The Unpleasant Truth About Australian Banking

Criminal Loans

NAB, Bank or Predatory Lender?

Priestleys’ Story   My name is Claire Priestley, on behalf of my brother, Chris Priestley, I would like to share our experiences with one of the leading banks in Australia, which damaged our properties and life. We have filed complaints with the bank’s directors, the regulators, and the government at all levels, from state to […]

Priestleys’ Story  

My name is Claire Priestley, on behalf of my brother, Chris Priestley, I would like to share our experiences with one of the leading banks in Australia, which damaged our properties and life. We have filed complaints with the bank’s directors, the regulators, and the government at all levels, from state to federal government, but we are still waiting for answers. 

This is our story. 

Our grandfather, William Priestley, drew his property, “Salt Glen”, in a ballot in 1908. It was a part of Brewon Station between Brewarrina and Walgett.  

His son, Gordon (our father), took over the property in 1950 and was dealing in sheep and cattle. He then purchased 4 more adjoining properties on the confluence of the Macquarie, Barwon, and Castlereagh rivers and developed one (Riverview) as a cotton farm in 1990.  

In 2004, my father transferred 3 properties to Chris and me with the debt of approximately $2M. 

Chris and I signed an agribusiness loan contract with the leading bank in 2004, which meant the bank had to comply with the 2004 Code of Banking Practice. This Code establishes the bank’s key commitments to farmers on standards of practice, disclosure, and principles of conduct. The industry’s Fact Sheet stated, “the Code is not legislation but when your bank adopts the code it becomes a binding agreement…” When our bank adopted this Code, we had a right to believe we would be fully protected. 

In 2006, we negotiated additional funds from NAB to purchase ‘Larrimah’ and further working capital. At the time, we were suffering from the Millennium drought. When the drought continued, the bank still provided us with additional capital to grow crops in this drought.  

With a Millennium drought and limited experience or support, our decision to use this leading agribusiness bank made good business sense.  

The Seven Sins 

The first occurred in 2008, whereby the bank directors breached clause 25.1 of the 2004 Code. Our forensic accountant noted that the damages caused to us were about $9M. However, during the Millennium drought, the bank and its directors should have known we could not afford to pay the interest, nor repay the debt. To lend in a drought and not support us when the seasons changed and cotton prices were the highest on record in 2010 and choose foreclosure as the only option, has brought us to believe that we were sold a predatory loan. 

The second occurred in 2010. In May we filed a verbal complaint with Fiona Worboys at the bank’s Narrabri office and a written complaint with Cameron Clyne, NAB’s Chief Executive. James Stafford then claimed Clyne told him to resolve our complaints at Farm Debt Mediation (FDM). We did not accept FDM as the appropriate forum and the decision by Clyne and Stafford was unconscionable. We attended FDM in July 2010 and lost any prospect of having the CCMC comply with dispute resolution procedures in clause 35 of the 2004 Code. Mr. Clyne, by directing us to FDM, obstructed justice and abused the due process.  

At FDM, we entered into a Heads of Agreement. We found the bank would not deal with complaints or misbehaviour. Regardless, under-resourced we agreed to repay $1M to the bank by 31 January 2011 or sell our farms by 30 April 2011, which was a threat. It meant the bank did not reach the agreement in good faith, as it was in breach of the Code and concealed the CCMC Constitution throughout the mediation. It seems extraordinary that the bank stated in the code that it would provide a better-informed decision about its financial services and products by providing effective disclosure of information (p.4). We could not meet these mediation commitments due to the November 2010 floods (Walgett was declared a natural disaster area between 2010-2012 4 times) that devastated wheat crops all over eastern Australia. 

We were under pressure from the bank to avoid having to go to court and therefore agreed to repay the debt within 9 months. Due to our inability to service existing debt, we reluctantly accepted the short period to turn our business around. The FDM process was unconscionable when we were in default of only $20,000.  

By attending FDM, the bank would have understood it was then impossible for us to obtain credit to sow and harvest crops. The bank, therefore, placed us in a position where we had an impaired loan. 

The events of 2010 exposed NAB to problems that would not have happened to a prudent and diligent lender. Whilst the bank’s senior executives and directors might argue it was our fault to accept additional funds, the manner in which they treated us during the next three years suggests the bank may have been so careless it could have destroyed our business, which is malice.  

When we signed the loan contract in 2004, Mr. John Stewart was Chief Executive, and when we filed complaints in May 2010, Mr. Cameron Clyne was. Both were Australian Bankers’ Association’s directors and were later found to be administrators of the CCMC Association’s Constitution. 

The third occurred in December 2012 and April 2013 when we attended the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. Prior to attending the Court of Appeal, we filed 6 complaints with the bank directors. At this time, NAB was a leading Australian corporation and we had no money, but now we had to resolve disputes in court. We were self-represented in court on both occasions and were not successful. After a court of appeal, the bank sold our home, land, and water licences. We were evicted by the Sheriff, security guards, and locksmiths, and made us homeless without relocation assistance. Our home and land were sold by tender to our neighbours, we did not receive any proceeds from the sale. We were treated as criminals when the bank’s behaviour appears criminal to us. 

The fourth occurred between 2012 and 2014 when we filed complaints with the CCMC and the bank’s directors. The CCMC did not deal with our allegations then we filed complaints with the bank’s directors, who were licensed and did not comply with the Corporations Act. Shortly after this, the bank sold our farms.  

In 2014, we re-filed complaints with the CCMC, who, again, did not investigate our complaints, nor comply with the code.  

The fifth occurred in 2016 when, for the third time, we filed complaints and allegations with the bank’s directors and the CCMC. On this occasion, we had alleged several issues with the bank. These failures by the bank and the CCMC would be due to either poor practices or a lack of attention to the rule of law. 

The sixth occurred in June 2017, when, documents provided to the senate inquiry into consumer protection in the banking, insurance, and finance sector (submission 107) stated ‘Once a bank subscribes to the Code, it becomes mandatory”. At this time, the banks received 1,130,037 complaints, and 101,703 were not dealt with in standard time. We now believe that NAB senior executives and directors did not comply with the Code nor the Essential Elements of complaints handling in the AS 4269-1995 Standard since October 2004. 

The seventh occurred in 2018 when documents were discovered through the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. The documents we obtained provided evidence that NAB Hayley Guest and CCMC Ralph Haller Trost changed the 2004 Code of Banking Practice when investigating our complaints. These practices by CCMC’s senior executives and directors of the bank appear to be criminal. 

On 5 March 2020, our solicitor obtained ASIC’s correspondence noting banks must comply with the code in place when loan contracts were signed. This supports our view that the bank had to comply with the 2004 Code. However, our bank and CCMC changed our Code for the 2013 Code which was possibly one of the bank’s greatest crimes. It meant the directors could avoid being prosecuted for predatory lending. 

Conclusion 

We have suffered from the bank’s having: 

  1. sold us pure assets or predatory loans, 
  2. failed to investigate complaints filed with Mr. Clyne, 
  3. failed to investigate complaints filed with Mr. Andrew Thorburn, 
  4. failed to comply with relevant industry Acts, 
  5. directed us to FDM without complying with due process, 
  6. adopted the ABA’s 2004 Code without full disclosure, and 
  7. not taken reasonable steps to require ABA to publish a statement the CCMC was bound by the Constitution. 

During the past 12 months, we have identified more concerning practices by National Australia Bank’s directors. When we signed loan contracts in 2004, we felt safe, however, we now feel betrayed by the bank and the regulator because farmers cannot resolve disputes free of charge.  

Pat Viceconte’s Story

My family was the victim of a predatory loan we signed with Bankwest for $9.7M in July 2008. I had then several businesses: Building and Land development, Livestock Farming, Import and Export of Livestock, and Commercial Property Rentals. I needed the funds to pay out my NAB facilities.

On 14 June 2008, before we went to Bankwest, the Manager Craig Sherman requested me to change the cash flow to show higher sales figures, which Sherman knew were false.

Bankwest approved the funding request on 1 July 2008. The approval was to build a subdivision in Mulwala and refinance the debt with NAB. I understood that Sherman took the file and information with him to Bankwest when he was the Westpac manager.

