The Unpleasant Truth About Australian Banking

Criminal Loans

Introduction

On 14 December 2017, Prime Minister Turnbull and the Governor General signed the Letters Patent. The next day, Commissioner Hayne required the banks and regulators to provide him with copies of all documents they had in relation to misconduct, and practices that had been below community standards since 2008. Neither the banks nor the regulators provided this information to Commissioner.

When banks’ chairmen and regulators swore to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, they misled the Royal Commission by concealing Australia’s greatest crimes. It meant that the disputes during the past 5 years could be discussed publicly.

In August 2018, the Senate recommend that the Royal Commission be extended. The recommendations were referred to the Prime Minister and Treasurer but were overturned.  Only 27 cases were dealt with by the Commissioner. The cases set out on this site provide evidence of Australia’s greatest crimes.

These cases, which weren’t heard in 2018, are being published here by small businesses and farmers. They provide evidence that the practices of the banks and regulators are more serious than those of Bernie Madoff who, in 2009, was jailed for 150 years and died in jail last year. However, no chief executives of the 8 banks referred to in those cases have yet been prosecuted.

These chief executives and the directors were the Architects of the 2004 Code. They, and regulators, ASIC and APRA, knew about the crimes but did not suspend or cancel their licenses. These 27 stories are unsettling and disturbing.

Year Complaints received Not resolved in 5 days Difficulty requests
2013/14 897,987 107,761 271,703
2014/15 1,099,272 99,000 288,139
2015/16 1,226,093 85,200 296,071
2016/17 1,189,832 91,630 279,000
2017/18 1,130,037 101,703 298,569
Total 5,543,221 485,293 1,433,482
  • All
  • ANZ
  • Bankwest
  • Bendigo
  • Commonwealth
  • Criminal Loans
  • NAB
  • Rabobank
  • Suncorp
  • Westpac

Ruined by ANZ Bank

Rob Willmott’s Story My name is Robert Willmott. I am one of the ANZ Bank’s victims who have attempted to protect our rights under our contract with the bank without success. My experience with the bank and the regulators suggests the bank did not act in good faith in our case from the beginning of […]

Farmers Complain No Reply

Ronald Feierabend’s Story 2 My name is Ron Feierabend, one of Suncorp Bank’s victims for ages now. I am keeping trying to resolve disputes with the bank, but this is proved a challenging and impossible process, not only for me but for all other Suncorp Bank’s customers. For the past 12 months, I have repeatedly […]

Bendigo: a lender or fraudster?

Gerard O’Grady Story My name is Gerard O’Grady. I would like to share my bad experiences with my bank, which I should not have trusted for ages now. In partnership with my parents, I ran a very profitable cattle farm. I was also involved in land development, which, if Bendigo Bank had allowed me to […]

Ruined by Commonwealth Bank

Neil Hermes Story My name is Neil Hermes. This is my story relating to the bank’s misconduct and its devasting effects to my family and life. In 2007, I signed a loan contract with Bankwest in order to purchase a tourism property at Jervis Bay on the south coast of NSW. This was an important […]

CBA Killing Farming Business

Craig Perry Story My name is Craig Perry. This is my story, my worst experience with one of the leading banks in Australia for ages. I was cheated by the bank since we accepted the bank’s first offer for our loan facilities. In 2010, my family signed a loan contract with Commonwealth Bank at Swan […]

CBA – Unconscionable Lender

John Wharton Story My name is John Wharton. I would like to tell you about my experience with my lenders, which committed one of Australia’s greatest crimes. I was a Councilor in 1991, before being appointed Mayor of Richmond in 1997. At that time, I was managing my family’s farming business with my wife. In […]

Australia is Bankster’s Paradise

Archer Field’s Story In 1990, a 99-year lease of Caves House was granted to Jenolan Caves Resort Pty Ltd (JCR), and subsequently, Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (the Trust) Board was set up by an earlier Liberal Government. Silkbard Pty Ltd (later renamed JCR) and the Trust were members of a Public Private Partnership (“the PPP”). […]

Cheated by NSW Government

JMA’s Story In 2005, the Jenolan Caves House lessee experienced financial difficulty following a decision by the government to not reappoint the Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (the Trust) Board. It meant the government breached the National Park and Wildlife Act; it was in breach of the Services Agreement. At the same time, St George Bank […]

NAB, Bank or Predatory Lender?

Priestleys’ Story   My name is Claire Priestley, on behalf of my brother, Chris Priestley, I would like to share our experiences with one of the leading banks in Australia, which damaged our properties and life. We have filed complaints with the bank’s directors, the regulators, and the government at all levels, from state to […]

Bankwest and the Contagion

Pat Viceconte’s Story My family was the victim of a predatory loan we signed with Bankwest for $9.7M in July 2008. I had then several businesses: Building and Land development, Livestock Farming, Import and Export of Livestock, and Commercial Property Rentals. I needed the funds to pay out my NAB facilities. On 14 June 2008, […]

Bendigo Bank’s Worst Victim

Wayne Prichard’s story My name is Wayne Prichard, and this is my story about deceitful banking practices by Rural Bank and its owners Bendigo Bank. I have outlined events that were suppressed following my signing of a deed of forbearance with the bank at mediation. I reluctantly signed the deed because of poor advice from […]

CBA’s Deceitful Code & Conduct

Michael Murphy & Tracey Moore’s Story Prior to 2008, I was living at Mount Newman (“Newman”), and Tracey was living in Perth. We wanted to purchase a home in Perth for our future. We discussed this with Commonwealth Bank, and it loaned us funds to purchase an investment property at Newman. This made sense because […]

Rabobank’s Directors Must Win

Introduction Lloyd and I have farming in our blood. We grew up on dairy farms and have a lifelong association with the land. Buying our own farm in 1989 was the result of years of hard work. If things had gone differently, our adult children would now be taking over the farms for our grandchildren. […]

Suncorp Bank and its Criminals

Ron Feierabend’s story   I am a farmer, and, by God’s good grace, I am a descendant of a family from Germany who for generations, have been solid reliable farmers.  Our history stretches back to the 1500s and, in the latter years, we had come to Australia to continue our agricultural heritage on the vast […]

Genner’s Predatory Westpac loan

My name is Paul Nielsen, and I would like to tell you a story about Ann Genner, who I met a few years ago. Ann arrived in Australia from Berlin with her mother shortly after the end of the Second World War. Her story is particularly disturbing: she was cheated by her bank and its […]

CBA Sells, Won’t Pay Damages

Selwyn Krepp’s story   My name is Selwyn Krepp and I have been trying to resolve disputes with Commonwealth Bank. This has proved difficult. In 2009, I had two investment properties in Queensland, units located at Cairns and a house nearby. Both investments were in good condition and the Bank required me to use them […]

Suncorp McLoughlin and Crimes

Jim Davidson’s Story   My name is William James Davidson and I arrived in Australia when I was 46 years old. I wanted to set up a family business. I was operating as a sole trader prior to 2008. In May, I set up the Far North Queensland Cattle Company Pty Ltd ACN 131 125 […]

Ruined by ANZ Bank

Rob Willmott’s Story My name is Robert Willmott. I am one of the ANZ Bank’s victims who have attempted to protect our rights under our contract with the bank without success. My experience with the bank and the regulators suggests the bank did not act in good faith in our case from the beginning of […]

Rob Willmott’s Story

My name is Robert Willmott. I am one of the ANZ Bank’s victims who have attempted to protect our rights under our contract with the bank without success. My experience with the bank and the regulators suggests the bank did not act in good faith in our case from the beginning of our loan period.

I was a Landmark customer for 10 years before it was purchased by ANZ bank (‘ANZ’). During that period, I always complied with the loan agreement and never missed a payment. In late 2009, when ANZ purchased Landmark’s loans, we had no banking services and our banking contract with ANZ only settled down towards the end of 2010. When the new bank manager was appointed, our loan contract was significantly reduced, and our successful cattle trading enterprise was shut down.

The decision by ANZ contrasted with its responsibility under our loan contract, as our debt-to-equity relationship was less than 50%, and it substantially starved our revenue and effectively shut our business down. This was not the reason why we were borrowing funds from the bank; we needed trading funds to generate earnings. The new manager did not have the training or experience to manage a farming business like ours and when he called in our trading loan with 30 days noted we went into default.

Having taken away from us the funding we required to continue trading profitably, ANZ forced us into selling our farming lands and assets, which meant for the next few years we were struggling to survive. I had to change my work plans which had proved successful for the last 15 years and obtained employment at Mount Newman mines, and our family business was destroyed.

Prior to Royal Commission, we went to Perth and explained the position my family was in, but no action was taken. At about that time, there was a lot of media coverage about how the bank was using the police to foreclose on farms. My family decided to survive what appeared to be one of the most disgraceful periods in the Australian banking industry and without our family’s support, we would have lost all our property and assets as a result of the way ANZ treated us.

I now believe this should not have happened and that ASIC had a responsibility to protect my rights. I have discussed this with people who attended meetings at Parliament House in 2018 and 2019 and I believe ASIC was not an honest cop because it claims it cannot act for any individuals, which has been the case since self-regulation was introduced by banks in 2003.

I believe that ANZ had a duty to advise me of my rights under the 2004 Code of Banking Practice (‘the 2004 Code’) and the AS 4269-1995 Standard, which were an essential part of our loan contract. The bank, its directors, and its licensee had not complied with the internal dispute resolution procedure in the Code, which stated banks must resolve disputes free of charge (clause 35.1(a)). The bank and ASIC knew this but were involved in deception by omission when keeping this information from me.

The deception by omission occurred throughout my dispute period. The Code, in clause 35.1(b), noted leading legal minds at this time had published the essential elements of effective complaint handling in the AS 4269-1995 Standard. As I did not have access to this document, ASIC took no action when it must have known that ANZ could deceive me when I was attempting to resolve my disputes.

And following are details of my story:

My family has owned and operated the farm at “Four Mile Hill” since 1900. In 1998, I acquired Four Mile Hill from the family and borrowed approximately $2M. From 1998 to December 2009, I had debt facilities from Landmark, and, during that time, I met all interest repayments in full and on-time.

Mid 2003, I acquired another farm at Scott River with the notion of developing it for sale. One of the properties was sold in 2005 at a considerable profit, which was then used to service debt and fund improvements to the Four Mile Hill farming operation.

I have been involved in the sand and extraction industry for 20 years. I selected properties with gravel reserves and potential for extraction, to increase overall profitability and cashflow.

On 12 February 2004, I received a Landmark letter of offer for $1M. The security is taken as the first-ranking mortgage over rural property and bill of sale over cattle.

And 3 weeks later, we received another Landmark’s offer for a $400k Seasonal Facility.

On 10 November 2004, as Director, I received Landmark’s offer for a $50k facility.

On 31 January 2005, I received Landmark’s offer of $2.75M. The next day, I received an identical offer.

In August 2005, I purchased a farm neighboring Four Mile Hill. The acquisition was to be funded by the sale of two properties, with the balance being an interest-only loan provided by Landmark. The overarching plan was then to repay the loan in full, from proceeds of the Layman Road development.

At the same time, I owned a 100 ha block on Layman Road that was situated within 2km of Busselton CBD. This property had significant development potential, for which offers were received from developers, that were over and above our total loan value with Landmark. With support from the State planning commissions and Landmark, I commenced rezoning the lot to residential. Agricultural rezoning was a less onerous form of subdivision. The rezoning could take up to 5 years to complete, which was factored into cashflow forecast and budgets that supported the Landmark loans. Furthermore, Principal of Action Real Estate in Busselton, estimated that once the Layman Road rezoning was complete, the value could be in the vicinity of $9M to $12M.

On 22 September 2005, I received a Landmark loan terms letter for a recent application for increased budget limits, relating mainly to interest rate options, along with enclosing the Original Letter of Offer, Copy of the Letter of Offer, and Settlement Authority for Signing.

On 14 December 2006, I received a Landmark Letter of Offer extending the $50k budget limit to 31 October 2007.

In January 2009, the second Scott River property was sold at a considerable profit.

On 16 September 2009, I received an email from Paul Torrisi of Landmark outlining his notion of the cashflow forecast assumptions. Among other things, the email notes the limit (assumed credit) of $11.8M with cashflow peaks at $13.5M (i.e., extra $1.7M), operating surplus of $840K, the interest of $920K, and machinery repayments of $133K.

On 14 October 2009, we received a Landmark letter of variation. The letter noted a total amount of credit of $13.5M.

On 8 December 2009, ANZ acquired the Landmark Loan and Deposit Books. From this date, ANZ provided no support, didn’t understand our situation, didn’t provide a banking manager for many months and, when they did, implemented a rapid debt reduction plan requiring all funds from land sales, cattle sales, and asset sales to be utilised to repay ANZ debt.

