)

Brian Long (1 Sep 2010 until 2012)

Lorna Inman (16 Mar 2011 until 2012)

David Turner (1 Aug 2006 until 2012)

Ian Narev (1 Dec 2011 until 2012)

Ralph Norris (22 Sep 2005 – 30 Nov 2011)

WHAT’S THE ANZ BANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

ANZ Centre Melbourne

Level 9

833 Collins Street

DOCKLANDS VIC 3008

ANZ Bank Adopted the 2004 Code on 16 August 2004 

The ANZ Banks Annual Report 2004 states good corporate governance meets the bank’s ethical and stewardship responsibilities, and provides us with a strong commercial advantage. Its Chairman noted in his report the bank has taken a broader role in the community and reinforces the board’s message that quality disclosure is fundamental to achieving the bank’s vision ‘to become Australia’s leading and most respected major bank’.

The banks report comments on directors and employees overriding responsibility, which is to act honestly, fairly, diligently and progressively, and in accordance with the law.  Its key codes and policies apply to the directors and employees and are expected to pursue the highest standards of ethical conduct, reinforcing the bank’s commitment to having an overriding responsibility to ‘always act honestly, fairly, diligently and progressively’.

The banks directors and employees are expected to adhere to the high standards set out in the bank’s code. These require directors and employees always act honestly and ethically in all dealings. The ANZ Bank aims to achieve a culture encouraging open and honest communication and all levels of accountability, to meet ethical responsibilities.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Michael Smith, Managing Director, ANZ Bank and recent Chair of the Australian Bankes Association in opens letter dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Michael Smith 4 May 2012 letter : Click here

View Michael Smith 10 September 2012 letter : Click here

ANZ Bank Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Gregory Clark (1 Feb 2004 until 2012)

Charles Goode (24 Jul 1991 – 28 Feb 2010)

Jeremy Ellis (1 Oct 1995 – 18 Dec 2009)

Margaret Jackson (22 Mar 1994 – 21 Mar 2009)

John McFarlane (1 Oct 1997 – 30 Sep 2007)

David Gonski (7 Feb 2002 – 30 Jun 2007)

Brian Scott (21 Aug 1985 – 23 Apr 2005)

John Dahlsen (20 May 1985 – 3 Feb 2005)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

David Meiklejohn (1 Oct 2004 until 2012)

John Morschel (1 Oct 2004 until 2012)

Michael Smith (1 Oct 2007 until 2012)

Ian MacFarlane (16 Feb 2007 until 2012)

Peter Hay (12 Nov 2008 until 2012)

Alison Watkins (12 Nov 2008 until 2012)

Hsien Yang Lee (1 Feb 2009 until 2012)

WHAT’S THE CITIBANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

Citigroup Centre

2 Park Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

Citibank adopted Code (2004) on 14 October 2004

Citibank in on record as saying it does not investigate issues relating to constitutional aspects of the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee and the ABA is responsible for publishing the Code of Banking Conduct. As such, Citibank does not investigate issues not relating to financial services.

A letter written on behalf of Citibank directors state clause 35 of the code requires the bank to have an Internal Dispute Resolution process to deal with ‘disputes‘ and a dispute [only] relates to any complaint by a customer in relation to a banking service (Citibank’s emphasis added).

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Stephen Roberts, Managing Director, Citibank in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Stephen Roberts 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Stephen Roberts 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Citi Group Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Stephen Roberts (29 May 2003 until 2012)

Steven Baker (29 Nov 1984 – 13 Feb 1986)

Richard Jackson (29 Nov 1984 until 2012)

Francis Catterson (6 Feb 1984 until 2012)

Michael Cannon-Brookes (28 Feb 1991)

Ronald Bunker (13 Nov 1998 – 29 Sep 2010)

Norman Craig (12 Jan 1995 – 29 May 2008)

Leslie Matheson (1 Feb 2002 – 7 Apr 2008)

Willard Scott (31 May 2002 – 19 Nov 2007)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Richard Warburton (23 Mar 2005 until 2012)

Barry Brownjohn (1 Mar 2006 until 2012)

Francis Ford (19 Mar 2008 until 2012)

Roy Gori (7 Apr 2008 until 2012)

Nicholas Greiner (29 Jul 2008 – 27 May 2011)