On 12 February 2010, we were served with a notice of Breach of Covenant by Craig Sherman. The interest cover was not met as they had 2.0 cover, EBIT. I advised Bankwest as they were higher than other banks at 1.5 times the cover. On 18 March, our accountant, Cara Hall, sent a response to show her calculation did not agree with Bank.

Craig Sherman replied asking that any further questions required best be handled by phone. Of the breach notice, we had to sell our land and buildings. We were cooperative and yet the bank continued the pressure to sell properties. There were additional charges for my overdraft, including penalty interest.

On 16 June 2010, we met at the farm with Sherman, his assistant, and Peter Alcock from Western Australia. They wanted to ensure we sold the properties, etc. In August, there was an auction of our farm, but the property was not sold. The stress and pressures continued by the bank, with increasing interest rates and fees.

From June to August 2011, we sold our buildings in Charles Street Launceston which all went to debt reduction. Our business collapsed when we paid out Bankwest in October 2013. All that remained were the Land Development in Mulwala and one commercial building. On 31 October 2013, Bankwest was paid out after we withdrew funds from our super fund.

I filed complaints to Bankwest and Commonwealth Bank’s officers and executives, but I have not received a suitable response yet. I suggest they compounded or concealed these crimes, and they were willing to risk their license.

—–

This is my story and my suffering from dishonest lenders.

In May 2008, Riverland Gardens Development budgets were provided to Craig Sherman as part of my loan application to Bankwest. The budget included 84 lots to be sold from July 2008 to November 2012, and sales totaling several millions of dollars. The profit from 197 lot sales was estimated to be $11.9M. I believe Sherman knew that initial sales would need to be reinvested in further developments, not as repayment of the principal debt. Riverland Gardens’ development increased to 236 lots in 2018.

On 6 June 2008, Sherman and the bank required a 12-month cashflow budget for the 2009 financial year as part of the bank’s credit process. I prepared the consolidated budgets for the 2009 financial year and emailed them to Sherman on 9 June 2008.

My budget had $1.3M in outflows and $1.1M in inflows, but included the proposed Bankwest loan repayments, leaving a cash deficit. Sherman also asked why Alpaca sales declined from $1.9M in 2006 to $834,000 in 2007. On 13 June 2008, Sherman, when reviewing my forecasts, asked me to change the cash flow to show a better result.

On 8 October 2008, Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited (“CBA”) acquired Bankwest, and on 7 November 2008, our Bankwest Loans drawn-down was $10.1M. On 12 February 2010, Sherman emailed me in relation to Bankwest’s credit review. He said, “you have met all commitments when due on all Bankwest borrowing arrangements to date”.

On 24 February 2010, Cara Hall, of Richmond Sinnott & Delahunty Chartered Accountants, wrote to me regarding our December 2009 interim reports. As per her calculations, the ICR was above 2.00 for the 2009 financial year and the 6 months to 31 December 2009. I attempted to explain quarterly ICR covenants were inappropriate for primary production and property development, as income fluctuates over a 12-month period. Taking a short 3-month period is not a suitable sample reflecting profits with a long-term business or development. I noted that the Westpac offer did not include an ICR covenant.

Bankwest forced me to sell valuable property and buildings, which was distressing, especially the Farm, which was listed for $13.3M.

On 16 June 2010, I met with Sherman and his assistant, and Peter Alcock (“Alcock”) from Bankwest. The bank was only interested in the sale of my properties, rather than trying to work with me and discuss alternative strategies to mitigate current cashflow issues. The Bankwest experts applied significant pressure: increasing interest rates and fees, which were unjust and harsh compared to previous loan commitments.

On 23 June 2010, our borrowing limit was $10M, down from $10.12M. Among special conditions, Bankwest required our monthly Mulwala (Riverland Gardens Development) sales to reduce the principal debt. In August, the Farm was passed up at auction.

In October 2010, I had a meeting with Sherman and Alcock in relation to their introducing a possible buyer of the Farm. The potential buyer was Trevor Delroy, a horse trainer from Perth. He inspected the Farm with a Romsey real estate agent. He then inspected it again with Gisborne real estate agent John Keating.

Among other financial and non-financial undertakings, Bankwest listed a Special Undertaking if there were no Lancefield property sales by 30 June 2011, with a revaluation of the properties to be instructed. Further, Special Undertaking by 15 May 2011 stated that if Joint Venture (JV) did not enter the Riverland Gardens Development and sale of Lancefield properties, the interest margin would increase by 0.5% pa on all facilities. Bankwest created these Special Conditions knowing that I would not be able to meet them within the short one-month timeframe.

On 27 June 2011, 66-68 Charles Street was settled for $743,485, with $739,841.44 being paid to reduce Bankwest’s debt. On 17 August, 76 Charles Street was settled to reduce Bankwest’s debt and the bank required 100% of the proceeds from the sale to reduce principal debt.

In October 2013, the Farm settled for $5.2M, and Bankwest was paid out in full, but I had to withdraw $370,000 from superannuation to repay the debt. With the sale of the Farm, I lost future income from the Farm and its Quarantine Stations. I believe the Farm was undersold, as it was originally listed for $13.3M.

On 6 November 2013, the principal of $6.5M on the Bankwest Flexi-Protect loan was repaid, and on 2 April 2014, I filed a complaint with Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), but my allegations were not investigated.

In December 2021, I filed complaints with Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA). AFCA advised that the complaint was outside its jurisdiction. Since January 2022, I have written to Commonwealth Bank’s officers and executives requesting the events outlined in my complaints be reviewed and investigated. There has been no response yet.

On 14 July 2022, I sent Catherine Livingstone and Matt Comyn a copy of my financial loss report, but neither provided a response within 21 or 45 days. It meant that under clause 35 in the 2004 Code, Commonwealth Bank and Bankwest cannot challenge my report.

I have evidence of the bank’s misconduct, including:

  1. providing me with predatory or pure-asset loans,
  2. manipulating cash flow budgets to meet serviceability requirements,
  3. misleading by way of not disclosing clear contract terms and conditions,
  4. creating debt facility breaches by way of not being a prudent and diligent lender and overall incompetence due to a lack of understanding of the overall group structure,
  5. applying undue pressure on me to sell assets for which I had no intention of selling,
  6. breaching the loan contracts by withholding documents pertinent to the bank’s rights,
  7. not acting in good faith or ethically by way of increasing interest margins and charging excessive fees, and
  8. causing material financial losses and irreparable reputational damage.

In July 2022, I filed complaints with ASIC Deputy Chair, Sarah Court, and its Chair, Joseph Longo, and later with APRA Chair, Wayne Byres. I suggested:

Small businesses and farmers in all states of Australia, like me, were damaged by the Bankwest and Commonwealth Bank’s decision to adopt the 2004 Code without including ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) in clause 35.1(b).

I believe customers like me who signed loan contracts with these two banks believe that by omitting this regulatory guide from the 2004 Code, the banks had a clear intent to commit a crime.

On 28 August 2022, I wrote to ASIC Commissioner, Sean Hughes, because he was the regulator’s most respected executive. I noted:

My family and I were victims of predatory loans . . .

Our cash flows and tax returns submitted to Bankwest and Commonwealth Bank demonstrated that we could not support the borrowings at that time.

However, the loans were supplied because of the noted strength of our assets. After 14 months we were served with a notice of default, albeit our financial position had not changed. Soon thereafter interest rates, margins and fees all increased dramatically. Our farm [was then] sold to a related Bankwest client.

The one property that gave reason for the bank to withdraw its loans, has saved us and has shown that if the bank had followed the 2004 Bank Code and provided, negotiations with reasonable time frames we would not have needed to sell any of our assets.

We have lost $19.9M as found by a Forensic Accountant . . .

This complaint has previously been lodged with ASIC and no follow-up, other than the ID number provided, to date.

With the new cabinet and proposed Integrity Commission, I was concerned that customers who suffered damages as a result of Australia’s greatest crime may not be heard. The small businesses and farmers who met at Parliament House in 2018 would also have been concerned if the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) was transferred to the Secret National Anti-Corruption Commission (SNACC).