On 19 October 2010, I received an email from Garry Harvey from ANZ in relation to the cash flow forecast and budget for the 12-month period to 30 June 2011.

On 21 December 2010, I received ANZ Letter of Offer for a $4.2M Revolving Agri Line, interest rate currently 9.26% pa and the term ending on either or both a Review Event and an event of Default; $2.5M business Loan (Fixed Rate); $5.8M Business Loan (Variable Rate); and $500k Business Loan (Variable Rate); along with a $5.SM Business Loan (Variable Rate); and $500k Business Loan (Variable Rate) both with only a 30-day expiry period. To raise 6.3 min 30 days over the Christmas period was impossible. It is our belief that this was a deliberate act to put us into default resulting in increased interest rates and bank charges, not to mention the mental and emotional stress this caused (21 December 2010, 4 days before Xmas-Letter of Offer from ANZ Bank)

I believe ANZ set us up to fail, as it was not realistic to formally list $8M worth of individual lots within a month nor was it appropriate for them to advise on what land assets to sell i.e. the bank was not providing formal advice on what was the most feasible properties to sell to reduce debt. Providing a monthly term for facilities totaling $6.3M appears counter-productive and costly, with a loan term reflecting realistic times to achieve the land sales, as per the overarching strategy, potentially more reasonable.

It took ANZ more than 6 months to provide the 1-month loan and it didn’t understand their business, nor did they provide any support.

On 1 February 2011, ANZ issued a Notice of Default. On 16 March 2011, we met with ANZ, at our farm. The meeting was to discuss options to extend debt facilities, with the following to be provided prior to 31 March 2011, including revised Cashflow forecast to 31 December 2011; detail of projected inflows and outflows; statement of financial position; update on listed assets and confirmed sales thereof; provision of signed 2010 financial statements and tax returns; debtor, creditor and ATO balance reports as of 31 December 2010; accountant prepared Interim financial reports to 31 December 2010; detail of cattle trading, gravel and sand excavation and cropping operations; and ANZ seek to take out life policy mortgage as security too.

In April 2011, we were forced to sell all cattle, due to ANZ pressure. As per our 2011 accountant-prepared financial statements, a total of 4,015 Cattle were sold for $3.9M which left only 15 cattle on hand as of 30 June 2011. There were 2,956 cattle on hand as of 30 June 2010. Further, we had a substantial forward contract on cattle and were forced, by ANZ, to sell cattle that we had only just acquired, which also meant that we could not fulfill the forward contract requirements. This resulted in material financial losses.

On 7 July 2011, we received ANZ’s letter of offer for Agri Finance, Revolving Agri Line, and Business Loan facilities. The facilities totaled $12.1M with a 12-month loan term on the $11.1M loans and no expiry on the $1M overdraft. The overdraft limit had been reduced from $4.2M to $1M, which meant that we had less short-term cash funding available. The interest and fees were significantly higher than that of Landmark. There was a significant amount of financial and non-financial covenants that had to be adhered too.

In December 2012, we received notice of failure to perform from ANZ. Further, the proposed sale of Lots 283 and 801 Lindberg ultimately failed due to not being able to fund (ANZ would not provide funds) the provision of power to the lots.

On 6 June 2013, we received ANZ’s Notice of Arrears. One month later, we received ANZ’s notice of arrears and failure to perform.

On 27 November 2013, we paid out all ANZ facilities and refinanced with Rural Bank, with the support of a $1.5M loan from family.

ANZ did its own analysis of the property sales and concluded that they were not undersold. ANZ claimed that the properties were sold for $591k more than the most recent valuations.

We had to sell off contracting plant and equipment, to fund ANZ’s demands, which meant we would no longer be able to extract gravel or sand.

On 31 December 2021, David Neve & Associates (Agricultural & Management Consultants) Issued a report to us, comparing 2009 Hegney Property Valuations against Actual Sales Prices (‘Neve Report’). Neve Report compared the realised property asset sales prices, from March 2011 to November 2013, against the 2009 Hegney market valuation reports prepared for the same. The Neve Report concluded that we had lost $3.9M (including interest), due to property assets being undersold from claimed pressure from ANZ. As of the time of this report, we are still in dispute with ANZ.

ANZ damaged our business by doing the following:

    • providing pure asset or ‘predatory’ loans without considering serviceability requirements.
    • providing short-term high interest-bearing loans not suited to our circumstances, not in our best interests, and not suitable for the underlying assets.
    • creating various debt facility breaches by way of not being a prudent and diligent lender and overall incompetence due to a lack of understanding of the overarching business development plan.
    • bullying, intimidating and putting undue pressure on us
    • breaching the loan contracts by withholding documents pertinent to our rights.
    • not acting in good faith or ethically when, which caused material losses in lost trading, under sale of assets, and lost opportunities.
    • causing material financial losses and irreparable reputational damage.

The forensic accountant’s financial loss report states that the result of the assessment of my net past financial loss is $28.2M on a pre-income tax basis.

In February 2018, we met with ANZ to discuss issues we experienced during our period of banking with ANZ, following the ANZ takeover of the Landmark loan book. After the meeting, we wrote to Ben Steinberg in May, stating that at the conclusion of the meeting we were told that our case was being referred to higher management for review and that ANZ would be in touch soon. Given that we have had no contact over the 11 weeks since the meeting, we have decided it appropriate to forward a copy of the major items raised and discussed during the meeting, noting:

    1. Eight-month delayed representation by ANZ following Landmark takeover. Following the ANZ takeover of the Landmark loan book, there was an approximate eight-month period between December 2009 and June 2010 when we had absolutely no bank representation with either our previous Landmark contacts or new ANZ management.
    2. Loss of our banking file. In our first meeting with ANZ bank manager Garry Harvey in mid-June 2010, he greeted us by stating that ANZ had “lost our Landmark file” during the Landmark takeover. This was confirmed by Ben Steinberg at the 13 February 2018 meeting. The ANZ did not explain how the ‘file’ was lost, nor was there any explanation as to why there was no hard copy or electronic backup of the information contained within our file. We believe that our file has been purposely ‘misplaced’ owing to specific content that would be damaging for ANZ given their actions.
    3. Lack of clarity regarding new ANZ terms and our legal rights. We were unaware that we had any option other than to sign the new agreements with ANZ. At no stage did ANZ advise or recommend we seek an independent legal opinion regarding changes to our existing loans with Landmark (Al0/10).
    4. Lending structures. Sharan Safe (ANZ) claimed that Landmark was operating under different lending structures (compared to ANZ), and this justified implementing dramatic debt reduction across our operations.
    5. Unjustified and unrealistic debt reduction goals. Approximately eight months following the Landmark takeover and six months from ANZ interim accounts being opened, we received a written demand to reduce debt by $6.3 million within 30 days (by 31 January 2011) along with a further condition for $8 million worth of land to be listed within four weeks. This target was both unjustified (given that we had never previously defaulted on a loan repayment in the history of our farming operations), and unrealistic property prices had declined significantly due to an oversupply of farmland being placed on the market by other farmers with similar demands from the ANZ). In the 13 February, 2018 meeting Andrew Mclaughlin stated that our “asset should have been valued at $24 million, not the $16 million assessed by ANZ”,
    6. Contradictory advice from ANZ personnel, with confusion continuing in 2018. In December 2010 we received a letter of demand from ANZ forcing us to reduce our debt by $6.3 million within 30 days (by 31 January 2011) along with a further condition for $8 million worth of land to be listed within four weeks. In March 2011 Keith Weybury told us that he didn’t want us to move too fast with land sales because market prices had been so damaged by a large number of impacted farmers. Roland Davis then told us not to take any notice of Keith and Lou, and to sell as quickly as possible. The confusion continues in 2018 when Ben Steinberg emailed Andrew Mclaughlin on 21 January 2018 and stated, “a cursory review of the matter indicates that there was no enforcement by ANZ and that the Willmott’s undertook voluntary asset sales and repaid the Bank before moving on”.
    7. ANZ’s strategy to remove all cash flow. In addition to marketing land, ANZ insisted on selling all cattle within the feedlot to further reduce debt rapidly. The ANZ then refused to provide ANY capital to restock, even though we had significant supply contracts on offer including over 5,000 head of cattle worth $3 million (income lost over a 12-month period). This removed the bulk of our cash flow and eventually forced us to default on loan repayments …… for the first time ever! We had offers from Vanessa’s father and brother to inject cash into the business to buy cattle required to secure the feedlot contracts, but this was also rejected by the ANZ. We had spent the previous three years heavily investing in building the feedlot infrastructure and developing associated markets.
    8. Bully tactics by Roland Davis. After the forced sale of cattle within our feedlot, refusal to fund restocking to secure future contracts, forced sale and marketing across the majority of our asset base, and subsequent loan defaulting for the first time in our history of operation, we received a request from Roland Davis to increase our life insurance policies.
    9. ANZ ‘clawback’. We consider ourselves to have been an ANZ ‘clawback’ as per ANZ letter of offer 1. The altered loans and associated conditions forced our business into a position where it was unable to trade.
    10. The First Letter of Offer in December 2010 confirms ANZ was indeed in the wrong. Landmark gave a further advance to Willmott nine months prior to ANZ Bank’s first letter of offer on 21 December 2010. The Landmark loan and conditions extended through to 2016. The first letter of offer from Garry Harvey of ANZ had a cover page that said “NORMAL – The loan agreement confirms the extension of existing banking facilities and includes a condition for you to identify lots that can be sold to reduce debt to a more manageable level.” The letter of offer then specifies a reduction in debt of $6.3 million within one month, with a condition for $8 million worth of land to be placed on the market within the same time frame. The cover letter actually contradicted the offer being made.
    11. In the 13 February, 2018 meeting Ben Steinberg was unsure what the previous loan arrangements were with Landmark, as ANZ had lost the file. Ben suggested that the first ANZ letter of offer likely reflected the existing Landmark facility. Rob confirmed that this certainly was not the case. Ben said he would be going to have another look for the Willmott Landmark in the archives but could not promise that it would be found.

But we again did not receive any response from the bank.

We have reviewed our documents and found that there is evidence that the bank damaged us by not complying with many clauses in the 2004 Code as listed follow:

    • not providing effective disclosure of information (Clause 2.1(b)(i))
    • not providing information to you in plain language (Clause 2.1(d)
    • not acting fairly and reasonably towards customers in a consistent and ethical manner (Clause 2.2)
    • not complying with all relevant laws relating to banking services (Clause 3.1)
    • not ensuring its staff (and its authorised representatives) to be trained so that they have adequate knowledge of the provisions of this Code (Clause 7(b))
    • not applying to the internal process for handling disputes with customers which is free of charge (Clause 35.1(a))
    • not meeting the standards set out in Australian Standard AS4269-1995 or any other industry dispute standard or guideline which ASIC declares to apply to this Code ((Clause 35.1(b))
    • not adhering to the timeframes specified in this clause 35 ((Clause 35.1(c)), and
    • not providing written reasons for its decision on a dispute ((Clause 35.1(d))

I attempted to explain the serious allegations of misconduct and practices by these banks which were more serious than the practices by Bernie Madoff, who was America’s greatest fraudster. However, I have not received any response nor an explanation of why the banks destroyed my business and my family’s life.

I will keep going filing complaints until the banks provide me with fair compensation and an apology.

 

Ronald Feierabend’s Story 2

My name is Ron Feierabend, one of Suncorp Bank’s victims for ages now. I am keeping trying to resolve disputes with the bank, but this is proved a challenging and impossible process, not only for me but for all other Suncorp Bank’s customers.

For the past 12 months, I have repeatedly written to the bank and the regulators (ASIC, APRA, Commonwealth Ombudsman, etc.) alleging the bank dishonestly obtained a financial advantage and damaged our properties, but neither the bank nor regulators investigated my complaints.

To start my process, in August 2021, I wrote to Suncorp Bank’s Relationship Manager, Agribusiness Central Queensland, Mr. Paul Kirchner, stating:

The 2004 Code of Banking Practice, an essential part of my loan contract, was not given to me by the bank either before or when I signed my contract.

Mr Christopher Doogan AM acting for the bank and the Australian Bankers Association, on 13 June 2017 informed the Senate Economic References Committee Inquiry into Consumer Protection in the Banking, Insurance and Financial Sector:

  1. The Code was developed and controlled by the Australian Bankers’ Association, and,
  2. Once the bank subscribes to the Code, it becomes mandatory for that bank to comply with it.

I am willing to sign a Declaration that the bank did not provide me with a copy of the 2004 Code, nor did it comply with the Code when I was trying to resolve complaints.

The bank’s failure to provide me with the 2004 Code was deceitful, which meant I did not know what the bank’s responsibilities were nor what my rights were.