George Trowse (17 Mar 2011 until 2012)

Samantha Mostyn (19 Jul 20011 until 2012)

David Mouille (26 Jul 2011 until 2012)

WHAT’S BANK OF QUEENSLAND STORY

Principle Place of Business

Level 17

259 Queens Street

BRISBANE QLD 4000

BOQ adopted Code (2004) on 6 December 2004

Bank of Queensland has its own code of conduct setting out principles directors, employees, owner-managers and contractors are expected to uphold. It actively promotes ethical and responsible decision-making in the bank and requires employees to undergo training in various areas of bank policy, including the Code of Banking Practice.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Stuart Grimshaw, Managing Director, Bank of Queensland in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Stuart Grimshaw 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Stuart Grimshaw 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Bank of Queensland Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Neil Summerson (5 Dec 1996 until 2012)

Antony James Love (16 Jun 1995 – 11 Dec 2008)

Neil Roberts (26 Nov 1987 – 20 Aug 2008)

Bruce Phillips (30 Nov 1996 – 12 Oct 2006)

Peter Fox (18 May 2001- 25 Nov 2011))

John Kelty (31 Aug 2001 – 31 Jul 2012))

David Liddy (9 Apr 2001 – 31 Aug 2011)

John Reynolds (4 Apr 2003 until 2012)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Carmel Gray (6 Apr 2006 until 2012)

David Graham (12 Oct 2006 – 8 Oct 2010)

Anthony Howarth (18 Dec 2007 – 26 Jul 2010)

Roger Davis (28 Aug 2008 until 2012)

Steven Crane (11 Dec 2008 until 2012)

 Michelle Tredenick (22 Feb 2011 until 2012)

Stuart Ian Grimshaw (1 Nov 2012 until 2012)

Richard George Haire (18 April 2012)

WHAT’S THE BANKWEST STORY

Principle Place of Business

300 Murray Street

PERTH WA 6000

BWA adopted Code (2004) on 1 April 2005

Bankwest set out its position with respect to the Code of Banking Practice stating it sets standards for good banking practice. It’s the banks commitment to customers on standards of practice, disclosure and principles of conduct. We subscribe to the code including modifications.

Until recently the directors of Bankwest were happy to be quoted as saying the code was a contract, but recently it changed its position. However, the bank does hold, we believe, the code represents a distillation of fair and prudent banking practices and compliance with it is in the interest of banks and customers.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Rob De Luca, Managing Director, Bankwest in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Rob De Luca 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Rob De Luca 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Bankwest Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Ian MacKenzie (15 Dec 1994 – 5 Feb 2010)

Colin Matthew (23 Oct 2003 – 19 Dec 2008)

Daniel McArthur (21 Jun 2002 – 14 Dec 2007)

John MacLean (25 Mar 2004 – 28 Jun 2007)

Leigh Warnick (1 Apr 1993 – 15 Dec 2005)

Michael O’Leary (3 May 1996 – 23 Sep 2004)

Ronald Turner (18 Dec 1990 – 23 Sep 2004)

Richard Turner (24 Oct 2002 – 23 Sep 2004)

Robyn Ahern (1 May 1996 – 23 Sep 2004)

Terence Budge (30 Nov 1997 – 12 May 2004)

Thomas Abraham (29 Mar 2001 – 24 Mar 2004)

Alastair Loudon (31 Aug 2000 – 24 Oct 2003)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

David Willis (5 Aug 2004 – 15 Dec 2005)

Susan Wilson (15 Dec 2005 – 13 May 2009)

Richard Turner (15 Dec 2005 – 19 Dec 2008)

Christopher Whitehead (15 Dec 2005 – 13 Dec 2006)

Simon Walsh (13 Dec 2006 – 19 Dec 2008)

Brian Jamieson (28 Jun 2007 – 30 Mar 2011)

Ian Corfield (14 Dec 2007 – 15 Apr 2008)

Ross Moulton (15 Apr 2008 -19 Dec 2008)

Jennifer Seabrook (19 Dec 2008 until 2012)

Garry Mackrell (19 Dec 2008 until 2012)

Jon Sutton (19 Dec 2008 – 28 Mar 2011)

Harvey Collins (13 May 2009 until 2012)

Robert McKinnon (13 May 2009 until 2012)

Simon Blair (18 Aug 2009 until 2012)

Roberto Deluca (28 Mar 2012)

WHAT’S BENDIGO & ADELAIDE BANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

The Bendigo Centre

BENDIGO VIC 3550

Adelaide Bank adopted Code (2004) on 4 April 2005

Adelaide Bank has a code setting out standards each manager, executive and employee is required to meet. Its code is said to enforce principles in the Code of Banking Practice and obliges employees to contribute to the wellbeing of the community and to demonstrate social responsibility and honesty in dealings with others.