Bankwest and the Contagion

Pat Viceconte’s Story My family was the victim of a predatory loan we signed with Bankwest for $9.7M in July 2008. I had then several businesses: Building and Land development, Livestock Farming, Import and Export of Livestock, and Commercial Property Rentals. I needed the funds to pay out my NAB facilities. On 14 June 2008, […]

Bendigo: a lender or fraudster?

Gerard O’Grady Story My name is Gerard O’Grady. I would like to share my bad experiences with my bank, which I should not have trusted for ages now. In partnership with my parents, I ran a very profitable cattle farm. I was also involved in land development, which, if Bendigo Bank had allowed me to […]

Bendigo Bank’s Worst Victim

Wayne Prichard’s story My name is Wayne Prichard, and this is my story about deceitful banking practices by Rural Bank and its owners Bendigo Bank. I have outlined events that were suppressed following my signing of a deed of forbearance with the bank at mediation. I reluctantly signed the deed because of poor advice from […]

Wayne Prichard’s story

My name is Wayne Prichard, and this is my story about deceitful banking practices by Rural Bank and its owners Bendigo Bank.

I have outlined events that were suppressed following my signing of a deed of forbearance with the bank at mediation. I reluctantly signed the deed because of poor advice from my legal representative at the time stating. I was told that if I did not sign it, I would have been sold up immediately and my rights to resolve disputes would be lost.

At the mediation, there were discussions held between the mediator, my bank, and my advisor. I was not included in these discussions. After the mediation, I was threatened with enforcement action if I did not sign a supplementary deed because the initial deed expired. My advisor harassed me to act when I did not want to agree. I was concerned that I would lose my rights to deal with the bank’s dishonest practices.

The result of this, I thought, was a restriction of trade because I could not meet my financial obligations under the Deed. I could not protect my livestock during the drought and earn off-farm income. I suffered more than duress, my health has deteriorated which has now resulted in high blood pressure and depression.

I did not know that the Deed of Forbearance would prevent me from other issues being considered until my mother read about the bank’s intention to sell my property. The bank published it in a local newspaper on 29 May 2019 without notifying me. The bank and its lawyers must have notified the newspapers nation-wide, days if not a week at least prior to the notice being published.

The trigger to sell my farm was based on a false statement that I did not reply to a bank letter which it claimed to have sent to me. My consultant had tried to contact the bank’s senior credit manager, Malcolm Renney, on several occasions, but Renney denied any knowledge of this. This made a mockery of the bank’s responsibility to customers like me because it had to act honestly and in good faith.

The bank alleged that there was a deal on the table which I had agreed to. That was a lie. The bank did not comply with the law, and it led me to the position that I am in today.

****

The following evidence illustrates the bank’s dishonest practices, which damaged my businesses, my credibility, and my life.

I owned and operated a grazing enterprise located at Lot 1 Old Glenroy Station, Charters Towers, QLD 4820 (“Old Glenroy”) and a helicopter business, via Heliway Pty Ltd ACN 083 087 183 (“Heliway”), for which I had been operating for more than 30 years. I had more than 23,400 hours flying experience.

In 2012, I had loans with Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (“ANZ”) and my farm Old Glenroy was drought declared. ANZ placed me in Asset Management and ordered me to sell Old Glenroy, even though there had been no loan defaults nor any serviceability issues. Previously, I had just sold another property and paid a significant amount off my debt which left me in a comfortable position to carry on at Old Glenroy.

The issues arose when I did not sign a new Letter of Offer due to increasing security over and above what was required. The bank manager became disgruntled and without discussion my file was transferred to Asset Management and my interest rate increased to 11.8%. I continued making repayments at this rate until the refinance to Rural Bank on 27 May 2013. Therefore, I sought advice from Jennifer Wainwright, Financial Consultant, who introduced me to Elders Rural Bank Manager, Phil Lowe (“Lowe”), to refinance ANZ’s debt with Rural Bank.

After the refinance, I discovered that Jennifer Wainwright was not a qualified financial consultant, nor did she have the qualifications to submit the refinance with Rural Bank, but Lowe did not advise me of this.

On 17 April 2013, I received the bank’s letter of offer for the debt facilities $2.9M included in this facility is a Term Loan (Account Number 090187527) of $100,000 to rebuild my R22 Helicopter and an overdraft facility (Account Number 301862025) of $100,000 for working capital. This was of paramount importance to cashflow projections submitted, to Rural Bank, as part of the refinance.

On 27 April 2013, the day of settlement with ANZ, Lowe called me and advised that ANZ made a mistake with the payout and that we were $86,000 short for settlement. I did not have the additional funds and therefore had to borrow $90,000 from a work colleague.

I received the additional funds and settlement was rescheduled for the following week. A week later Lowe called me again and advised that ANZ made another mistake with its payout and that I was another $38,000 short. I told him that there must be a mistake and to hold up on settlement. I asked if there was anyone who could investigate the reason why the payout figure kept changing or should I contact the Ombudsman. Lowe told me not to involve anybody else and that he would ask another Rural Bank client to help me with the extra funds. Lowe stated, ‘we will get you out of ANZ and deal with the deficiencies down the track,’ I was shocked but accepted his offer.

On 20 May 2013, Lowe received an email from Carol Bawden, Securities Officer of Rural Bank, advising ANZ’s indicative payout of $2,992,402.66. Three days later, Lowe sent an email Carol Bawden regarding the updated ANZ payout 27 May 2013 circa $3.016M. I then received ANZ’s letter stating its payout was $3,017,178.42. This was $24,775.76 higher than advised a week earlier.

This was now a serious problem for me, when the Term Loan was required to fund the rebuild of an R22 Helicopter, but I could not access the funds because Lowe had used them to payout the ANZ loan. On 27 May 2013, when I drew down on my new loan, I was in default. This was a disaster because without being able to rebuild the helicopter, the business was not viable.

For 12 months, there were no other options other than to sell my six hundred breeders at half their value. For farmers, breeders are essential for future income, but in my case, the helicopter was my greatest priority. In March 2014, Lowe called suggesting I should mortgage my small property in Charters Towers to pay for the helicopter rebuild and give me some working capital. This property was unencumbered. I therefore had no choice but to agree.

On 1 April 2014, I contacted Rural Bank and Lowe to advise that I did not have sufficient funds to make the next interest payment. On 23 May 2014, Rural Bank surprisingly wrote to me and advised me of an offer to provide an increase to the Trading Limit Facility of $120,000. I thought this was the funds to rebuild the helicopter, but I soon found that it was funds for Lowe to keep my seasonal facility from falling into default before the upcoming review. Lowe asked me if I could provide a backdated invoice as evidence to credit to allow the facility increase. I did not accept the facility limit increase because it was dishonest. Then, my seasonal loan fell into default.

On 16 December 2014, I applied for the Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (QRAA) loan. It required Rural Bank’s support. The QRAA loan term and interest rate was more affordable than Rural Bank. However, without explanation, Rural Bank did not support me, which was extraordinary. If I were supported, I could have either purchased a new aircraft or some breeding stock.

In February 2015, a friend of mine was interested in purchasing my property, Old Glenroy. At that time, I had few options, but Lowe suggested preparing a marketing plan before selling the property.  We were suffering from the worst drought ever in this area and while the marketing plan was being prepared, my friend’s position changed, and the opportunity was lost.

On 4 May 2015, Rural Bank wrote to me and said my loan facilities were being managed by the Asset Management Unit. Prior to receiving this correspondence, I received a phone call from one of Rural Bank’s asset managers, Mark Currey, introducing himself and advising me that my file was now with asset management unit. This was 24 days after another Rural Bank client was informed by Lowe that my file was being transferred to asset management unit. The correspondence stated that the bank required the debt to be repaid in full by 31 March 2016, by way of selling Old Glenroy. The cash flow budget attached to the letter contained data not correlating to my business’ operation.

In July 2015, the Bank provided me with a deed of forbearance. Later that month Mark Currey contacted me and suggested a meeting to discuss some of the issues I raised with the bank and the Deed.