I am looking forward to meeting with you in order to resolve my complaints, which have to be dealt with free of charge.

Without any response from Mr. Kirchner, in September 2021, I again wrote to him, stating:

I have written to you on several occasions regarding allegations of misconduct by your bank. The bank did not provide me with the 2004 Code of Banking Practice either before or when I signed the loan contract in 2012.

This disappointed me because, without this Code, I was not able to access the essential elements of complaints handling in AS 4269-1995 Standard. It concerned me that the bank did not have a properly functioning complaint handling service, and this caused me a significant disadvantage.

In July 2019, ASIC stated that ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 was part of clause 35.1(b) of the 2004 Code. The failure to include this in the 2004 Code was unfair, as this clause only stated, ‘any other industry dispute standards or guideline which ASIC declares to apply to this Code’. I suggest the Australian Bankers Association should have included Regulatory Guide 165.

I believe my bank did not meet these standards when I filed complaints. Instead, the bank did not comply with provisions in the 2004 Code and the essential elements in AS 4269-1995 Standard when dealing with the serious allegation in my complaints.

I require a commitment from you and your directors to revisit my complaints and comply with this Code and the rule of law within 21 days.

I look forward to your confirmation that you and the bank will resolve my complaints free of charge.

I repeatedly wrote to Mr. Kirchner without success.

On 15 April 2022, I signed a Statutory Declaration and sent it to the bank, stating:

I signed a loan contract with Suncorp Bank in 2012, when John Mulcahy, Chief Executive, promised to comply with the 2004 Code. But he misled me.

When I signed the contract, the bank’s directors dishonestly told me disputes would be resolved free of charge, as set out in clause 35.1 of the 2004 Code. They said:

We will have an internal process for handling disputes with you. This process will (a) be free of charge; and (b) meet the standards set out in Australian Standard AS4269-1995 or any other industry dispute standard or guideline which ASIC declares to apply to this Code.

Not until 2021, did farmers who attended Parliament House meetings in 2018 and 2019 know which standard or guideline ASIC declares to apply to this Code. Bankers and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) deceived millions of customers between 2003 and 2014 because they did not know the guide referred to in clause 35.1(b) was ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001).

Prior to publishing the 2004 Code, ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) was in place. My bank’s directors concealed this regulatory guide, using extortion to damage farmers like me. They misled the Royal Commission and were the architects of Australia’s greatest crime. This was a national problem indiscriminately destroying the lives of individuals and farmers.

On 3 June 2022, I wrote to Ms. Christine McLoughlin AM, the bank’s chair, stating:

I wrote to you on 24 May 2022 because your Chief Executive John Mulcahy and his board adopted the 2004 Code without including ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) in clause 35.1(b).

Without it, farmers could not resolve disputes free of charge, nor could the bank attend Farm Debt Mediation in good faith. This is not an allegation, and Suncorp then took possession of our farm dishonestly.

I am also writing to Julie-Ann Jordan, Program Officer, Farm Business Debt Mediation, Queensland Rural, and Industry Development Authority because this is a systemic problem and has damaged other Suncorp clients.

The attached document identifies this practice was in place in 2004. The Code Compliance Monitoring Committee’s Bulletin 8 requires external parties attending mediation to advise us that they will ‘be handling dispute resolution and are obliged to comply with clause 35 of the Code.’

Without this guide, the mediator and DLA Piper did not meet this obligation when attending Farm Debt Mediation and the damages to us were significant.

Please rectify this oversight within 7 days so that the bank and its lawyers will not sell our farms.

Again, on 5 July 2022, I wrote to Suncorp Bank’s Chair, Ms. Christine McLoughlin, stating:

I refer to my letter of 30 June 2022, which set out my concerns with the way your bank has handled its responsibilities since my family has been customers.

My 30 June letter identified practices that your bank should have addressed prior to the review by Commissioner Kenneth Hayne and Rowena Orr in 2018. I would like to highlight the practices that you have not dealt with appropriately.

  1. In May 2004, chairmen and directors of subscribing banks, including Suncorp Bank, claimed that the 2003 and 2004 Code ‘will have an internal process for handling disputes with [customers] and [it] will be free of charge’.
  2. Your bank adopted the 2004 Code which claimed it would ‘meet the standards set out in Australian Standard AS 4269-1995 or any other industry dispute standard or guideline which ASIC declares to apply to the Code.’ This statement was made by your bank’s chairman who was ‘a trusted person in a high position of responsibility’, but he did not include ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001). Without this guide, customers could not resolve disputes free of charge and had to use the court.
  3. I wrote to you on several occasions in the past 12 months because your bank’s directors placed me in a position whereby its conduct was misleading. This was an act of fraud because your directors and your bank dishonestly obtained profits from misappropriating my business’ funds.
  4. Your directors should have been familiar with the House of Representatives’ inquiry into the impairment of customer loans to the committee’s 4 June 2015. A report filed by Tasmania Small Business Council’s Submission 61 (Attachment 1) states:

The definition of “fraud” is provided under section 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW):

A person who, by any deception, dishonestly:

  1. Obtains property belonging to another, or
  2. Obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage,

is guilty of the offence of fraud.

For the purposes of this definition:

“Dishonest” means dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people and is known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people.

  1. The misconduct by your bank’s directors might more accurately be described as ‘control fraud’. It occurred when a trusted person in a high position of responsibility in a company, corporation, or state subverts the organisation and engages in extensive fraud for personal gain. The term ‘control fraud’ refers both to the acts of fraud and the individuals who commit them. The concept of control fraud is based on the observation that the directors and Chief Executive of the company were uniquely placed to remove the checks and balances on fraud within a company.
  2. In my letter to you on 30 June 2022, I noted that Suncorp Bank did not provide me with a copy of its Standard Terms and the relevant code when I signed the Facility Offer. Without these documents, small businesses and farmers like me could not protect our rights. There were several other allegations supporting my concerns that your directors and leading banks misled millions of customers.
  3. I alleged your directors were involved in dishonest practices since 2004 when they adopted this code. During this period, your bank was listed on the Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) and your directors may have been obtaining credit including money laundering, fraud, and other criminal practices.
  4. Your directors knew or should have known that the ASX would only allow your bank to continue trading and raising capital on the stock market when it is sure that no funds would be used for responsible lending, money laundering, rigging rates, or other dishonest practices.
  5. Your directors will confirm that they knew or should have known that former Senator George Brandis QC and Professor at the Australian National University advised the government that small business customers could not afford to use the courts. The Former Governor General and Justice of the High Court of Australia, Sir Ninian Stephen had previously made the same statement.
  6. Without having access to the ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) since 2003, customers like me had to use the courts to resolve disputes because there was no free of charge forum for us to use. The directors will also confirm that the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee reported leading banks, since 2013, had received more than one million complaints per year.
  7. Your bank’s directors did not meet the standards set out in the AS 4269-1995 Standard, which supports my family’s position that small businesses and farmers were not protected by the Code, Regulatory Guide 165 (2001), and the AS 4269-1995 Standard.
  8. The farmers and small businesses who attended meetings at Parliament House purchased a copy of the AS 4269-1995 Standard in 2021. This document was published by the OB/9 Committee which included:
  • Law Consumers Association;
  • Law Institute of Victoria;
  • Law Society of N.S.W.;
  • S.W. Law Reform Commission;
  • Office of Consumer Affairs, Qld;
  • Office of Fair Trading and Business Affairs, VIC; and
  • Trade Practices Commission.

The commitments made by the OB/9 Committee require Suncorp Bank’s directors to ensure their staff and external lawyers comply with all the provisions of the document. My family is customers of the bank, and it should not have taken us until 2021 to understand that if the bank had not complied with the AS 4269-1995 Standard, they were in breach of the loan contracts and could not meet the good faith requirements to attend Farm Debt Mediation.

We have reviewed the transcripts of your bank when your Chairman and Managing Director appeared before the Royal Commission Rowena Orr in 2018. We believe your bank misled the Royal Commission. Suncorp Bank’s officers and executives who claimed that they would tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth apparently ignored the Oath, when they did not tell the whole truth in relation to their directors’ misconduct since 2008.

We also found that your external lawyers did not attend Farm Debt Mediation in good faith, nor did they comply with the CCMC Bulletin 8. This was not an oversight that the bank and its external lawyer did not meet the commitments in the Code, AS 4269-1995 Standard, and ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001).

I attempted to explain the serious allegations of misconduct and practices by your bank since 2003, which was more serious than practices by Bernie Madoff, who was America’s greatest fraudster. I have not received your response nor an explanation of why the bank’s directors destroyed the businesses and lives of farming and small business customers for the last 19 years.

Until you have explained your directors’ position in relation to these practices, the farmers and small businesses who attended Parliament House meetings in 2018 and 2019 will continue to believe this was the greatest crime ever and that your bank willingly committed acts of fraud. Your decision to not provide us with all the relevant documents when we signed our loan contract was intentional and caused us financial and personal loss, pain, and damages.

I am also writing to your external solicitors, federal and state politicians, and third parties as your bank’s misconduct between 2008 and 2018 were kept from Kenneth Hayne.

I require a commitment by your directors to investigate the allegations in this letter and repay damages by EOD 12 July 2022.

More recently, on 25 November 2022, I wrote to Ms. Michelle Bain, Suncorp Bank’s General Counsel, stating:

I am writing to you because Suncorp Bank has sold us a loan contract claiming the bank will comply with the 2004 Code, but this was a dishonest document and allows the bank to avoid resolving disputes free of charge. It was a crime, and the directors will have to now accept responsibility for this.

The following information provides background to the crime, which has only been found to exist during the past 2 years.

In 1989, John Howard and his government commissioned a review of practices whereby industries could be self-regulated. The person responsible for carrying out this review was Berna Collier, Professor of Commercial Law, Centre for Commercial and Property Law, Queensland University of Technology.

In August 2000, the Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation published recommendations that were intended to improve the performances of industries and would be better for both companies and customers. The Treasurer at that time was Peter Costello a highly qualified lawyer and experienced politician. There were a considerable number of recommendations, but the report highlighted:

Self-regulatory schemes tend to target specific problems within industries, impose lower compliance costs on businesses, and offer quick, low-cost dispute resolution procedures (p.1).

As consumers cannot guard against specific industry problems that they do not know exist, transparency in schemes is an important mechanism to ensure both credibility and accountability (p. 6).

Best practice in self-regulation. . . has important implications for the government’s approach toward a more efficient regulatory framework for both businesses and consumers (ToR, p. v). Good practice . . . can be understood as significantly improving market outcomes for consumers at the lowest cost to businesses (p. 59).

However, certain entities may not be able to meet the compliance costs of best practice even though minimum standards will provide consumers with appropriate service and protection.

We have set minimum standards for the training of advisers. By setting and enforcing these training standards, we aim to help licensees comply with their legal obligations to ensure that they and their representatives are adequately trained and competent to provide the services covered by their AFS licence. Under the Corporations Act licensees must adequately train and supervise their representatives and must themselves be competent.

It emphasises the importance of “Industry adherence to self-regulatory schemes” (p.61) and stressed “consumer awareness is an important element of good practice in self-regulation” (p. 68).

Redress encourages industry members to react promptly and fairly to complaints by having internal complaint resolution mechanisms and, where appropriate, subscribing to some form of fair and independent dispute resolution scheme. . . [It is] “essential to ensure that dissatisfied consumers have access to cost-effective mechanisms for resolving their complaints” (p.73) (emphasis added).

The Taskforce considers that a business should provide clear and accessible information to consumers on any independent customer dispute resolution mechanism to which the business subscribes.

Such independent customer dispute resolution mechanisms (outlined by the Taskforce and included in Submission 64 Select Committee on Lending to Primary Production Customers) should be:

  1. accessible;
  2. independent;
  3. fair;
  4. accountable;
  5. efficient; and
  6. effective (p.74).

Establishing a self-regulatory scheme is only part of the equation. Industry also needs to be aware that it has a continual responsibility to ensure that self-regulation is addressing its objectives and ethical members are not being disadvantaged (p.78).  

In 2002, David Murray and David Bell, made statements to small businesses and farmers stating the contemporary codes (2003 and 2004) required the banking industry to meet these key requirements. Murray and Bell stated:

The Australian Bankers’ Association today launched the new generation Code of Banking Practice which is the banking industry’s customer charter on best banking practice standards.

Chairman of the Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA), David Murray said ‘The Code sets out the banking industry’s key commitments and obligations to customers on standards of practice, disclosure, and principles of conduct for their banking services.

This Code becomes operational in August next year when individual retail banks will adopt these standards and their compliance will be monitored by an independent panel.

This Code has real teeth as I know of no other banking Code in the world that is enforceable as a contract by the customer.