Adelaide bank has a corporate governance charter. It states the bank is committed to the highest standards of governance and best practice. The practices described in the corporate governance schedule are the responsibility of directors; the directors have adopted the Code of Banking Practice, which reflects the banks attitude to expected behaviour.

Bendigo Bank Adopted the 2004 Code on 1 July 2005

Bendigo Bank’s policy states if an employee acts fraudulently, dishonestly or breaches legal duties, any unvested bank options or performance rights lapse.

The bank believes customer service and community relevance remain its longest standing competitive advantages. Thus, the bank needs to continue to invest in the people and technology needed to maintain its standards.

Adelaide bank’s corporate governance charter would, in all likelihood, remain in once eth banks merged.

The JMA parties referred dual contacting issues to Mr Michael Hirst, Managing Director, Bendigo and Adelaide Bank in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Michael Hirst 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Michael Hirst 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Bendigo and Adelaide Directors (1 August 2003 and 11 May 2004):

Robert Johanson (1 Jul 1995)

Jennifer Dawson (27 Aug 1999)

Terence O’Dwyer (23 Oct 2000)

Kevin Roache (1 Jul 1995 – 26 Oct 2009)

Robert Hunt (1 Jul 1995 – 3 Jul 2009)

Donald Erskine (27 Aug 1999 – 31 Nov 2007)

Neal Axelby (23 Oct 2000 – 31 Nov 2007)

Richard Guy (1 Jul 1995 – 31 Aug 2006)

Directors following publication of 11 May 2004 Code:

Antony Robinson (24 Apr 2006 until 29012)

Deborah Radford (27 Feb 2006 until 29012)

Kevin Abrahamson (30 Nov 2007 – 24 Nov 2011)

James McPhee (30 Nov 2007 – 27 Jan 2010)

Kevin Osborn (30 Nov 2007 – 3 Dec 2009)

Adele Lloyd (30 Nov 2007 – 23 Jun 2008)

Roger Cook (30 Nov 2007 – 17 Dec 2007)

Michael Hirst (3 Jul 2009 until 29012)

James Hazel (1 Mar 2010 until 29012)

David Matthews (1 Mar 2010 until 29012)

Jacqueline Hey (5 Jul 2011 until 29012)

WHAT’S THE RABOBANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

Darling Park Tower 3

Level 16

201 Sussex Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

Rabobank adopted Code (2004) on 22 September 2008

Rabobank is reported to have over 9 million customers worldwide in 48 countries.

It encourages innovations and provides products and services that contribute to the sustainable development of the wealth and prosperity of its clients.

Having adopted the Code of Banking Practice, Rabobank made a statement that it is committed to working towards improving the standards of practice in the banking industry. It states in its code publication notes that the Code governs the behaviour of banks, encouraging fair and ethical behavior, and has appropriate dispute resolution practices.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Theodorus Gieskes, Managing Director, Rabobank Australia in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Theodorus Gieskes 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Theodorus Gieskes 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Rabobank Directors Since it Adopted Code 22 September 2008;

David Smithers (17 Sep 2003 until 2012)

John Palmer (30 Nov 2004 until 2012)

William Gurry (18 Mar 2005 until 2012)

Jan Pruijs (26 Nov 2010 until 2012)

Bernardus Martin (26 Nov 2010 until 2012)

Theodorus Gieskes (1 Nov 2009 until 2012)

Anne Brennan (28 Nov 2011 until 2012)

Henry Van Der Heyden (23 Mar 2012 until 2012)

WHAT’S THE AMP BANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

Jessie Street Centre

2 – 12 Macquarie Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

AMP Bank Adopted Code (2004) on 10 December 2010

The AMP directors adopted the Code of Banking Practice in December 2010 however the banks Managing Director, Michael John Lawrence was appointed a director of the ABA in 2008. The conduct of the AMP Bank would therefore reflect acceptance of the ABA policies.