On 29 June 2015, assisted by Michael Clive of CBC Lawyers in Townsville, I met with Rural Bank’s Asset Managers, Mark Currey and Philip Mansfield to discuss the issues in the Deed of Forbearance. This was the first time I met the Rural Bank’s Asset Managers in person. The meeting lasted for about 2 hours. Before leaving the lawyer told me to sign the Deed, and, if not, the bank would sell me up.

On 29 July, I signed the deed under duress when Michael Clive said, ‘there is nothing you can do about it, they have a gun at your head’. I never imagined this threat would happen to me.

In July 2016, I wrote to the Financial Ombudsman Services (FOS) outlining my concerns and asked if it would review my case. I reported that in July 2015, Rural Bank required me to involuntarily sign a Deed of Forbearance. In August, FOS replied and refused to support my concerns as it stated there was no concrete evidence of the customer’s illegitimate pressure made by the financial services provider.

MEDIATION IN 2016

On 29 November 2016, Rural Bank required me to attend Farm Debt Mediation (FDM) in Brisbane. Mark Currey and Philip Manfield assisted by Martin Byres; Coors Chambers Westgarth attended for Rural Bank. John Maitland (Solicitor) and James Kewley (Barrister) attended with me, and the mediator was George Fox.

Fox started the meeting by questioning each of the attending parties to confirm they had exchanged relevant documents. I could recall that every lawyer at the meeting told Fox they provided the relevant documents, and then the two parties were required to move to separate rooms. Despite numerous requests I kept thinking Rural Bank’s Currey and Mansfield did not provide all the relevant documents.

The mediation lasted all day and was dominated by the Deed of Forbearance. The fact that I signed the deed did not give me a chance to ask Rural Bank’s experts about my current position. All the bank was focussed on was selling my property and repaying the escalated debt. The bank, its lawyer, and the mediator did not act in good faith, and I could not protect my rights.

On 12 November 2021, Old Glenroy was sold.

I suffered from Rural Bank and Bendigo Bank’s deceitful practices. They had:

  1. provided me with pure asset or ‘predatory’ loans without considering serviceability requirements,
  2. based serviceability on cash flow budgets not prepared by independent experts,
  3. knowingly used fictitious invoice to substantiate loan advance,
  4. breached the loan contracts by withholding documents pertinent to our rights,
  5. did not act in good faith or ethically with ANZ refinance and thereafter, for which caused material losses, and
  6. caused material financial losses and with irreparable reputational damage.

Due to the bank’s dishonest, I lost more than $19,093,020, as noted in my forensic accountant’s financial loss report of 26 May 2022.

It was clear that there were other parties involved in this misconduct other than the banks directors and their legal advisors. When attending Farm Debt Mediation, it was apparent the Queensland government (an owner of one of the other major banks) would have known about the defective arrangements. I believe the parties involved should have been removed from industry before my Brisbane meeting in November 2016.

I believe the Queensland government and Annastacia Palaszczuk, the Premier, should have known that banks and mediators did not always comply with the rules. Had the FDM meeting been filmed or recorded, it would have been evident all documents were not exchanged, and that the mediation had to be set aside. It was a scam.

However, following the Parliament House meeting in 2018, farmers discovered the 2004 Code was dishonest as it did not include ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) in clause 35.1(b). The leading banks, by omitting the ‘industry dispute standard or guideline from the code’, had a clear intent to commit a crime.

Ms Jacqueline Hey, Bendigo Bank’s Chair and her directors must have known about the deceitful 2004 Code. However, neither the directors nor general counsel had the good sense to rectify it.

Michael Murphy & Tracey Moore’s Story

Prior to 2008, I was living at Mount Newman (“Newman”), and Tracey was living in Perth. We wanted to purchase a home in Perth for our future.

We discussed this with Commonwealth Bank, and it loaned us funds to purchase an investment property at Newman. This made sense because we had not owned our own home before, and this provided us an opportunity to invest in real estate and purchase a home later.

To obtain the investment funds from Commonwealth Bank, required Tracey to obtain a guarantee from her friend, June Avila, which did not prove difficult because we trusted the bank.

A few weeks later, when completing Newman’s purchase, a house in Perth became available. We asked the bank if we could purchase it for our home, but it meant we now would have two properties, the Newman investment, and home at Mount Nasura, Armadale, Southeast Perth.

In October 2008, Tracey asked June Avila, who had two properties in Perth, if she would guarantee our Commonwealth Bank’s loans. Avila agreed, and we now owned a home at Mount Nasura and an investment property at Newman. However, Avila would have to guarantee both loans.

The funds provided by Commonwealth Bank for the Nasura home had been changed and, without our knowledge, we now had two investment properties. This meant the bank’s salesman misled us.

This was a problem 3 years later when Tracey’s son (Ned) suffered a serious hit-and-run incident and was institutionalised in hospital for almost a year. In 2012, Tracey had to stop working and we found it difficult to continue paying the bank’s interest from the Newman house rent with a single income.

This problem was serious and was caused by Commonwealth Bank’s failure to provide us with mortgage insurance for the loans or the correct type of loan.

In 2016, Tracey was caring for Ned, and I was suffering from poor health. This meant Commonwealth Bank had taken a risk when it did not ask us to sign insurance for the loan when we signed contracts, and now we had to accept the damages that followed.

In August 2021, I wrote to Catherine Livingstone, Commonwealth Bank’s Chairman, and Matt Comyn, its Chief Executive regarding the bank’s practices. Neither responded despite statements that the bank had adopted the 2004 Code, and that compliance with it was mandatory.

In these circumstances, Commonwealth Bank was not a prudent and diligent lender, nor did it comply with the rule of law. Now Tracey and I could not resolve disputes free of charge dispute being a commitment by the bank in both contracts.

*****

And this is our story.

Prior to 2008, Tracey and I worked as fly in fly out mining workers. We were operating large haul trucks and earthmoving machinery at Newman, Western Australia and our gross income before tax was about $200,000.

In September, we purchased an investment property at Trotman Avenue, Newman, for $570,000. Commonwealth Bank’s mobile lender, David Evans, helped us with the application. The bank loaned $600,400.00 without insurance. This meant it approved a value ratio (LVR) of 105% with Tracey’s friend, June Avila, as guarantor. June and Tracey also had a weekend at Pingelly WA, which they owned 50/50.

David Evans said that he would use our personal details from the Newman loan for the Mount Nasura loan application. We did not have an opportunity to review the loan documents nor contact a solicitor to obtain independent legal or financial advice. We were asked to sign documents with “yellow sign here stickers”. Given the high LVRs with Tracey’s friend as guarantor, the limit of 80% would have been prudent and diligent for Commonwealth Bank, Australia’s leading lender. The licensee did not recommend we obtain independent legal or financial advice when it did not offer us a home loan insurance policy.

This policy would have covered repayments in the case of injury or illness, unemployment or to pay a lump sum in the instance of a trauma event, terminal illness, and or death. Tracey already had Commonwealth Bank’s care plan insurance policy, set up by our self-managed fund. However, when Evans and the bank were preparing our loans there were multiple errors, and when we identified those errors, the bank took no action. The errors included incorrect employment details, inconsistencies with dependents and child support payments, the incorrect type of loan, changed marital status, and misrepresentation of asset value used in the loan application.

The Commonwealth Bank’s loan provided for Mount Nasura was a Viridian Line of Credit (“VLOC”) with interest only and not meant to be an investment loan. It was for our home. Therefore, required a primary residence principal and interest (“P&I”) loan. Without independent legal or financial advice, the bank sold us a VLOC interest-only loan, and we discovered it was more expensive than a comparable P&I loan.

In February 2011, Tracey’s seventeen-year-old son was a victim of a hit-and-run incident, leaving him with a severe diffuse axonal brain injury. He required twenty-four-hour care for the rest of his life. We took time off from work to assist with his recovery and rehab. Tracey and I then suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and could not continue being fly-in and fly-out workers.

In 2011, we received an offer for our Newman property $810,000. We accepted it, but we only had $180,000 after paying out the Newman loan. We used this to cover costs for the Nasura loan, for supporting Ned, and to cover our living costs.