In 2004, Suncorp Bank’s directors adopted the 2004 Code, but its officers and executives did not meet David Murray and David Bell’s requirements. In August 2018, farmers like me attended a meeting at Parliament House and several people reported dissatisfaction in the way their banks had complied with the principles set out in Submission 64 (Select Committee on Lending to Primary Production Customers). They expressed disappointment that the 6 key elements set out above were not addressed by their banks.

In 2021, it became evident that the 2004 Code was deceitful and that Suncorp Bank’s customers could not resolve disputes free of charge. This concerned small businesses and farmers from all parts of Australia. They now realised they were misled by the federal government, regulators, and the banks. Clause 35.1 states: 

We will have an internal process for handling disputes with you. This process will:

  1. be free of charge;
  2. meet the standards set out in Australian Standard AS4269-1995 or any other industry dispute standard or guideline which ASIC declares to apply to this Code;
  3. adhere to the timeframes specified in this clause 35; and
  4. require us to provide written reasons for our decision on a dispute.

Customers were not protected by the 2004 Code because ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) Licensing: Internal and external dispute resolution was omitted from clause 35.1(b). By omitting this guide, Suncorp bank had a clear intent of committing a crime because no customers could resolve their disputes free of charge.

In December 2010, the Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia’s Submission 90 regarding competition in the banking sector. This report demonstrates the introduction of Self-regulation in the banking sector was for the benefit of the government, regulators, and the bank. The customers had no rights under the Code and as noted earlier in this report, the bank’s directors had the intention to use the Code to commit a crime.

The rules set out in the AS 4269-1995 Standard protect customers, but banks did not make these available to their clients. There was no requirement by banks to provide advice on the Standard and noting it set out the essential elements for complaint handling. The NSW Law Society is familiar with its role in protecting its members but has not required its members to protect their clients.

The new government will have to enforce these claims for up to $1.1M. Small businesses and farmers look forward to banks’ directors and senior executives being forced to pay this penalty for not complying with dispute resolution and Farm Debt Mediation rules set up 20 years ago. We understand banks must meet the rules set out in:

  1. Internal Dispute Resolution (IDR) procedures
  2. hardship provisions (clause 25.2 of the Code)
  3. the AS 4269-1995 Standard, and
  4. effective disclosure of information.

The 26 million Australians, 3.5M small businesses, and 230,000 farmers can now, after 20 years of criminal practices by banks, protect property, machinery and livestock and funds they saved for generations.

Please confirm by return email when you received this important letter that should be forwarded to the bank’s directors since 2004.

I have been attempting to resolve my disputes with Suncorp Bank, the banking industry regulator, and Commonwealth Ombudsman, but sadly without success. I have now filed complaints with the government. My family believes the state government, for 20 years, profited from the bank and its regulators’ crime. It should have known about this, which it has concealed or compounded to protect the bank, not customers like us. I never can accept that these events could happen to me and my family in Australia.

Gerard O’Grady Story

My name is Gerard O’Grady. I would like to share my bad experiences with my bank, which I should not have trusted for ages now.

In partnership with my parents, I ran a very profitable cattle farm. I was also involved in land development, which, if Bendigo Bank had allowed me to complete, would also have been very profitable. Elders Rural Bank, which first provided finance to my beef cattle farm in 2002, was aware of the business I ran, both cattle farming and land development.

In April 2007, I took five-year loans out with Elders Rural Bank (‘Elders bank’) to refinance the Robo loan and to purchase Burkes land. Elders bank initially offered me three loans with variable interest rates and conditions. The security was taken in the form of the first registered mortgage over all Livestock along with property being purchased and exiting real property assets held by me.

Among other special conditions, I was required to market and sell projected land sales, within 12 months of drawdown, and such proceeds to be applied to reduce permanent term loans. I was not advised to seek independent legal advice at the time of signing.

In June 2008, Elders bank offered me three additional loans. Eight months later, in February 2009, it reduced the interest rate for Term Facility 4 and required additional security. It also offered me the fifth facility of $2.5M with variable interest rates, in relation to the restructuring of existing terms and for the purchase of “Maloney”.

On 17 August 2009, Elders bank sold its shareholding to Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, and it became known as Rural Bank.

Up until 2009, I purchased several properties for their development potential; there were variations made to the original loan agreement. Barry O’Neill (local Elders Bank’s Manager) told me to put my home up as security which my parents had a deed over, he said that it could not be mortgaged. He said we would only need it as security for a short time, and I did trust him. I did not know, at that time, this was predatory lending.

In mid-2009, Barry O’Neil, Ross Buzolich (my account), and I met up to work through potential tax issues. O’Neil, on more than one occasion, described me as his best performer. In early November we decided to ask Elders Rural Bank if they would consider releasing seventy-one acres of the Burks land security valued at $480,000 to put into my self-managed super fund. In late November 2009 Elders Rural Bank released the security over the seventy-one acres.

In March 2010, I had conversations with O’Neil in relation to buying 5 acres for $250,000. O’Neill asked me to see if the vendor would draw out settlement until June 2010 and made no indication that funding would be troublesome. On this advisement, I paid a $25,000 deposit in March 2010. However, Elders then failed to provide funding for settlement. Not only did I lose $25,000 plus interest for 6 months, but I was also forced to rescind the contract. Further, the 5 acres’ market value was likely to be around $2M at the time of this report.

In March 2010, I wanted to purchase 30 acres at Lumsdens Lane and asked O’Neil to arrange the financing. The deal ultimately fell through due to the Elders’ conduct. The market value of the 30 acres of land that I intended to purchase for $340,000 is likely to be around $2.7M at the time of this report.

In May 2010, I understood that Elders was no longer interested in funding development opportunities. Further, Elders removed my authorisation to increase livestock numbers, thus precluding me from generating profits from livestock operations, even though the livestock farm had generated profits over the 2008 and 2009 financial years.

In June 2010, O’Neil told me there was a problem with the head office. I was in complete shock. I took it a pond myself to get a new valuation from a valuer who was on the Rural Bank’s panel. The new valuation came up with a further $800.000 worth of value, O’Neil presented the new valuation to Rural Bank, but the bank did not accept it because they did not ask for it.

O’Neil put me in touch with Bruce Keeley (the broker). O’Neil and I worked with Bruce to try to get me refinanced. Firstly, both O’Neil and Bruce pleaded with the Bank to reconsider their actions. Bruce told Rural Bank that what Rural Bank was doing to me was the most disturbing thing he has seen in his 40 years in banking. Bruce managed to find two parties interested in refinancing me if Rural Bank would make sure my lease payments were up to date. He asked Rural Bank for $40,000 to get the lease payments up to date, but they refused.

Rural Bank refused to pay my monthly bills they controlled all my cattle sales. O’Neil informed me that the head office was giving him a hard time because he did not have the stock mortgage up to date. O’Neil informed me that he was requested not to contact me.

On 27 July 2010, Advance Home & Business Loans had the intention to refinance my Elders’ facilities. By then, Elders had not paid me lease payments that were due in June 2010 and may not pay them in the future, which was greatly harming the refinance process. As a result, the refinance was not successful due to Elders refusing to pay the equipment and property leases.

Rural Bank was making all sorts of unreasonable demands regarding the sale of cattle and my properties, the bank was threatening to sell my parents’ home and bankrupt them and myself.

On 27 January 2011, I received Elders’ Default Notice, demanding payment of $3.1M within 7 days.

On 3 February 2011, I found that the Deed of Agreement, dated 22 May 2002 between Laurence, Doreen, and Gerard (‘the 2002 Deed’), stated that the land, which had the dwelling, could not be used for mortgage purposes. Elders was aware of the 2002 Deed and knowingly caused me to breach the 2002 Deed, by mortgaging the land.

In May 2011, Rural Bank took my cattle and sold them undervalued, I did not sign any paperwork concerning the movement of my cattle.

On 17 April 2012, Elders emailed me in relation to the sale of Burkes and other properties on the market, along with reaffirming the bank’s rights to take possession of all properties. as a result of Elders’ unrelenting pressure, Laurence and Doreen feared we would lose our home.

On 27 August 2012, I received a notice to attend Farm Debt Mediation, negotiating the matter with Elders. No agreement was reached at the Farm Debt Mediation. I managed to find some backers we tried to do a debt reduction deal; the Bank could not give us an answer on that day, therefore we agreed to attend another Farm Debt Mediation in September.

On 13 February 2013, the bank’s lawyers issued a Notice of Demand pertinent to Term Loan Facility 4 and Trading Facility 2.

On 21 February 2013, I received a Notice of Demand & Intention to Exercise Power of Sale, pertinent to the Elders debt of approximately $3.4M, for Term Loan Facilities 2, 3, and 5. The 5 properties that were subjected to the mortgagee’s power of sale were valued, and commissioned by Elders, totalled approximately $2.3M and $2.5M on Forced Sale and Controlled Sale basis respectively. The valuation included groundwater licenses and irrigation plant.

On 17 April 2013, I received an email confirmation from Elders’ Counsel that my equipment would be removed prior to the auction as the chattels did not form part of bank security. The next day, the properties were sold at auction for approximate $1.8M. The value achieved was significantly under fair market value, as evidenced by the valuation only 2 months ago, along with the fact the Properties had notable development potential. Prior to the sale, Elders did not allow me to pick up the hay, irrigator, or silage that were situated on one of the five properties and were not part of bank security. Rural Bank colluded with South Rural Water and the new owners of my land to transfer my water licences. Rural Bank did not have a right to my water because they never had a mortgage over my water. I also had some silage and a centre pivot irrigator which Rural Bank gave to the new owner of my land.

I filed a series of complaints to banking regulators, to FOS and ASIC in 2013; to the Farm Foreclosure – Bank Engineering Defaults inquiry in 2015; the Lending to Primary Production Customers inquiry in 2017; to the Banking Royal Commission in 2018 and to AFCA in 2019; however, I did not receive any responses yet.

On 25 March 2013, I filed a complaint with the Financial Services Ombudsman (FOS). Whilst my complaint was lodged with FOS, Elders still sold my properties at auction for $1.8M, which was significantly under fair market value, as evidenced by the valuation only 2 months preceding, along with the fact the Properties had notable development potential.

On 18 June 2013, FOS wrote to my counsel advising that the complaint was not within FOS’ terms of reference except for whether Elders should have paid Gerard Goods & Services Tax (GST) on the sale of cattle; whether Elders breached Gerard’s privacy; whether the pivot irrigator is a fixture of a fitting; and whether Elders provided Gerard with sufficient time to remove his personal items from the security properties. However, FOS did not resolve any of these issues.

One month later, FOS sent me a letter stating that their involvement in the dispute is unwarranted and that they would not continue with any investigation.

On 9 January 2015, Elders sent me a letter offering a Settlement.  At that time, Elders did not make any contact with Laurence or Doreen, even though the bank knew that they were both elderly, Doreen had recently had open heart surgery, they were farmers, not highly educated, had very little banking knowledge, were not advised to seek independent legal advice nor were they parties in the FOS complaint.

We signed the Settlement Letter without knowing it had fully released Elders from any responsibilities. The Settlement Letter claimed Elders would accept $200,000 to release the Home Dwelling as a full and final settlement. Elders claimed that this left us with an approximate $2.1M shortfall.

On 2 January 2016, I received Elders Statements confirming a write-off, per Settlement Letter, of approximate $835,000. However, in the Settlement Letter, Elders advised the write-off was approximate $2.1M.

In December 2015 and January 2016, my counsel filed a Statement of Claim with Elders for approximate $6.8M, as per Mr. Ross Buzolich loss calculations.

In 2020/2021, I filed proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria at Melbourne against Elders Lenahan Farms and Collins.

As of the time of this report, I am still in dispute with Elders, with no assets.

In summary, Elders bank caused me a financial disadvantage by doing the following:

  1. failed to allow us to remove the irrigator and silage from the Properties;
  2. transferred Water Licences issued by Southern Rural Water Authority for no monetary consideration, which caused us a loss of $357,500;
  3. sold our properties to obtain a financial advantage dishonestly
  4. provided predatory loans without considering serviceability;
  5. created debt facility breach, along with other breaches of other third-party contracts, by way of not being a prudent and diligent lender nor acting in good faith;
  6. bullied, intimidated, and put undue pressure on us;
  7. breached the loan contracts by withholding documents pertinent to our rights;
  8. did not act in good faith or ethically, which caused material losses in lost trading, and under sale of assets;
  9. caused material financial losses and irreparable reputational damage.