AMP Banks corporate ambitions in the banking sector can be viewed by referring to the banks corporate governance reports. To this end, AMP asserts superior leadership exists where transparent accountable behaviour is consistently demonstrated; flashing light appear when companies lack transparency.

In the AMP Compliance Essentials paper, the bank requires its associates to comply with the Corporations Act and Trade Practices Act. It states AMP Bank expects its associates to comply with the Code of Banking Practice that describes standards of good practice and ensure banks have procedures for resolution of disputes between banks and customers.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Michael Lawrence, Managing Director, AMP in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Michael Lawrence 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Michael Lawrence 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

AMP Bank Directors Since it Adopted the Code 10 December 2010

Neville Cox (24 June 2003 until 2012)

David Morris (24 June 2003 until 2012)

Craig Duncan Meller (2 Apr 2002 until 2012)

Michael John Lawrence (21 Dec 2007 until 2012)

Nora Lia Scheinkestel (24 Apr 2009 until 2012)

Colin Grahame Storrie (14 Apr 2011 until 2012)

Patricia Akopiantz (23 Nov 2011 until 2012)

Paul Anthony Fegan (1 Apr 2010 until 2012)

WHAT’S BANK OF MELBOURNE STORY

Principle Place of Business

314 Whitehorse Road

BALWYN VIC 3103

Bank of Melbourne adopted Code (2004) on 25 January 2011

Bank of Melbourne Directors details and values in 2004 can be viewed by referring to the Westpac Banking Group section in the paper, as it is a division of WBC. Its policy regarding the policies of the bank and officers regarding compliance with the Code of Banking Practice, Corporations law and Trade Practices Act would reflect the values of the parent bank.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr Scott Tanner, Chief Executive Officer, Bank of Melbourne in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the Scott Tanner 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View Scott Tanner 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Bank of Melbourne officers since it adopted Code (2004)

Scott Tanner (Chief Executive – 2012)

Elizabeth Proust AO (Advisory Board Chairman – 2012)

Carol Schwartz AM (Advisory Board – 2012)

Peter Hawkins (Advisory Board – 2012)

WHAT’S BEIRUT HELLENIC BANK STORY

Principle Place of Business

Level 4

219 – 223 Castlereagh Street

SYDNEY NSW 2000

Beirut Hellenic Bank adopted Code (2004) on 1 January 2012 

Beirut Hellenic Directors and their values in 2004 are not relevant as the bank only adopted the Code when this paper was published.

The JMA parties referred dual contracting issues to Mr James Wakim, Managing Director, Beirut Hellenic Bank in open letters dated 4 May 2012 and 10 September 2012.

To view the James Wakim 4 May 2012 letter: Click here

View James Wakim 10 September 2012 letter: Click here

Beirut Hellenic Directors Since it Adopted Code 1 January 2012

Gregory Gav (31 Mar 2005 until 2012)

Nicholas Pappas (26 Mar 2001 until 2012)

James Wakim (28 Feb 2011 until 2012)

Stephen Bracks (18 May 2011 until 2012)

Nikolas Hatzistergos (28 Aug 2006 until 2012)

Promises, and More Promises

As mentioned, directors of the code subscribing banks, through the Australian Bankers Association made promises to implement reforms to benefit customers. At the same time, the Federal Government stepped up its efforts to introduce regulations and reforms to achieve the same end.

In response, the Australian Bankers Association stated bank directors are pleased the Federal Government was looking for ways to reduce red tape for banks and customers while maintaining the important consumer protections.’

The Managing Director, ABA repeated bank support:

We note and support government’s view that there needs to be greater consultation by the regulators within the industry. The ABA supports… recommendations regulators should develop a wider range of performance indicators for annual reporting.’

A milestone in achieving the government’s stated aims would be to apply the Martin Committee’s principles and remove the bank CEOs constitution, introduce proscribed Codes and require banks to honestly and truthfully investigate all complaints.

There must be truth in banking and if any bank directors have acted dishonestly, they should tale a lesson from the National Australia Bank’s archives, 2004.

Senate Committee Report webpage (Sub No. 90): Click Here…