We reached out to the bank for assistance with the Nasura Loan, due to our changed circumstances. The bank provided a three-month payment holiday but did so on the Pingelly loan incorrectly. After multiple calls to the bank, we continued to take payments for the Nasura loan, which then led us to make our first complaint with the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS).

At the time we were out of work and caring for Tracey’s son, we were receiving gratuitous service payments from Insurance Commission of Western Australia (ICWA), whilst Tracey’s son’s compensation matter was going through the courts.

On 14 December 2012, we applied for financial difficulty assistance with Commonwealth Bank. It took the bank ten weeks to respond to us, for which the temporary repayment variation was provided.

In 2013, Tracey’s son received monetary compensation from ICWA for the incident, with a Court Ordered Trust (“Trust”) enacted to manage the monies.

In March 2014, Tracey and I went to Commonwealth Bank in Maddington to change the Mount Nasura loan from a Viridian Line of Credit to a standard variable home loan in 2014. The Commonwealth Bank staff member, Rose Shepis, told us that we had probably paid about $200,000 too much on the line of credit. It was not a lump sum but just what had been accumulated through monthly payments on the loan.

She is then arranged for the VLOC to be switched to a variable rate home loan in March 2014, with the opening balance of Complete Home Loan Account Number 777519557 (“Complete Home Loan”) of $570,000.

In early 2015, I found a local job but was made redundant in late 2015.

In January 2016, I suffered from a heart attack, for which due to the stress from the fallout from Tracey’s son’s incident along with the bank’s disputes and issues.

In October 2016, we applied for financial difficulty assistance. The bank granted a three-monthly repayment deferral. Again, in January 2017, we applied for financial difficulty assistance and the bank granted another three-monthly repayment deferral.

In October 2018 Tracey and I attended a round table meeting with Clare O’Neil MP and Matt Keogh MP, which arose out of the Royal Banking Commission. As a result of that meeting, our second dispute through AFCA was started. AFCA found in favour of the bank, without explaining the bank executives and directors had probably sold us predatory loans, which is a crime.

On 2 November 2018, AFCA ruled in our favour and ordered Commonwealth Bank to pay us each $500, by way of loan credits, per case 528696.

On 27 September 2018, we emailed Matt Comyn Commonwealth Bank’s Chief Executive, with further complaints. On 28 November 2018, Commonwealth Bank Alexandra Colnan replied to the email noting that they had reviewed our concerns but would not be investigated due to similarities with prior case 528696.

In December 2019, we filed a complaint with AFCA with case 609992, raised the following issues:

  1. Commonwealth Bank’s decision to initially approve the VLOC in 2008;
  2. Commonwealth Bank’s actions when it changed the VLOC to variable rate home loan and whether it complied with its responsible lending obligations in 2014; and,
  3. Commonwealth Bank’s management of the new home loan including the current balance owing and the date repayments are made.

On 3 March 2020, AFCA ruled that Commonwealth Bank did not make any errors listed in our complaints.

Therefore, Commonwealth Bank did not have to pay us any compensation or take any further action in relation to the matters we raised.

Furthermore, AFCA claimed that we could pay the loans comfortably based on our incomes at the time of loan inception, this supplicates the question as to why Commonwealth Bank did not recommend a standard variable P&I home loan.

On 10 December 2020, we filed a complaint with AFCA (case 772841) in relation to the bank withholding information and deliberately misrepresenting our personal details on the loan applications.

On 16 February 2021, AFCA wrote to us advising that our concerns raised had already been subject to an AFCA determination (case number 609992);

On 8 May 2021, due to a dispute with the bank, we stopped making repayments on the Complete Home Loan.

On 27 May 2021, we emailed Senator the Hon Michaelia Cash and the Chief Executive and Chief Ombudsman of AFCA in relation to our prior complaint cases 609992 and 772841.

On 27 July 2021, AFCA wrote to us, advising that our determination per 60992 was in favour of Commonwealth Bank and closed and that case 772841 is outside AFCA Rules and as such had been closed too.

In about August 2021 we had a research team review our case. We discovered the Commonwealth Bank’s directors had not instructed their managers to pay the damages in our Financial Loss Report. These damages amounted to $227,417, plus compensation and an apology. The Commonwealth Bank’s directors knew that the AFCA’s advice was deceitful. If they claimed otherwise, there is proof that Catherine Livingstone and her directors did not have to pay the damages, compensation, and apology.

As of the date of this report, the Complete Home Loan balance is around $525,000.

At no time did the Commonwealth Bank’s managing director or directors require their staff to provide evidence that they had appropriately responded to complaints we had filed during the past 15 years. This level of negligence would have allowed us to obtain the justice that you and the bank’s directors did not provide us.

I believe there is a difference between the Commonwealth Bank’s directors’ decision to conceal predatory lending and fraud. In our case, we believe the misconduct by the bank’s directors was intentional. By definition, the bank dishonestly acted to obtain a financial advantage and caused us a financial disadvantage. The silence by the Commonwealth Bank’s directors throughout this disputed period meant we were victims of fraud.

I have filed several complaints to my local bank manager in Armadale since August 2021, and at no time did the bank manager and the directors comply with the 2004 Code, an essential part of my loan contract.

We were suffering from Commonwealth Bank’s decision to have:

  1. failed in being a prudent and diligent lender;
  2. misled and deceived us;
  3. provided VLOC interest-only loan not suited to our circumstances, not in our best interests, and not suitable for the underlying assets;
  4. breached the loan contracts by withholding documents pertinent to our rights.

More seriously, it was not until recently that we understood Commonwealth Bank Chief Executive and Managing Director in 2002, David Murray, was one of the Architects of the 2004 Code.

When Commonwealth Bank adopted the 2004 Code, its directors omitted ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) from clause 35.1(b). By omitting this guide, the bank intended to commit Australia’s greatest crime. Its Chairman, John Ralph AC, and his directors were not prudent and diligent. This meant we could not resolve disputes free of charge as set out in IDR procedure in clause 35 of the Code.

The directors, including Catherine Livingstone, Paul O’Malley, and others must have known this and should not have caused us extreme pain and suffering when we filed complaints with them. We might consider this was a deceitful act or simply negligent by the bank’s directors since 2003 or was it criminal conduct by the regulators ASIC and APRA.

We are still waiting for the bank to repay our damages, plus compensation and a letter of apology as required under the AS 4269-1995 Standard.

Rabobank’s Directors Must Win

Introduction Lloyd and I have farming in our blood. We grew up on dairy farms and have a lifelong association with the land. Buying our own farm in 1989 was the result of years of hard work. If things had gone differently, our adult children would now be taking over the farms for our grandchildren. […]

Introduction

Lloyd and I have farming in our blood. We grew up on dairy farms and have a lifelong association with the land. Buying our own farm in 1989 was the result of years of hard work. If things had gone differently, our adult children would now be taking over the farms for our grandchildren.

Instead, we’ve been forced to live with our daughter and granddaughter in Charters Towers, and now we’ve moved to Kununurra, WA, having lost a drawn-out battle with a high-profile bank that employs criminals. We have seen our two Queensland properties repossessed and sold.

Why did the bank lend us $4 million between 2005 and 2014 – a crippling loan that was impossible to service – and then not allow us to trade our way out of one of Queensland’s most savage droughts and then there was a livestock ban that broke hundreds of established farmers.

Over the years since our two grazing properties were sold in 2017, I have spent untold hours delving into a labyrinthine world of deception wherein the bank continually moved the goalposts, breached industry codes and standards, and hid behind privacy laws.

I have written hundreds of letters to politicians and regulators questioning my bank’s criminal conduct, the bank’s current and former chairman, and Chief Executive of the Australian Banking Association (ABA); the Financial Ombudsman; the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Services Industry; Chair and Deputy Chair of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC); and the state and federal police.

And . . . We are still looking for answers. . .


On 31 October 1989, we bought Ballabay Station, an 8,215ha farming and grazing property north of Pentland, in north-western Queensland. Prior to this, we were managing a property in Queensland’s gulf country and, as we were in our mid-30s with three young children, we were keen to establish our own farm.