I contacted a research group that has been supporting small businesses and farmers who were victims of the banks. We have obtained evidence that my bank breached several clauses in the 2004 Code, including:

  • not acting fairly and reasonably towards us in a consistent and ethical manner (Clause 2.2)
  • not complying with all relevant laws relating to banking services (Clause 3.1)
  • not ensuring its staff (and its authorised representatives) are trained so that they have adequate knowledge of the provisions of this Code (Clause 7(b))
  • not trying to help us overcome our financial difficulties (clause 25.1)
  • not applying with the internal process for handling our disputes free of charge (Clause 35.1(a))
  • not meeting the standards set out in Australian Standard AS4269-1995 or any other industry dispute standard or guideline which ASIC declares to apply to this Code ((Clause 35.1(b))
  • not adhering to the timeframes specified in clause 35 ((Clause 35.1(c));
  • not providing us with written reasons for its decision on a dispute ((Clause 35.1(d))
  • not providing us with information about its internal process for dealing with a dispute at the time the dispute arises, and any external process (clause 37(a)(b))

I filed complaints with FOS, AFCA, and recently with the bank’s directors, ASIC, and APRA with the evidence that the bank breached the Code of Banking Practice, the AS 4269-1995 Standard, ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001), and, of course, it breached my loan contracts. However, neither the bank nor the regulators have investigated any of my complaints, until now, I am still in disputes with the bank. No customers, like me, are protected when the bank and the regulators did not comply with the rule of law and attempted to avoid paying us compensation and an apology.

Neil Hermes Story

My name is Neil Hermes. This is my story relating to the bank’s misconduct and its devasting effects to my family and life.

In 2007, I signed a loan contract with Bankwest in order to purchase a tourism property at Jervis Bay on the south coast of NSW. This was an important tourism property, and I was borrowing 50%, which is normal in the tourism industry.

It was not until April 2009, that Bankwest required us to change the way we operated the business and appoint new lawyers and accountants, and required us to provide the bank with a new valuation. This meant the bank breached the loan contract and treated my wife and me very disrespectfully. This was unacceptable as we always had a good record with the bank and had always paid our interest on time.

The changes forced on us by the bank destroyed our business and was served with a demand by Bankwest, which meant I was bankrupted. I cannot believe that a major bank could treat its customers so poorly when there were provisions in the loan contract to protect small businesses and people like me.

In October 2021, I wrote to Commonwealth Bank again and asked it to review my case and find my missing securities. Again, the bank did not act in good faith which concerned me. Until recently none of Commonwealth Bank’s employees could deal with disputes that should have been addressed as services out in the 2004 Code, which was not included in the documents handed to me.

This is the details of my experiences with the bank.

Since 1991, I have operated a successful tour business in Australia titled Discovery Ecotours. The business ran tour operations across three locations at Ayers Rock, Darwin/Kakadu National Park, and Jervis Bay.

On 23 September 2002, my company (formerly Australia Ecotours Pty Ltd, Discovery Ecotours Holdings Pty Ltd, Discovery Ecotours (QLD) Pty Ltd) was registered as a Proprietary Company with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).

My company had a lease-to-buy contract for the purchase of staff headquarters and depot in Rapid Creek Darwin.

On 12 February 2007, my company purportedly (in its own capacity or in the capacity as Trustee) acquired the leasehold over property ‘Christians Minde’, Sussex Inlet, Commonwealth Territory (surrounded by NSW), Jervis Bay for $1.4M with Bank of Western Australia Limited (‘Bankwest’) providing $810,000 loan towards the purchase. The property contained Northern Guest House, Self-Contained Flat, Southern Guest house, Manager’s Cottage, Derelict Flat, Boatshed, Workshop/Storage Area, and Grounds.

The 2007 financial statements showed that the trading income increased from $2.18M to $2.54M from 2006 to 2007. The gross profit from trading increased from $1.879M to $2.21M from 2006 to 2007. The net profit before income tax increased from $236k to $429k from 2006 to 2007. This meant that my company was performing well with growing revenues and profits.

Bankwest provided $810,000 towards the purchase of Christians Minde in February 2007.

It appears that Bankwest was purportedly unaware of there being any Trusts and that my company held the security in a capacity as Trustee thereof. Bankwest also had no fixed or floating charges over any Trusts.

Bankwest sought to rectify the Credit Risk Review findings with the recommendation, among other recommendations, requiring a 3% Penalty Rate above margins to apply until I provided the financial statements clarifying the Bank’s facility and corrected Debtor’s name.

Bankwest’s Credit Risk Review indicated that general account conduct had been unsatisfactory over the preceding 12 months, that the loan could be high risk or impaired and that the credit rating has deteriorated.

 

Martin Darcy, at the time, was a 50% shareholder and Director of my company. As per the Credit Risk Review, he resigned as Director and requested that his Guarantee be released. Bankwest declined to release Martin Darcy’s Guarantee considering he was still a shareholder.

On 13 March 2008, Bankwest provided a loan extension to the Company for $168k to part purchase Odyssey Tours. Bankwest noted my company’s excellent relationship, record, company structure, and reporting.

On 8 October 2008, Commonwealth Bank acquired Bankwest.

In December 2008, my company began its internally funded $500k improvement plan for the Resort.

On 24 April 2009, Bankwest issued the Company with a Notice of Breach of loan conditions.

In June 2009, on the back of the Bankwest Credit Risk Review and pressure to reduce loans, the Company commenced looking for alternative lenders to refinance the existing Bankwest loan facilities.

For the year ended 30 June 2009, my business turnover was $2.72M, and recorded a net profit of $450.5k. The turnover and net profit in 2007 were $2.54M and $429.5k respectively, illustrating the Company’s continued strong financial performance.

On 6 August 2009, I received Commonwealth Bank’s Letter of Offer for a $850k facility to payout Bankwest and for resort improvements. On the back of the offer, my company makes financial commitments for further resort upgrades ready for the 2009 summer season.

On 26 August 2009, Commonwealth Bank withdraws its loan offer, which was done so at the direction of Bankwest. Due to the Commonwealth Bank withdrawing its loan offer, resulted in significant losses due to financial commitments on the Resort upgrades along with losses from summer season deferral.

At the end of 2009, due to significant pressure from Bankwest, we suffered from:

  1. cost of numerous meetings, phone calls, and emails;
  2. cost for numerous updated accountant reports;
  3. cost for valuations;
  4. default charges and interest;
  5. the opportunity cost of seeking alternative finance;
  6. cost for changing accountants;
  7. losses from lost trade in the 2009-10 summer; and,
  8. the significant emotional toll on my family.

On 31 March 2010, due to Bankwest pressure and Commonwealth Bank pulling refinance funding, I had to place my company into voluntary administration.

As a consequence of the voluntary administration, valuable exclusive licences for tour operations at Ayers Rock, safari campsites in Kakadu National Park, and safari campsites in Litchfield National Park were lost.

From mid to the end of 2010, we received demands for payment from Commonwealth Bank for loan fees for the withdrawn offer in August 2009.

On 31 January 2011, I received Bankwest’s Demand for Payment for $1.16M, even though my business was in administration and the Christian Minde leasehold and business were owned by my company.

On 1 February 2011, due to Bankwest demands, I put my family home on the market for sale. Two days later, I made a formal offer to Bankwest, via my lawyers, but Bankwest did not respond.

On 26 March 2011, under significant financial duress, I accepted an offer for my family home.

On 1 April 2011, the administrator had Christians Minde valued, with a resultant value of $1.1M. Only two weeks later, I went bankrupt. In a run-down state and with no trade the administrator then sold Christians Minde for $740k.

On 21 October 2012, ASIC deregistered my company.

On 7 May 2018, I submitted a complaint to the Australian Banking Royal Commission, then on 18 May to Commonwealth Bank and Bankwest.

On 16 July 2018, Commonwealth Bank and the next day Bankwest rejected my compensation claim. A Bankwest employee told me that it influenced the Commonwealth Bank refinancing decision and that no refinancing would be permitted by Bankwest from any other source. It was the group organisational structures that placed the debt facilities in breach, even though there was no financial default. The group organisational structure was the same at the time of original finance (February 2007) and at loan extension (March 2008), and it was Bankwest’s incompetence that created the debt facility breach in April 2009.

Since then, I have filed many complaints against the banks, AFCA, and other regulators. Our matters with Bankwest and CBA are still open today.

We now have little to no assets because the Bankwest and Commonwealth Bank:

  1. provided loans without considering the overarching structure of the business and how it interacted;
  2. created debt facility breach by way of not being a prudent and diligent lender and overall incompetence due to a lack of understanding of the overall group structure;
  3. bullied, intimidated, and put undue pressure on us;
  4. breached the loan contracts by withholding documents pertinent to our rights;
  5. did not act in good faith or ethically when influencing refinancing, which caused material losses in lost trading, and under sale of assets; and
  6. caused material financial losses and irreparable reputational damage.

The forensic accountant’s financial loss report states that the result of the assessment of my net past financial loss is $17.8M on a pre-income tax basis.

I attempted to explain the serious allegations of misconduct and practices by these banks which were more serious than the practices by Bernie Madoff, who was America’s greatest fraudster. However, I have not received any response nor an explanation of why the banks destroyed my business and my family’s financial lives. I will still keep going filing complaints until the banks provide me with fair compensation and an apology.

I have also contacted other small businesses and farmers who were suffering from the bank’s misconduct and we have reviewed the relevant documents which support our points:

The 2004 Code of Banking Practice has been found to not meet the Internal Dispute Resolution (IDR) procedures in particular when a customer wants to resolve disputes free of charge because the ASIC guideline which we now know was ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) which the bank must comply with already having been omitted.

The bank did not meet the timeframe as set out in clauses 35.3 and 35.4, nor did it provide us, complainants, with written reasons (clause 35.1(d)).

The bank did not prominently publicise the Code in branches (clause 37.1(a) especially in regional and rural areas (as noted in the CCMC’s Bulletin 4).

The bank did not meet the standards in AS 4269-1995 Standard (clause 35.1(b) nor could they comply with clause 37.2a.

We expect the bank to meet these requirements services in clause 2.1(b)(i), especially as banking services which are defined as ‘any financial service or product provided by the bank to you’.

We did comply with the definition of small businesses, as stated ‘a business having less than 20 fulltime employees and equivalent people’. Therefore we believe the bank did not ‘comply with all relevant laws relating to financial services and products (Clause 3.1), the bank did not provide us information in plain language (clause 2.1(d) nor act fairly or reasonably towards us (Clause 2.2). The bank directors did not ensure its staff and authorised representatives were trained (clause 7(a)(b) and it did not comply with clause 34(b)(i)(ii).

In the event that the bank has not complied with its responsibilities and rule of law, ASIC must withdraw or suspend Commonwealth Bank’s license until its misleading statements and dishonest practices are dealt with appropriately by its directors. I do expect the bank and regulators to comply with the standards, the Code, and all relevant documents so that our rights should be protected.

Craig Perry Story

My name is Craig Perry. This is my story, my worst experience with one of the leading banks in Australia for ages. I was cheated by the bank since we accepted the bank’s first offer for our loan facilities.

In 2010, my family signed a loan contract with Commonwealth Bank at Swan Hill branch as we needed to restructure our family partnership and pay out the loan we had with Elders bank. The arrangement we had with the bank was unsuitable, as it was interest-only and we were purchasing the bank’s commercial bills. We did not understand the bank’s method of financing which we raised verbally with Tim Triplett (Swan Hill Agri Manager) over several years adding further that it was extremely expensive and not in our best interests. However, Tim Triplett simply ignored requests to provide alternative options for funding, stating “sorry it is a commercial world, and this is the only way Commonwealth Bank can do it.’

The bank did not require us to have a business plan, instead, we provided an annual budget for cropping and livestock costs, which meant the bank did not carefully assess our risk before approving our budget.

The unstructured relationship with Commonwealth Bank was inappropriate for the farming business that suffered from significant variations in livestock and grain prices as the market determines farm earnings after the running costs have been paid. It is more serious because seasons varied and there must be sufficient cash reserves, which are part of every agribusiness program but cannot be assumed when budgeting.

On 17 November 2010, we received the bank letter for a temporary increase to the overdraft to $350,000 which required clearance by 28 February 2011. The total debt facilities to $2.85M.

In 2011, the bank introduced covenants that required the sale of land if fiscal targets were not met. The facilities offered by Commonwealth Bank provided no opportunity for principal repayment. Then the bank took unreasonable amounts of time to approve new facilities and temporary adjustments to the Overdraft. The timing of planting barley and wheat crops is extremely important for its success, especially more so in dry years. The delay in funding is the difference between a profit and no profit, which means the difference between income and no income. On 25 April or anything up to 2 weeks prior thereto, is the industry best practice for barley and wheat planting. The bank’s approval dates, which were applied for well before the cut-off date for planting, were delayed.

With a number of variations of sessional finance increasing the overdraft until 20 March 2015, our debt facilities increased to $3.75M.

We experienced drought in 2014 and 2015, which the bank was unwilling to support and its recommendation to us was to require our suppliers and creditors to carry out debts so that the bank did not have to increase our loan. Again, we were the victims of a bank that was not an appropriate agribusiness lender. Around this time, the bank forced us to sign unreasonable forms against our will, inclusive of agreeing to sell land to obtain crop finance. Further, the finance given was not sufficient to run the farm, but sufficient to meet interest payments. The bank advised us to make small creditors carry farm input costs.

In 2016, when we were likely to have a good year and the bank was confident that we could continue financing our term loan, it did not reconsider the way it was dealing with our business. It continued to look at our financial situation in arrears. This year, the bank again did not support by way of funding to plant crops. In converse, it forced us to sign documents that would result in a lump sum repayment on the debt. Further, we received support from creditors, enabling the planting of crops and a very profitable year.

In early February 2017, we requested crop finance from the bank, to ensure adequate timing of funds for April planting. The bank took until 30 June to offer a $500,000 facility for crops, two months past the optimal time for planting crops. It wanted to charge a $25,000 fee for the finance and we did not take up this offer, as it was too late to plant seed. It was a great season but due to the time it took for approval of funds from the bank, we missed the opportunity for seeding and the crop was only half-sown.

In 2017, the bank took us to the farm debt mediation which was not an appropriate way to resolve disputes free of charge. At that time, Commonwealth Bank had not provided us with a copy of the relevant documents that would support our loan and any difficulties we face. The Mediator, a former banker, and the bank bullied us at Farm Debt Mediation and the Mediator tried to force us to sell the farm with the bank’s control.

After the mediation in 2017, we had to attend further mediations because, while Commonwealth Bank should have known that it had to comply with the essential elements of complaints handling set out in the AS 4269-1995 Standard.

Throughout this period, the bank’s practices were disgraceful because there were two further periods of mediation, and our debt with Commonwealth bank was less than 50% of the value of the farm.

In 2018, I met with Commonwealth Bank Chief Executive Matt Comyn in Canberra. On the back of this meeting, I attended three additional meetings with him and other senior Commonwealth Bank staff on 7 December 2018, 30 May 2019, and 27 June 2019 to no avail and ended back at Farm Debt Mediation.

In 2019 and 2020, I attempted to outline my loss at Farm Debt Mediation, on the back of Commonwealth Bank’s conduct, totalling $16.9M. The bank denied any wrongdoing and ignored our claims completely. During this time, we missed two good seasons of crop and because of the bank’s actions, we had virtually no cropping income since 2016. The bank forced us to sign a deed of settlement, essentially giving my family no choice in the matter.

From 2015 to 2020, I had to spend $100,000 on accounting, legal, and other independent experts, through various channels trying to resolve our disputes with the bank, which should have been dealt with free of charge as set out in the 2004 Code and AS 4269-1995 Standard.

The bank had a series of misconduct in my case, including:

  1. providing pure asset or ‘predatory’ loans without considering serviceability requirements;
  2. providing short-term high interest-bearing loans not suited to our circumstances, not in our best interests, and not suitable for the underlying assets;
  3. breaching the loan contracts by withholding documents pertinent to our rights;
  4. prejudicing the signing of the Deed of Settlement in 2020;
  5. harassing and intimidating us during FDM; and
  6. causing material crop losses due to unreasonable delays in funding along with disruptive conduct during disputes.

I now believe that all these Commonwealth Bank’s practices should not have happened and that ASIC had a responsibility to protect my rights. I have discussed this with people who attended meetings at Parliament House in 2018 and 2019 and believe ASIC was not an honest cop because it claims it cannot act for any individuals, which has been the case since self-regulation was introduced by banks in 2003.

I believe that Commonwealth Bank had a duty to advise me of my rights under the 2004 Code of Banking Practice and the AS 4269-1995 Standard, which were an essential part of our loan contract. The bank, its directors, and its licensee had not complied with the internal dispute resolution procedure in the Code, which stated banks must resolve disputes free of charge (clause 35.1(a)). The bank and ASIC knew this but were involved in deception by omission when keeping this information from me.

The deception by omission occurred throughout my dispute period. The Code, in clause 35.1(b), noted leading legal minds at this time had published the essential elements of effective complaint handling in the AS 4269-1995 Standard. As I did not have access to this document, ASIC took no action when it must have known that Commonwealth Bank could deceive me when I was attempting to resolve my disputes.

I understand that Commonwealth Bank’s directors, according to ASIC Regulatory Guide 165, were responsible for causing us a financial disadvantage, which is a crime.

It seems that Commonwealth Bank directors and their associates are determined to trust luck to protect them because by omitting ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) from the Code, the bank profited and cause customers like me a financial disadvantage. This is a massive crime and far more serious than the practices of Bernie Madoff when he was described, in 2009, as America’s greatest fraudster and was jailed for 150 years.

We have obtained evidence that the bank damaged us by not complying with the 2004 Code including:

  • clause 2.1 when it did not provide us with information in plain language
  • clause 2.2 when it did not act fairly or reasonably towards us
  • clause 7(a)(b) when it did not ensure its staff and authorised representatives were trained effectively.
  • clause 35.1(b) when it did not deal with our complaints free of charge
  • clauses 35.3 and 35.4, when it did not complete the investigation or inform us of the outcomes nor did it provide us, complainants, with written reasons (clause 35.1(d)); and
  • clause 37.1(a) when it did not prominently publicise the Code in branches especially in regional and rural areas (as noted in the CCMC’s Bulletin 4).

I have been writing to the bank’s Chair, Chief Executive, and directors during the past 12 months because the bank placed me in a position whereby its conduct was misleading. This was also an act of fraud because the bank’s directors dishonestly obtained profits from misappropriating my business’ funds.

John Wharton Story

My name is John Wharton. I would like to tell you about my experience with my lenders, which committed one of Australia’s greatest crimes.

I was a Councilor in 1991, before being appointed Mayor of Richmond in 1997. At that time, I was managing my family’s farming business with my wife. In 2007, we owned two properties, Runnymede, purchased in 1992, and Yarrabong, purchased in 2004.

In 2007, we had a Bankwest Agri One Overdraft 625-000895-5 with a limit of $750,000, and Landmark debt of $3M. However, with additional Bankwest funds, we could purchase two more properties, Red Rock and Canyon. At that time, it was not easy to service the debt because we had limited working capital.

On 30 June 2008, I was having discussions with Bankwest so that I could purchase Red Rock and Canyon. In July, Runnymede and Yarrabong were valued by Herron Todd White (HTW) at $11M for Bankwest. In August, Red Rock and Canyon were also valued by HTW at $6.3M.

In September 2008, after we purchased Red Rock and Canyon, we agreed to sell Canyon to reduce debt.

Bob Kayes, Bankwest’s Agribusiness Manager, Rockhampton, was managing our account at that time. When we finished mustering Red Rock/Canyon’s 6,006 head of cattle, Kayes said: “You would have missed a few, wouldn’t you? If you can make it 6,606 it will save me having to go back and do another cashflow review.”       

The contract for the Red Rock and Canyon included 4500 branded cattle, so any more was a bonus.

Bankwest knew we only had 6,006 cattle, but Kayes ‘created’ cattle (phantom cattle), so he could have the bank’s loan application approved. Kayes said without additional cattle, the bank would require a full review of the loan application so cashflow was acceptable. It posed a problem for my business because the cash flow provided to the bank was not accurate.

This also put me into a difficult financial position because more debt increased my servicing costs and pressure on cashflows. In December 2009, I received a letter of Facilities Variation from Kayes. It secured the properties and cattle on all four properties.

This became more serious in 2010 because the debt had escalated to $13.7M. During the next two years, we were in a worse position and there was a declining market, the Global Financial Crisis, and floods.

In March, I received another letter of Facilities Variation from Kayes. In April, the bank claimed I had defaulted on the Facilities, and the bank appointed Korda Mentha to carry out an Investigative Report. It cost us $37,000 and did not come up with changes to the existing program. At that time, we had a good line of cattle and had often topped the sales.

Four months later, the bank again engaged Korda Mentha to prepare a Review and required the investigating accountant to prepare a report on our business. It charged us $39,914.42. Taylor Byrne’s report now showed Yarrabong was valued at $1.2M, Runnymede at $5.5M, Red Rock at $3.9M, and Canyon Station at $1M. The valuations cost us $12,850, Gadens’ legal fees were $5,461, and accounting fees of $8,000, which meant the total cost of the review was $66,225.42.

In October 2011, we put Red Rock on the market and Elders estimated it would bring in between $3M to $4M, with no cattle. It was going to be auctioned prior to the end of the year and we receive a lot of interest.

In November, the bank’s receivers moved in and took the property off the market. Elders claimed they had never seen such aggressive behavior from the Receivers Korda Mentha and the Ray White agent, Kevin Currie. When it became a receivers’ sale, the property’s value dropped and with 1200 cattle, it was sold for $2.6M in 2012. This caused us a significant loss of $1.6M. Red Rock sold in the last 12 months for $11M.

We had numerous bank meetings attempting to resolve our differences, but I found the bank, Korda Mentha, and Ray White Rural were aggressive. We employed a Farm Financial Advisor, who previously worked with Government Department to review our books and make an independent offer. It was submitted to the bank but was then rejected. I wrote to the bank and met with the managers in Brisbane and Townsville, but they did not show any leniency.

On 20 December 2010, I signed a Deed of Forbearance hoping to slow the enforcement action before 30 June 2011. We were requested to:

  1. unconditionally sell Yarrabong by 28 February 2011,
  2. unconditionally sell Canyon by 30 June 2011,
  3. provide the bank with a monthly marketing report from 31 December 2010,
  4. direct all livestock sale proceeds to the bank’s overdraft, and
  5. provide copies of monthly accounts from 31 December 2010.

On 30 June 2011, the bank claimed I had not complied with the obligations in the Deed of Forbearance, as Canyon had not been sold and the loan-to-value ratio had not been satisfied. I was selling Canyon to the Qld Government as a National Park, and this process took more than 12 months, as we were dealing with Government, and it was taking a long time. The bank knew this but showed no empathy and moved on us with Receivers and Managers two weeks after the funds went into our account.

In early September, a contract for Canyon was entered into and due to be settled by 31 October 2011. Later that month, the bank wrote to me regarding my ability to meet the ongoing servicing and other requirements. The bank advised me that the sale of Canyon would not remedy my concern and I needed an alternative plan to rectify defaults.

In September and October 2011, Steve Esdale helped me prepare a letter for the bank which provided details of my proposal for facilities extension to 30 June 2015.

On 11 October 2011, Gavin Nolan of KordaMentha replied confirming their engagement to provide an addendum to the Independent Accountants Review of our Group that was conducted in October/November 2010, as part of the bank’s process in considering my offer.

On 4 November 2011, the bank rejected my offer.

On 15 November 2011, the bank appointed Richard Buckby and Robert Hutson of KordaMentha as Receivers and Managers of my properties. The next day, my access to my business bank accounts was suspended.

A week later, Lorin Bishop, Elders, Rural Property Specialist, wrote to me stating the best sale result for Red Rock would have been achieved by continuing the marketing program, which had started two weeks prior. Bishop said the property received favorable interest from initial promotion and, in his opinion, marketing as a Receiver’s sale usually negatively impacted the eventual sale price.

In early December 2011, I was concerned for the welfare of the livestock, which was now under the management of the receivers. I engaged Veterinarian Elizabeth Lynch BVSc, who wrote a letter to examine the welfare of Runnymede cattle based on their proposed transport for sale.

In January 2012, there was a fire that burned for a week through the Canyon untreated, lick was not being distributed on Red Rock, and livestock were not being managed correctly by the Receivers.

On 7 June 2012, I found myself being charged with Contempt of Court on 4 May 2012, in relation to the above matters that were being managed by receivers.

In 2014, there seemed no other way to resolve disputes with the bank and I commenced an action against it for unconscionable conduct by its associate, Bankwest. It changed my budget to justify Bankwest’s 2008 loan. The hearing was set down for 7 days but lasted for 1½ days. I was the only person to provide evidence to Honor Justice Greenwood. My lawyer, Stewart Levitt wanted me to sack him the morning of the Court Case, for lack of effort, but I refused as I needed to get on the stand and tell my side of the story.