Having looked at many properties before settling on Ballabay. This farm was affordable (we borrowed $350,000 to buy the $920,000 property); it had the potential for diversification and was close to day schools for our children. Bringing up our children in an open, clean country environment was also our priority.

Ballabay was well placed for development. It was close to the bitumen highway, sale yards, and meatworks and offered an opportunity for us to diversify into farming as well as support the grazing of about 400 head of cattle. There was an abundant water supply, fertile river, and creek flats and the land was fenced into 11 main paddocks.

Between 1989 and 2005, we made significant improvements to the property – upgrading fencing and irrigation systems, eradicating noxious weeds, implementing rotational grazing, providing, and maintaining the wildlife corridors, and much more. We renovated the homestead and the workers’ cottage and built living quarters in the shed.

As our children grew up, they worked beside us on the property.  Our family has always been a close-knit team, setting and achieving goals together and planning a productive future on the land.

2005 – 2011: BANKING SUPPORT

Sixteen years after buying Ballabay, we decided to refinance our $350,000 loan with a new bank. The finances show that we made a profit of $14,000 in 2004 and $8,801 in 2005. In June 2005, we estimated that the Ballabay property was worth $3,044,850. We then had 81.64 percent equity.

Rabobank is a Dutch multinational banking and financial services company that has a 123-year history of lending to farmers. In 2005 it advertised itself as having “the experience and knowledge to understand the distinctive needs of agribusiness and the cyclical nature of agriculture”.

On 23 May 2008, the partnership borrowed a further $60,000 for working capital and $165,000 for opening up new irrigation land for crops. The loan limit was now $985,000, but the partnership had made losses of $68,473 in 2006 and $79,156 in 2007. This is the cost farmers accept when developing their farms.

In 2008, I inherited 50 percent of my mother’s farm, Laurel Vale Station near Prairie, Queensland; my nieces inherited the other 50 percent, but they wanted to sell their share. Lloyd and I discussed this and then met with Peter Stevens, Rabobank’s Rural Bank Manager Townsville and we decided it was a good investment.

The price of $1,343,260 included plant and equipment and 275 heads of mixed cattle. In February 2009, Rabobank increased the overall loan to $2,585,000 to fund the purchase.

Laurel Vale is situated west of the Great Divide, some 100 kilometres west of Ballabay. It had a good water supply and pumping system that could be monitored remotely and a large Queenslander-style timber homestead. It worked well in conjunction with Ballabay and offered us an opportunity to reduce the risk of failed seasons on both properties. Meanwhile, we continued to make significant improvements to Ballabay.

2011–2013: PERFECT STORM

The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 left most of Australia relatively unscathed, but economic growth slowed, unemployment soared, and exports took a massive hit. The federal government’s ban on live cattle exports to Indonesia on 7 June 2011, started a period of extreme pain for cattle farmers in the north, exacerbated by a once-in-a-lifetime drought that sucked the farming country dry for several years.

In early 2012 farms had a good body of grass, but winter rain spoiled its quality of it. Cattle conditions dropped away, and cattle markets virtually came to a halt. To keep our properties going, in February 2012, we signed an application to increase the loan limit to $3,560,000.

I can recall that by early 2013, our farms were distressed by the drought and the export ban fiasco. We had to travel to Tully, in Queensland’s Far North, to cut and cart hay for our livestock. Lloyd lived with friends in Tully for six months, where he cut and wrapped 5,500 bales of donated hay. At the same time, our son carted the hay back to Ballabay and Laurel Vale – a journey of 500 kilometres – in his own truck with hired trailers. I was at home doing my best to feed the hay out to the cattle and keep everything going with help from Neil between him delivering loads of hay. The welfare of cattle was our highest priority.

In September 2013, I rang Peter Stevens to explain we would be unable to meet interest payments at the end of December, fully expecting the bank to understand and support us. I asked Stevens if Rabobank would support us with the Special Drought Assistance Loan package from Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (QRAA). It was for up to $650,000. He did not respond or discuss this with us.

On 31 December 2013, we defaulted for the first time as we could not meet an interest payment of $126,374.32.

2014: DOWNWARD SPIRAL 

On 14 January 2014, Peter Stevens, Rural Manager and Bob Ole, Special Asset Manager, met us at Ballabay. I asked, ‘What can we do,’ Ole said you need a financial adviser. I asked, ‘How much is that likely to cost us?’ He said about $20,000, I nearly fell off my chair. We didn’t have 20 cents and our animals had to be fed.

On 23 June 2014, with no property sold or contract signed Stevens rang and told us to open an account with another bank for our hay income and expenses and that all the money from cattle sales must go to Rabobank. It was seven days before the deadline, and Rabobank stopped us trading, effectively shutting down our ability to manage the farms and maintain animal welfare during the worst drought in Queensland’s history.

On 2 July 2014, Gadens lawyer Jacqueline Ogden, acting on behalf of the bank, wrote to us giving us 21 days to agree to participate in Farm Debt Mediation (FDM) with the bank. It was a threat. Gadens attached a service of notice pursuant to clause 3.1 of the Queensland Farm Debt Mediation Scheme, which meant the bank and its external lawyers had to attend FDM honestly and in good faith.

In August 2014, we applied for the Drought Concessional Loan through the Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (QRAA). It was refused when Rabobank did not support it, despite the Partnership’s livestock revenue between 2011 and 2014 noting we were eligible to apply.

On 6 November 2014, we attended Farm Debt Mediation in Townsville. The object of it is to provide the efficient and equitable resolution of farm debt disputes. We were required to sign an 18-page agreement that had been prepared in advance. Although we didn’t know it then, requiring us to sign a pre-printed agreement was evidence that Rabobank and Scott Couper, Gadens, did not attend mediation honestly or in good faith.

Lee Nevison, the mediator, terminated the session so he and Rabobank’s Scott Couper could fly back to Brisbane that evening. We were under great pressure to sign the agreement, despite not understanding any of the ramifications. The Deed of Forbearance and Acknowledgement required us to sell one of our farms within six months.

When we attended FDM, Rabobank and its solicitors had concealed the most important document we were entitled to have, suggesting they were involved in concealing criminal practices. The mediator, Lee Nevison, did not require the bank to comply with the 2004 Code of Banking Practice or the Industry Standard.

Soon after FDM, Rabobank appointed valuers, Honnef North Australian Valuations. They valued the farms at $2,500,000 and $2,200,000 – not including livestock or plant.

2015 – 2016: DEMANDS ESCALATE

Gadens sent us the Demand for Possession on August 18, 2015, requiring us to vacant possession of Ballabay and Laurel Vale, plus livestock and goods (vehicles, plant and equipment, machinery, tools, stores, supplies, and crops, including hay) within seven days. At that time, the total amount outstanding was $4,499,347.93.

In 2015, we employed a new accountant, Mr. Greg Bloomfield, who filed a complaint with the bank, claiming it sold us predatory loans. Later that year, we filed complaints with the industry’s monitors, Code Compliance Monitoring Committee (CCMC) claiming Rabobank had not dealt with our complaints, as required under our loan contract. Further, we claimed the bank and the CCMC did not handle our complaints properly.

In May 2016, we received a letter from Will Colwell, Ferrier Hodgson. He said his company was appointed as the Receivers, noting they were “entitled to immediate possession of the properties and assets, and reserved all rights in this respect”.

Six months later, Scott Couper, Gadens, wrote to us, stating the receivers obtained an enforcement warrant for possession of the property and that the Court Bailiff would “soon attend to service of the enforcement warrant on you”.

2017: WE ONLY WANTED TIME

Our ongoing dispute with the bank took a shattering turn for the worse when the receivers took possession of Laurel Vale in February 2017. They were accompanied by eight police officers, arrived at the property, and served our son with a warrant. He was visiting Laurel Vale where he was agisting cattle. He was arrested, ordered not to go near either farm again, put on bail, and then, Neil’s bail conditions were overturned. Three weeks later, we were all evicted.

I recall events that terrible day. At 10.30 AM, two cars with police came screaming down the driveway and six police who jumped out climbed the fence, and were yelling at us “this property is under siege”.

The police told our son that ‘he is in breach of his bail’ and Lloyd and I no longer owned the farm. They said we had 30 minutes to collect personal effects and leave. Neil and I refused to go. Neil was then pulled from his chair by two police officers, deliberately tripped, pushed to the ground and handcuffed.

We were put in separate paddy wagons and taken to Charters Towers police station. Our son had previously been handcuffed and left in the wagon, in the direct sun, for two and a half hours without water. I could not accept this was happening to us. We are not criminals, but this was like a story on TV – unbelievable!

Lloyd and I, homeless, moved in with our daughter in Charters Towers. In June 2017, our farms, with cattle, were sold at auction by the receivers for a combined total of $6,325,000. Ballabay made $3.2M while Laurel Vale made $3.1M. Further cattle, hay, and machinery sales meant that the sale proceeds were $6.7M.

In November 2014, the bank required us to attend fam debt mediation when our debt was about $4.4M. Now, in 2017, under siege by the bank, our equity was lost.

2018 – NOW: OTHER RELATED MATTERS

In 2018, I wrote to the Office of the Australia Information Commissioner (OAIC) because I could not understand what happened to us. At that time, the CCMC had all the documents. When the OAIC provided copies of my documents, they included a conversation between staff employed by the CCMC and Rabobank. They had exchanged emails whereby the bank and the national monitors agreed to replace the 2004 Code, an essential document in our loan contract, with a 2013 Code.

The motive: Rabobank would not have to pay compensation if it was not prudent and diligent. I can only assume the national industry monitors did this because the federal regulators, ASIC, supervised by Treasurer Scott Morrison at that time would not prosecute such a serious crime.

When I obtained these documents, I believe banks and national industry monitors had been doing this in the past. There is sufficient evidence this crime is systemic. It meant Rabobank and other leading banks were being protected by ministers with powers to override the regulators. Therefore, when Rabobank and the national monitors were entrapped, no action was taken when it was reported to the federal cabinet last year.

In August 2018, I attended meetings at Parliament House with farmers who suffered similar practices by criminal bankers. We later discovered our bank also misled us by withholding essential documents from the 2004 Code.

In 2021, Federal Treasurers Scott Morrison and Josh Frydenberg; and the Federal Attorney Generals, Christian Porter, Michaelia Cash, and now Mark Dreyfus all had evidence of this crime. However, despite having powers to prosecute the guilty parties, they took no action.

Sometime later, ASIC and the responsible Ministers will have to comply with the Rule of Law. This must concern Anthony Albanese’s National Anti-Corruption Commission as it will have to deal with this, so the guilty parties will be removed from the industry.

NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION

On 27 September 2022, Michael West Media writes about Callum Foote’s article ‘NACC or SNACC? Labor delivers its anti-corruption body but will we get to hear about it?’ The article states:

The day has finally arrived: an Australian government today made good on its commitment to legislate an integrity watchdog, the National Anti-Corruption Commission. But there is one major bone of contention … secrecy.

Helen Haines, the independent member for Indi, has long been an outspoken advocate for the necessity of all public hearings in any new federal anti-corruption body.

“For this commission to truly be the best it can be and have the trust of the Australian people, we need time to debate these issues in the public sphere, through the committee process,” Haines said earlier this month.

Helen Haines’ concerns are crucial because Rabobank’s conduct has been extraordinary. It claims to be the world’s foremost agribusiness bank and it may have committed a crime and kept the proceeds. In April 2022, when we filed complaints with ASIC, two Federal Treasurers, Scott Morrison and Josh Frydenberg were instructing ASIC and crimes weren’t discussed.

I am hopeful Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will support Helen Haines’ outspoken comments and ensure a National Anti-Corruption Commission is available to everybody.

Ron Feierabend’s story

 

I am a farmer, and, by God’s good grace, I am a descendant of a family from Germany who for generations, have been solid reliable farmers.  Our history stretches back to the 1500s and, in the latter years, we had come to Australia to continue our agricultural heritage on the vast farms of Queensland, Australia.

In 1959 my family settled in the little town of Gin Gin, Queensland and worked on Wingadee farm some forty miles from Bundaberg and five miles outside Gin Gin where I was born.

I would like to tell you a series of unfortunate events that would find me returning to the world of farming after some years trying with another industry and end up having to fight the longest and hardest battle of my life as a farmer.

In December 2011, I approached Suncorp Bank with an offer, for a $980,000 Term Loan Facility No.1, to purchase Wingadee with the proceeds of my compensation pay-out.

There was no confirmatory communication with me from the bank after submitting the application, but it was approved by the bank three days later. On 23 January 2012, I settled on Wingadee for $1,550,000, with Suncorp providing $980,000 towards the purchase. I provided the balance of the purchase price at $570,000, sourced from monies I had received from the workers compensation payout.

Following a major refinance of my accounts in June 2012 Suncorp decided to greatly increase the loan facility for us to run the farm.

On 24 March 2012, I received Suncorp Bank’s letter of offer, for its $25,000 Business Premium Account Overdraft Facility No. 2 to assist with working capital.

On 1 June 2012, Alan J Gees, of Opteon (Wide Bay), issued a market valuation report for Wingadee, dated 25 May 2012, for $2,100,000. The report was prepared for Peter Treasure of Suncorp for mortgage security purposes.

In June 2012, I received Suncorp’s letter of variation for Term Loan 1, increasing the facility limit from $980,000 to $1,130,000. Then in December, I received Suncorp’s letter of variation for Term Loan 1, increasing the limit from $1,130,000 to $1,149,380.

All seemed to be operating well and a bright future appeared to be on the cards. However, things took a turn for the worst when Cyclone Oswald struck the region in January 2013 affecting many of the farms and properties in and around Bundaberg and Gin Gin. Wingadee was subjected to a 1 in 200-year flood, which materially reduced sugarcane yields in the 2013 harvest season.

We took a tremendous hit with a lot of damage to crops and infrastructure virtually stopping our business dead in its tracks. It was obvious that in order for us to really get back on our feet we would need to borrow more money.  So, in May 2013, I refinanced the loan and overdraught facility with Suncorp on a temporary basis.

In September 2013, I contacted Peter Treasure, because I required additional funding for the continued cost of operating the farm. It had to be completed initially by December 2013 to secure the 2014 cane crop. The bank required me to apply to the Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (“QRAA”). I completed the application in November for exceptional disaster assistance and a grant package of $333,611.

Initially QRAA declined my application, but it wasn’t until January 2014 that they formerly notified me of the rejection. I appealed to the Chief Executive Officer of QRAA to reconsider the application. With Suncorp manager’s help, we were able to draft up a new budget plan to submit to QRAA in support of my appeal.

As this process was underway, I believed that the Suncorp Bank loan and overdraught facilities of refinancing were proceeding as per the application. I heard nothing from the bank to the contrary and once again I received no documentation from them either.

As already mentioned, the Suncorp’s bank manager was working with me in preparing a new budget plan for QRAA, and so I had no reason to believe that there were any problems with it. The QRAA appeal was declined three times.

What I didn’t understand was that Suncorp had employed a Credit Specialist for advice with appeals and refinancing, yet during the appeals process the bank manager stated he had never had a successful loan through QRAA.

Suncorp Bank refinanced my loan package six months after I had requested the funds. As a result of the late financing, income for the next 12 months virtually lost.

During 2013 and 2014, Wingadee was subjected to a historic drought, which materially reduced sugarcane yields in the 2014 harvest season.

When I was signing of my loan contract in March 2014, the assistant bank manager, Pauline Nicholson was helping me. She told me she “altered” the documents. When I asked her for her help and told her I was looking to refinance with QRAA for a low interest drought loan, she literally spat in my face and angrily told me to do it by myself.

I was a little surprised by this but didn’t react to it immediately and left it until April 2014 when I felt compelled to find out exactly what “alterations” she had made. I asked her for a copy of the agreement and the budget figures, and she printed a copy for me.