We had agreed to a budget for the purchase of Red Rock and Canyon in July 2008 with Bob Kayes, which would have given us a total of 10,000 head of cattle in total between our properties. In late August, Bob Kayes rang me and informed me that they had approved the loan, and we could start mustering Red Rock/Canyon. We immediately began mustering with the sellers in attendance, as the sellers had guaranteed 4500 heads of branded cattle, and once that number had gone through the yards and been ticked off, the sellers could leave the property. Bob Kayes even came up for a few days and participated in the muster. He would have seen how poor in the condition the cattle were from a lack of management. On 4 September my wife and I drove to Townsville from Red Rock, where we were mustering, to sign the final Loan documents, which seemed odd, since we were already on the property and moving cattle off. We signed these documents in a hurry, in our Lawyer Arthur Browne’s office, as we needed to get back to Red Rock that night. Having faith in our Bank manager and Bank, we were under the belief that these documents were the same as our July budget. Our lawyer also witnessed us sign a blank page, which the Rockampton branch of Bankwest asked us to do, and they would fill in the necessary details later. Unknown to us, the bank had changed the budget from what we agreed to back in July with Bob Kayes and included a statement that we had to reduce the debt significantly within 12 months of buying the properties. This would have required us to sell 7000 head of cattle the following year, leaving us with fewer cattle than we originally started with. I refused to agree to such a plan, and that is when we found out about the changed budget. Plus, the inclusion of having to muster 6600 head of cattle, not the 4500 head in the contract.

At the Federal Court hearing with Justice Greenwood, I was the only person to give evidence, and when I provided the 2 differing budgets, which Justice Greenwood showed much interest in, asking me to refer to them again, Gadens walked out of Court. We adjourned for lunch 30 minutes after that, and Gadens called my lawyer during the break and offered to write off all debt. My wife and I were totally exhausted, traumatized, and broke that we accepted it, so we could go home.

There is no doubt that the bank shafted us badly in this process and we lost everything that we had worked so hard to achieve over a lifetime. In the period after my court case, many banks began to write off huge amounts of debt with many of their clients in our region. About 50% of the debt was written off.

We paid $450,000 in legal fees fighting this case with Bankwest and Commonwealth Bank, yet under the law, the Code, and the AS 4269-1995 Standard, which were all part of my loan contracts, disputes had to be resolved free of charge. It surprised me that the bank and its lawyers had not read my contract carefully because, under Code Compliance Monitoring Committee Bulletin 8, they had to tell me that they would comply with the Internal Disputes Resolution procedures in clause 35 of the Code. At no time did they attempt to deal with this. It seems the rules of law did not comply with either the bank or its lawyers.

In 2018, I attended a meeting at Parliament House with other small businesses and farmers who had also suffered damages due to misconduct by these banks. I believed the directors had hidden documents, but ASIC and APRA had not taken any action. It surprised me and other Queensland farmers that throughout this period, ASIC could have suspended or cancelled bank licensees but never protected customers.

In July 2021, I was advised that Commonwealth Bank was operated by officers in Sydney and was therefore an NSW bank. Some of the other Commonwealth Bank farmers told me to purchase a copy of the AS 4269-1995 Standard, which was included in the IDR procedures in clause 35.1(b) of the 2004 Code. The government, regulators, and banks do not meet their requirements under the Code or the Standard.

The Standard represented the interests of the Committee OB/9 Committee members including the Australian Consumers Association (CHOICE); Department of Consumers Affairs NSW; Law Consumers Association (ACCC); and Law Society NSW. It was unacceptable that these organizations did not remove the Standard from the 2004 Code when there was evidence of a scam which is defined as a dishonest scheme, a fraud.

Archer Field’s Story

In 1990, a 99-year lease of Caves House was granted to Jenolan Caves Resort Pty Ltd (JCR), and subsequently, Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (the Trust) Board was set up by an earlier Liberal Government. Silkbard Pty Ltd (later renamed JCR) and the Trust were members of a Public Private Partnership (“the PPP”). I purchased the shares and units of PPP with the NSW government in 1994.

The PPP members were bound by conditions in 3 commercially defining documents: the Lease, the Service Agreement, and the Plan of Management.

In 1996 the Trust Board was reconstructed, removing the commercial members. The performance of the Trust suffered, and infrastructure maintenance backlogs occurred.

In 2001, the 99-year lease of Caves House was worth $11.33M according to my bank because it was developed from a zero-star rating to a superior 4-star standard. The bank then increased my loan to $5.8M.

From early 2002 onwards, there were frequent and serious breaches of the Trust’s obligations to maintain the infrastructure in the village and provide clean water as required by the Services Agreement and the Plan of Management.

In December 2003, the Trust, without my knowledge, met at Wombeyan Caves, Taralga, NSW. Bob Debus, Member for Blue Mountains, and Attorney General attended, as did Prof. Richard Mackay, Chair, Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (the Trust), and his board. At the meeting, Mackay and the Trust Board agreed not to be reappointed. They would have known that the 99-year lease, developed to a high standard, but was now worthless due to their decision.

In February 2004, Andrew Fletcher, Trust, General Manager commented on the decision at Wombeyan to not reappoint the Board. He said, ‘an Administrator can be appointed pursuant to Section 58ZE of the NPWS Act’. However, Mackay and his board did not protect the business owners when agreeing with the government, in December 2003, to not-reappoint the Board.

In May 2004, I signed a new loan contract with my bank. It included the bank’s essential documents, a Facility Offer, the St George Bank’s General Standard Terms, 2003 Code of Banking Practice, and its valuation of $11.33M (dated 18 February 2001), carried out by its valuers, A D Magin, Val No.2568, and R E Roberts Val No.1593.

Prior to my signing this new contract, the bank had reviewed events at Jenolan Caves but did not provide me with its report. I read the bank’s contract and under clause 25.1 of the 2003 Code of Banking Practice (‘the 2003 Code’) it had to, ‘exercise the care and skill of a prudent and diligent banker in selecting and applying credit assessment methods and forming an opinion on my ability to repay the loan’.

In July 2005, Gail Kelly and her directors would also have found this when the bank carried out another review of the Jenolan Caves businesses. Again, they did not provide me with a copy of their review. Jeff Shaw, who was acting for me, at that time, claimed that under the Act, governments and banks must comply with the law. He was previously NSW Attorney General and claimed the new government could not sell or transfer the lease.

In September 2005, my company could not continue paying the bank’s interest. The bank then appointed Receivers and Managers, despite knowing that Jenolan Caves visitor numbers had fallen from 270,000 in 1995 to 210,000 in 2004. The visitor number declined when the government relocated the administration and senior executives to Oberon and then to Bathurst. During this period, visitor numbers declined by 20%,

In November 2005, I wrote to Gail Kelly and requested ‘a meeting to address a preferred way forward that maintains the value of the asset and protect the rights of our companies, and to ensure all parties are protected.’ There was no reply, suggesting the bank’s dispute resolution procedures were not protecting customers like me. We later found that the bank misled millions of customers because none could resolve disputes free of charge.

The bank did not comply with the 2003 Code. Since 2003, Westpac’s managing director Dr. David Morgan knew that the federal government published recommendations made by John Howard’s Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation. It states:

The promotion of dispute resolution schemes is both beneficial for industry, and to the consumer. For industry, a dispute resolution scheme can be used as a marketing tool to differentiate itself from competitors. Whereas, for consumer, the promotion of a dispute resolution schemes informs them of their rights (p.116).

In June 2003, John McFarlane, Westpac’s current Chairman, also knew that the dispute resolution schemes inform customers of their rights. He was also the bankers’ association chair that published details of how the code will be monitored. Richard Viney, the association’s code reviewer, commented on this. He said:

The code has real teeth as I know of no other banking code in the world that is enforceable as a contract by the customer.

The 2003 Code, however, was dishonest, as small businesses and farmers could not resolve disputes free of charge. McFarlane and Morgan knew that the bank had provided a code that was not enforceable. It was, in fact, a dishonest scheme, or fraud.

In December 2005, the bank appointed Grant Thornton, Receivers and Managers. It required Paul Billingham, its director, to deal with serious misconduct that was happening at that time. Billingham did not comment on what caused the damages when my business relied on the Trust, but it was operated without a Trust Board. At that time, all documents filed at Caves House were retained by Grant Thornton.

Prior to March 2006, everything the bank, the Receivers and Managers, and the Trust did was done secretly. I wrote to Philip Crawford, Director, Henry Davis York, the bank’s external lawyers, and noted this but he did not respond. I wrote to Kelly requesting a meeting ‘to discuss an arrangement that will satisfy banks with minimal damage to both our businesses.’ Gail Kelly, like McFarlane and Morgan, would have known the bank’s dispute resolution procedures, published by the Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA), were a dishonest scheme.

On 6 June 2006, Billingham wrote to me, in my capacity as a director of Jenolan Caves Resort (JCR), and made a distressing statement. He said, ‘the lease has not been offered for sale and no unsolicited offers were received. A few days later, I wrote to St George Bank’s Chair, John Thame, claiming the bank had not complied with the 2003 Code.

On 27 June 2006, without telling me, St George Bank signed the ‘Jenolan Deed’ with NSW Government, thereby agreeing to sell and transfer my property. This was kept secret, which was intentional. When discovered, it took the businesses in the Jenolan village 10 years to access the Deed when a Tribunal ruled in our favour. We could now consider options to recover damages when the bank transferred the $12.5M lease to the NSW Government without, according to Billingham, offering it for sale.

Then the bank’s lawyers commenced an action in court to bankrupt me. At that time, we could not prove the bank had acted dishonestly or misled the court. In 2009, we could not prove the Internal Dispute Resolution (IDR) procedures were deceitful and we could not resolve disputes free of charge. The late Jeff Shaw, before he retired, could not prove that the bank’s directors had betrayed me and their other customers.

In October 2007, the bank and its lawyers again betrayed me. I filed complaints with the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee (‘CCMC’). The compliance monitors were required to ‘investigate and make a determination on whether my allegations were fair’. In 2012, the business owners were still angry about dishonest practices by the government and the bank. We met Steven Munchenberg, ABA, Managing Director, who offered to contact Westpac on behalf of Rosemarie Bayne, a Jenolan business owner, because the bank would not investigate our complaints free of charge. The bank, however, did not respond.

About ten years later, in October 2018, Jenolan business owners encouraged me to write to the Office of Australia Information Commissioner (OAIC) to obtain documents held by CCMC in relation to the bank’s misconduct. The documents noted Westpac and CCMC had concealed, or compounded crimes and that their lawyers and government were complicit. The OAIC noted the bank applied the 2004 Code in my case which was not part of my contract, and neither the government nor the bank was willing to pay us compensation as set out in CCMC’s Constitution. The parties alleged to have been involved were Dr. June Smith, Brian Given PSM, Nicola Howell, Carmel Franklin, Angela Green, and Ralph Haller-Trost.

Also, in 2018, I attended a protest meeting with several hundred small businesses and farmers at Parliament House. They claimed banking practices were dishonest, and they wanted to expand the Royal Commission. Some of them filed submissions with the Parliament and others with Commissioner Kenneth Hayne. In documents we discovered there was a clear intent by the bank when directors took an oath but tried to avoid telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. We believe the bank misled Kenneth Hayne by failing to provide all documents in relation to its misconduct and practices that fell below community standards since 2008.

We suggest Westpac did not include allegations that it had not always resolved disputes free of charge since 2008. We also believe Brian Hartzer misled Kenneth Hayne when questioned by Rowena Orr QC, in January and February 2018.

In 2019, Tasmania Small Business Council (TSBC) obtained crucial documents. In July, TSBC was advised by ASIC that there was a document omitted from clause 35.1(b) of the Code. It was ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001).

In November, TSBC’s Chair, Geoff Fader, was advised by Sean Hughes, ASIC Commissioner, that banks must comply with the code in place when loan contracts are signed. This supported Fader’s view that banks must comply with the code, otherwise, they would be attempting to obtain a financial advantage.

My financial loss report notes that my damages were $64M. Westpac should have dealt with this immediately. The Prime Minister should accept Prof. John Hewson’s views of 15 October 2022 when he suggested Australian banking misconduct is a problem that must be rectified.

Prime Minister Albanese and NSW Premier Dominic Perrottet will have to address these deceitful practices, so Australia does not become Banksters’ paradise.

ENDS

JMA’s Story

In 2005, the Jenolan Caves House lessee experienced financial difficulty following a decision by the government to not reappoint the Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (the Trust) Board. It meant the government breached the National Park and Wildlife Act; it was in breach of the Services Agreement. At the same time, St George Bank (the bank) recalled the lessee’s loan. The bank appointed Receivers and Managers and, on 6 June 2006, wrote to the lessee stating the lease had not been offered for sale nor had the government received any unsolicited offers. 

Ten days later, on 16 June 2006, the lessee filed a complaint with St George Bank’s Chairman, Mr. John Thame. It noted the bank must comply with the 2003 Code of Banking Practice. This was an essential part of the lessee’s loan contract, setting out the rights of the bank’s customers. The clauses referred to the St George Bank’s Chair included 25.2. It required banks to “try to help customers overcome financial difficulties.” The Chair also referred to clause 35.3, stating the bank will “within 21 days … complete its investigation and inform the customer of the outcome.” These practices did not happen. 