To say I was flabbergasted is an understatement! The document she handed me was nothing like my budget figures. They had been significantly altered and were not the same as the ones I submitted to the bank. Maybe her hissy fit was because QRAA may also have examined the books and found the bank altered the documents, which is fraud. Or was it because the new Suncorp loan, if terminated, would affect success-based commissions to parties who took part in this event.

At that time, we were trying to get back on our feet and the costs were adding up for restocking, replanting and repairs to the farm’s infrastructure. Even then, I did not believe that Wingadee was in danger of repossession or that we wouldn’t recover, but it took a long time to get back into production and reduce the debts, and we did not recover.

On 16 April 2014, Wingadee Solar Farms Pty Ltd was incorporated with the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (“ASIC”). I was the Sole Director, Sole Secretary and Sole Member from that date.  It was setup to establish a solar farm on Wingadee and I applied for a 20MW network connection with Ergon Energy on 14 July 2014. The network connection never materialised, due to the dispute with Suncorp.

Six months later, I reluctantly contacted Pauline Nicholson seeking additional funding for my next years’ cropping program. The meetings continued until March 2015. During this period, Suncorp Bank had more budgets and cashflow projections, but still took an unreasonable amount of time processing my requests. With this delay, the peanut crop was planted late, resulting in a loss of about $30,000.

On 10 February 2015, Alan J Gees, of Opteon Property Group, issued a valuation report of Wingadee for the bank, dated 27 January 2015 of $2,310,000. It was prepared for James Noye, Suncorp, for mortgage security purposes. In March and then in June, I received the bank’s letters of variation. The first required me to market Wingadee for sale.

On 1 August 2015, I ceased paying Suncorp Bank’s debt repayments.

Then in October, I received Suncorp’s letter of default, requesting immediate payment of arrears of $24,866.20, in relation to Term Loan 1, Term Loan 2 and my overdraft facility. The bank advised that if the payment of arrears was not made by 29 October 2015, all my loans would become immediately repayable in full.

As a result of Suncorp’s misconduct and its failure to provide funding in a timely and reasonable manner during the 2014 and 2015, I could not meet my debt commitments or continue with my cropping program during the next three years. For example, my cane crop losses in 2016 were $290,000, with further losses therefrom.

After all this, I had to attend farm debt mediation with the bank in June 2016.

There were several stops and starts during mediation, but the bank adopted delaying tactics. It was becoming a bitter and very frustrating process. The mediations collapsed with no agreement.

I walked out of the mediation because my solicitor had cross-examined Suncorp Bank’s Assistant Manager Edwin Brak, and the mediator Lee Nevison had apparently formed a view that Edwin Brak and DLA Piper’s Danielle Keyes had misled him.

Many times, my solicitor pointed out that the fraudulent actions of the bank by falsifying agreements and budget figures was unlawful. The bank did not provide all the essential documents my lawyers requested for several occasions. It also denied knowledge of my disabilities and mental health issues, which it had evidence of in 2011, when I signed my first loan contracts.

In February 2017, I had discussions with Esco Pacific about a potential solar farm on Wingadee. In May, I signed a Licence Agreement with CWP Renewables to explore the viability of it. Recently the option expired partly due to a delay with Suncorp disputes. It might have generated millions of dollars in profits and with employment, but it failed.

On 9 October 2017, I was approached by Bruce Angel to agist up to 200 head of cattle on the farm. This would have provided me with revenue of $2,816.66 per month. Bruce Angel withdrew his interest, after being made aware of my dispute with the bank.

On 22 December 2017, Suncorp’s Wendy Calcott proposed a “without prejudice” meeting in January/February 2018, to resolve our disputes. This meeting did not happen. The bank, without my knowledge commenced foreclosure proceedings to evict me. Even though the valuers had increased the value of the farm, the bank later appointed receivers.

On 20 July 2018, John Logan of John Logan & Associates, issued a market valuation report for Wingadee, dated 20 July 2018, for $2,400,000. The report was prepared for Suncorp Bank.

On 10 September 2018, the Solar Farms Company was deregistered by ASIC.

On 12 December 2018, I attended Queensland Farm Debt Mediation with Suncorp Bank for the second time. The meeting was held at DLA Piper’s Brisbane office and DLA Piper’s representative was Kon Tsiakis. Suncorp’s manager Gerald Uncle also attended.

On 8 February 2019, my treating Psychiatrist, Dr Natasha Laukens, wrote to Michael Cameron, Wendy Calcott, Christopher Turvey and Gerald Uncle, supporting my request for Suncorp Bank’s dispute to be settled as soon as possible. In June, the bank appointed John Richard Park and Kelly-Anne Lavina Trenfield of FTI Consulting as its Receivers and Managers over Wingadee.

On 8 October 2019, John Logan of John Logan & Associates, issued a market valuation report for Wingadee, dated 8 October 2019, for $2,465,000. The report was prepared for the bank’s Receivers and Managers.

On 11 November 2019, I received a cash offer of $2,700,000 for Wingadee from Avocado Hill Trust, in writing. I did not accept the offer because of my dispute with Suncorp. The next day, Matthew Leslie, of Suncorp Bank, commenced a Customer Advocate Review, which continued for almost 12 months, until October 2020.

On 3 July 2020, I received an email from Suncorp Bank with an attached building rectification quote, which would cost more than $115,000. Among other things, the bank claimed that the house on Wingadee was a health hazard and safety concern.

On 4 February 2021, I received a notice of default to exercise a power of sale from Suncorp Bank, signed by DLA Piper Australia. The notice required me to pay the bank the sum of $2,469,927.04 by 12 March 2021.

On 18 February 2021, my treating Psychiatrist, Dr Natasha Laukens provided a further letter in relation to my mental state. Dr Laukens noted my declining mental condition was due to my father being diagnosed with a terminal illness and my dispute with Suncorp Bank. My solicitor, Geoffrey Cunningham of Payne, Butler & Lang, then forwarded a copy to the bank.

On 15 March 2021, Suncorp instructed Receivers and Managers to exercise their powers and take possession of Wingadee. They filed a statement of claim and commenced proceedings against me in the Supreme Court of Queensland.

On 9 August 2021, I exercised my rights to file complaints with the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (“AFCA”) because the bank altered essential documents in my contract and its staff had changed my budgets. On 21 October, AFCA replied, No. 822449, that my case was closed.

On 12 November 2021, an enforcement warrant was filed in the Supreme Court by DLA Piper, proceedings No: BS 2992/2021. It authorised the Receivers and Managers to enter and take delivery of Wingadee. Suncorp offered to pay relocation expenses and 6 months basic rental. I was offered two days to accept and sixteen days to vacate my house and property.

On 30 June 2022, Term Loan 1 balance was $2,627,152.41, which included Suncorp Bank’s enforcement costs. On 1 September, Wingadee was passed in at auction and the property was then listed for sale by the Receivers and Managers.

I am still in dispute with Suncorp Bank’s directors, and I have negative net assets.

If the farm was sold, the Suncorp loan would be paid out, but I would still have money left over from the proceeds. I have lost millions of dollars fighting the bank, but it will still have to meet its responsibilities under the loan contract.

Over this period, I have dealt the bank’s misconduct on numerous occasions because it misappropriated funds and attempted to leave me and my family with nothing.

Where did my money go?

My money went to the bank’s directors and staff, their lawyers DLA Piper, Receivers and Managers FTI Consulting, and other agencies and associates.

Conclusion

I would like to explain that Suncorp Bank:

  1. Was not a prudent and diligent lender.
  2. Intimidated, bullied, and put undue pressure on me.
  3. Breached contracts by withholding documents pertinent to my rights.
  4. Did not attend farm debt mediation in good faith or ethically, which it caused serious losses in my trading, and
  5. Caused material economic losses and with irreparable reputational damage.

As a result of the practices by my bank’s directors and staff, I suffered a financial loss more than $3.7M.

Who would ever have thought that Queensland farmers would come under attack by a few powerful people in government, and have seen the farmers’ assets and savings decimated?

Who else would believe that this is where our losses came from, not from a foreign enemy or an invading army, but from seemingly friendly bankers?

Nobody would expect their farms and assets to be taken away by predators, who are regulated by government bodies and ministers supposed to protect us, instead of being the enemy we dreaded.

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