Instead of complying with this Code, the bank sold the property, with all furnishings in the hotel, to the government at 10% of the bank’s own valuation. As a result, many people like us working for the businesses suffered damages. 

This is our story. 

In 1990, a 99-year lease of Caves House was granted to Jenolan Caves Resort Pty Ltd (JCR), and there was a Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (the Trust) Board set up by an earlier Liberal Government. JCR and the Trust were members of the NSW Public Private Partnership. The members were bound by conditions in three commercially defining documents: the Lease, the Service Agreement, and the Plan of Management.  

In 1996, the Trust Board was restructured, removing most of its commercial members. The performance of the Trust suffered, and infrastructure maintenance backlogs occurred. From 2002, there were frequent and serious breaches to the Trust’s obligations to comply with the Plan of Management and to provide clean and potable water.  

In July 2003, the Trust carried out a review of Jenolan Caves Water Supply, which noted “water failures cause severe constraints on the operation of Caves House”. In August, the Trust Chairman, Mr. Richard McKay stated the Trust’s infrastructure was aging and that he had requested funding from the Treasury to replace breaking pipes.  

For the next three years, water problems at Jenolan Caves damaged all the businesses, and they could not operate profitably. The concerns were referred to the Trust, Office of Environment, Department of Premier and Cabinet, and government several ministers. These problems included an intermittent water supply, failure by the Trust to maintain and clean pipes, failure to replace lids on tanks, and failure to filter the water. As a result, the water was often muddy in colour and the hot water supply to the hotel failed frequently. 

The most important consequence of the Trust’s water failures was the presence of E-coli and other contaminants which were revealed through independent water tests. Guests to the hotel were reporting stomach problems after drinking the water and the resort was required to provide bottled water to the hotel’s visitors.  

In addition, tourist numbers at Jenolan Caves had fallen dramatically from 272,443 in 1996/97 to 214,453 in 2002/03. The decline in visitor numbers occurred following the restricting, by the new government, of the Trust Board with few commercial members. This greatly concerned the Jenolan Caves businesses. The businesses also expressed a view that declining visitor numbers were the result of increased ticket prices.  

The businesses were suffering when the government undermined the relationship between the Lessee and the bank. There was unreliable water supply, water toxicity, and decreasing visitor numbers. The Lessee was removed from managing the property on 9 December 2005 and the bank appointed Receivers and Managers to take control. For the three years between 2004 and 2006, the businesses relied on expert reports calling on the Trust to install filtration so the water it provided to the staff and guests was not potable and safe. Neither the Government nor the Trust relied on the expert’s reports.  

On 9 December 2005, St George Bank appointed Receivers and Managers without considering whether the government was still intending to acquire the lease and assets at a reduced cost. Without the Trust Board, owners of the lease could simply not refinance the property. 

On 16 June 2006, the Receivers and Managers wrote to the lessee stating they did not offer the lease for sale, nor did they receive unsolicited offers. A hotel without a continuous supply of potable water was unsalable. On 30 June 2006, the Lessee’s bank sold the 99-year lease back to the government at a significant discount. 

As a result of the government’s decision to provide unfiltered, toxic water to staff and guests for several years, everyone suffered except the government. When the government obtained the lease, it immediately installed filtration. Documents discovered several years later confirmed that the government, three months prior to acquiring the 99-years, had obtained quotes to install water filtration. 

Government’s Attempt to Destroy Jenolan Businesses by Failing to Meet Contractual Agreements  

On 3 September 2003, a review, approved by the government, stated that no public funds could be used to benefit the lessee of Caves House. The Trust was therefore unable to meet its duty to provide suitable water for human consumption, 24 hours a day.  

The Trust’s Manager, Peter Austen, had written to the lessee regarding a complaint about disruption to the water supply. He stated, “the Trust has little control over unpredictable events such as this. The Trust has at all times operated in accordance with the Service Agreement”. There were times when the award-winning 4½-star hotel restaurant was preparing meals for a large group of guests and water had to be carried in buckets from taps located in the village. 

The staff was desperate because they had to address these problems and deal with angry guests. The JMA Parties arranged for independent water tests, which found the water did contain E.coli and other pathogens. Sonic Healthcare supported these results, but the government and the Trust dismissed them claiming the water was safe. The Department of Health then found toxicity in the Trust’s water supply. Its results were kept from the lessee and the businesses for the next six months. The government simply continued to state, “the Trust denies your claim the water supplied to Caves House is unfit to drink”.  

On 14 October 2011, Mr. Templeton wrote a letter and provided a chronology regarding the water problems at Jenolan Caves. He sent it to the Attorney General and Minister for Justice, the Minister for Health, the Minister for Environment, Member for the Blue Mountains, and Member for Bathurst. A further copy was sent to the then Premier Barry O’Farrell, who later admitted to having an unreliable memory. 

On 28 March 2012, Mr. Paul Miller, General Counsel for the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, responded to Mr. Templeton on behalf of the Attorney General and the Minster for Justice replied. He stated: 

The Government is satisfied that matters relating to water quality at Jenolan Caves were adequately addressed at the time and has formed the view that any further inquiry is not warranted. 

On 10 May 2012, Ms. Rosemarie Bayne filed a Freedom of Information application under the GIPA Act regarding Mr. Miller’s reply. The documents provided by the government, maintained, at various intervals, that the water was adequately investigated. However, it claimed that neither the Government nor the Trust investigated all water problems between 2004 – 2006.  

St George Bank’s Unfair Contract 

The JMA Parties filed complaints with the bank for transferring the Jenolan lease to the Government without offering it for sale. This was shortly after banks were self-regulated and could breach contracts with impunity. JMA obtained a copy of the CCMC Association’s Constitution on 27 July 2012.  

By May 2004, St George Bank invited the lessee to sign a new contract to replace the older one. Given the previous seven-year relationship between the lessee and the bank, there was no reason to expect the bank would have invited the Cave House Lessee to sign a deceitful loan contract without full disclosure. St George Bank claimed it was a model banker and, under the contract, would investigate all complaints free of charge within 21 days. The bank did not intend to meet its responsibilities under the contract.  

Complaints to Bank and CCMC  

On 16 June 2006, the lessee filed a complaint with St George Bank, which laid out concerns that the bank disregarded allegations of unlawful behaviour by it and the government suggesting they had both acted dishonestly.  

The complaint referred to specific sections of the 2003 Code, alleging St George Bank had breached its contract. Clause 2.2 of this Code states the bank will act responsibly and ethically toward customers. Clause 25.2 states the bank “will try to help customers overcome financial difficulties with any credit facility it has with the bank”. 

The bank’s directors did not comply with these clauses when they were dealing with the Lessee. Instead of helping to sell the hotel for a fair price, the bank took control of the property ten days before selling the lease at a discount. At no time did the directors comply with the dispute process in clause 35 of the Code.  

On 30 June 2006, prior to amendments to the Act being assented to, the bank signed the Jenolan Deed that remained secret for a long time. On 3 October 2007, the lessee filed a complaint with the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee (CCMC). It responded by stating it could not investigate complaints lodged more than a year after the event or a year after the complaint was known. This was not included in the 2003 Code, but part of the 2004 Code. On 27 July 2012, Ms. Bayne obtained a copy of the CCMC’s constitution, which had been concealed since February 2004.  

During this period, JMA Parties filed several complaints with the CCMC regarding the bank’s knowledge of the unlawful appointment of the Trust’s Administrator in February 2004, and the CCMC’s secret constitution. None of these allegations were carried out as required under the dispute resolution procedures in the 2003 Code.  

Premier Barry O’Farrell and Minister Robin Parker.  

In 2014, the lessee attended Sydney Local Court and attempted to require the government and the bank to comply with 2013 subpoenas. On 24 April 2014, the Crown Solicitor’s Office, acting for the Trust and the Department of Premier and Cabinet, attended the court without complying with subpoenas. On 24 April, the Premier was Mike Baird, and the proper Minister was Rob Stokes. Legal Aid suggested the government may have perverted the course of justice. 

Alleged Invalid Appointment  

On 2 December 2003, Premier Bob Carr signed recommendations that the government would replace the Trust board. When making the decision, Carr had access to the Special Review, which did not recommend the board be replaced. However, the following day, the Cabinet approved recommendations to replace the Trust Board.  

On 12 December 2004, Shadow Minister for Environment issued a press release. The lease said, “there is a strong belief that the way the government is running the cave is illegal.” It also said, “the Minister can only appoint an administrator if he sacks the Trust.”  

On 24 March 2011, retiring Members of Parliament, provided JMA copies of records in relation to Jenolan and Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust’s matters. They included a bundle of papers (more than 1000 pages) containing details of the Liberal and Nationals supporting documents for statements they made in Parliament in support of our allegations that the appointment of the administrator was invalid. The documents included advice by Robertson, T, SC, regarding the allegedly unlawful appointment, which was presented to the Members of Parliament that day. 

The administrator’s appointment was an essential part of the government’s case. It allowed the government to acquire the Caves House at a discount. The appointment of the Trust’s administrator without removing the Trust Board meant that the government had acted unlawfully. 

Court Date: 24 April 2014  

There were several GIPA applications filed in 2013 and 2014 to determine whether the government acted lawfully. Regardless, the Trust, DPC, OEH, and the responsible ministers did not comply with subpoenas prior to attending court on 24 April 2014. Mr. Field was acting on behalf of his mother. However, she died on that day, and Field would then be acting on behalf of his mother’s estate.  

Mr. Field, therefore, did not attend court, appointing a lawyer to represent him and his mother’s rights. He had commenced the action one year earlier to protect his mother’s interests because there was a considerable body of documents alleging the government did not act lawfully. This continued until the day that the lawyer attended the court. Field’s lawyer sought a ruling by the court that the government had not acted diligently when purchasing his family’s furnishings and assets in 2006.  

On 24 April 2014, the Local Court, Small Claims Division found against Mr. Field, stating that he did not have to stand in the court to bring this case. This was not considered relevant by Magistrate Prowse when the Scone Court agreed, with the consent of the government, for the subpoenas to be filed in 2013. It was now, one year later, and the court in Sydney had completely changed its opinion.  

When the matter was before the court on 24 April 2014, the Trust Administrator was Dianne Leeson, Assistant Director General, DPC, and the responsible minister was Premier Mike Baird. There is no evidence that the DPC rectified the conduct of Assistant Director General Leeson, nor did Premier O’Farrell follow the 24 April 2014 court case. 

The JMA Parties believed the government’s decision not to investigate the ownership the late Jackeline Field’s furnishings, not owned by the company, introduced serious concerns that no reasonable person would have allowed happening. The decision by the Trust and the government was simply theft. 

The government’s decision in 2013 to not investigate these allegations was not dealt with by the government when failing to comply with the court’s subpoenas. In 2014, without complying with subpoenas, Baird, Stokes, and Speakman appear to have acted unconscionably. 

Conclusion  

Prior to 2003, JMA businesses experienced good profits, however, they were unaware of the way the Council on the Cost and Quality of Government report was being created. It would be used to change the administrative structure of the Trust, and to demonstrate the government’s unwillingness to meet contractual obligations.  

Since 2004, the Trust’s Administrator refused to accept the government acted dishonestly by not providing a continuous supply of potable water. It also meant there would be no intention by Premiers and members of government to address events that had destroyed families’ businesses and people’s lives since April 2003. 

On 10 November 2005, The Hon Michael Baird had been NSW Premier for 18 months. He and his government’s ministers took no action when receiving advice from retired Court of Appeal Judge, The Hon RP Meagher AO QC, who stated: 

There is, on the facts, no dispute that the Trust is in default of its obligations. The water it provides (when it does provide) is hopelessly far from potable. Noxious weeds abound, and nobody has cared to eradicate them. These facts are not only asserted by Jenolan Caves Resort but have been admitted by the Trust in a letter from its chairman. 

The evidence suggests Baird’s government did not comply with the law. However, it could also be argued the deceitful practices of St George Bank allowed the NSW government to recover Caves House, rated superior by AAA Tourism at 4½ stars. The bank and Gail Kelly helped Mike Baird and his government to recover the $12.5M property for only a fraction of its value. 

The bank’s directors played a significant role in allowing these events to happen. In 2021, the JMA Parties discovered the bank, by omitting ASIC Regulatory Guide 165 (2001) in the 2003 Code, had a clear intent to commit a crime. This is one of Australia’s greatest stories. The victims were people and businesses in the Jenolan village who did not suspect these deceitful practices by a leading bank and the NSW government.  

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